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Abstract 
 
Much research has been devoted to the story of Taiwan’s post-war economic 
development. The neo-classical economists argue that its government created a free 
market economy which led to rapid economic growth. The revisionists, Robert Wade 
and Alice Amsden, address the role of the state in formulating and leading the 
economic miracle. One of the characteristics of the Taiwanese economy was that the 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were found in great numbers (around 
90%) in Taiwanese manufacturing industry. These SMEs were export-oriented and 
contributed greatly to the export growth in the 1970s and the 1980s. The success of 
the Taiwanese manufacturing SMEs was usually attributed to the market and the 
development policies which the state established and enforced.  
However, the existing literature ignores (1) the further development of the 
SMEs after the late 1980s; (2) the role which Taiwanese society played in the rise and 
the development of the SMEs. This ignorance over-estimates the role of the state in 
the development of the SMEs in the post-war era. The present dissertation re-
examines the argument of the neo-classical economists and the revisionists by finding 
a historical pattern and tracing the further development of the SMEs after the late 
1980s. To what extent did the market established by the state and the state 
development policy supported the rise and the development of the Taiwanese 
manufacturing SMEs from 1950 to 1980? What puts into question the influences of 
the state on the SMEs after the late 1980s? Why did the state have limited influences 
on the SMEs after the late 1980s?  
The dissertation finds that Wade and Amsden over-estimated the role of the 
state in the rise and development of the SMEs by explaining the limited influences of 
the state on the SMEs after the late 1980s. The research, by clarifying the relation of 
the state, market and social institutions from the historical pattern, demonstrates that 
the social institutions are adapted to the changing environment and continuously 
provided important financial sources to facilitate the SMEs’ business operations from 
1950 to 2000.  
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Part I. Introduction 
When the Kuomintang (KMT) lost the second Chinese Civil War in 1949 and 
retreated to Taiwan, conflicts continued across the Taiwan Strait. From 1949 to 1979, 
battles and bombings continued. During this period, despite the military and political 
resistance, Taiwan’s post-war economic development was a successful model for 
other developing countries. In 1956 GDP per capita in Taiwan was USD 232.74; in 
1986 it had increased to USD 6618.29.1 In the 1950s the major export was agricultural 
products; by the 1980s the major export products had become manufacturing goods. 
In addition to the rapid economic growth and industrial transformation, the Gini 
coefficient was low.  
One of the features of the Taiwanese economy was that the small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) proliferated in great numbers (around 90%) in 
Taiwanese manufacturing industry. These SMEs were export-oriented and contributed 
greatly to the growth in exported goods in the 1970s and 1980s.2 Moreover, research 
indicates that the great number of SMEs led to the low Gini coefficient in Taiwan. 
The success of the Taiwanese manufacturing SMEs and the rapid growth of the 
Taiwanese economy were usually attributed to the successful state-led development 
model. The role of the government in supporting the development of the 
manufacturing SMEs and creating economic prosperity is considered significant.   
Much research has been done regarding the story of Taiwan’s post-war 
economic development. This dissertation re-examines the argument of the neo-
classical economists and the state-led development model proposed by Robert Wade 
and Alice Amsden, regarding the role of the state in the rise and development of the 
Taiwanese manufacturing SMEs in the post-war period. To what extent did the 
market established by the state and the state development policy supported the rise 
and the development of the Taiwanese manufacturing SMEs from 1950 to 1980? 
What raised doubts about the influences of the state on the SMEs after the late 1980s? 
Why did the state have limited influence on the SMEs after the late 1980s?  
One strand of the existing literature highlighted the significance of the free 
market economy which the Taiwanese government created for the upsurge in private 
                                                      
1
 Heston, Alan,  Summers, Robert, and Aten, Bettina, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Centre for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
September 2006. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php. (accessed 11 January 
2011). 
2
 Small and Medium Enterprise Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan R.O.C. 
(Taiwan), White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Taiwan, 2005 (Taipei, 2006) pp.1-2. 
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enterprises. It argues that the government established a suitable environment with a 
market mechanism for manufacturing SMEs to prosper. This strand of the literature is 
usually questioned, because similar institutions do not necessarily create economic 
prosperity in other countries. Therefore, in the other strand of the literature, scholars 
such as Robert Wade and Alice Amsden address the significance of the state in 
Taiwan’s post-war development. This group of scholars considers that the state has 
done more than create a suitable environment. The development policies established 
the institutions, created the incentives and guided and directed the development of the 
manufacturing SMEs. The prosperity of the manufacturing SMEs was planned, 
supported, guided and directed by different policies of the government at different 
stages of their development. It is also worth noting that the state’s ability to do all 
these things related to the type of political system that Taiwan had in the post-war 
period.  
A free market economy can create a suitable environment; however, a suitable 
environment does not necessarily create prosperity for the manufacturing SMEs. The 
state-led economic development model argued by Wade and Amsden raises the 
question: did the state’s policies directly or indirectly lead to the prosperity of the 
SMEs? The first strand of the literature focuses on the market mechanism, while the 
second strand of the literature addresses the role of the state. Both ignore the part 
played by Taiwanese society in the rise and development of the SMEs. In other 
words, both strands of the literature regard Taiwanese society as a passive receiver of 
a market mechanism and of the state’s policies.  
This dissertation first tries to fill the gap of knowledge about the dynamics of a 
society which supported the development of the manufacturing SMEs and facilitated 
manufacturing SME business operations from 1950 to 2000. Although it is not new to 
address the role of society in the development of SMEs, this dissertation further 
identifies a historical pattern in order to describe how the social institutions 
transformed and provided support to the SMEs under institutional changes. When 
analysing Taiwan’s post-war economic development, the existing literature usually 
focuses on the post-war period from 1949 to the 1980s. Few have examined the 
historical heritage before 1949 and the further development of the SMEs after the late 
1980s. The omission of historical heritage and continuity over-estimates the role of 
the state in the rise and the development of the manufacturing SMEs in the post-war 
period and under-estimates also the dynamics of the society which supported the 
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manufacturing SMEs. This dissertation traces socio-economic history back to 1522 
and creates a historical model in order to see the historical heritage as it relates to the 
dynamics of the Taiwanese society in its trade and business operations.  
The research project finds that Wade and Amsden over-estimate the role of the 
state in the rise and the development of the manufacturing SMEs, whereas the 
neoclassical economists over-estimate the role of the market established by the state 
in the rise and the post-war development of the manufacturing SMEs. Both the state 
and the market which the state established gave only limited support to the 
manufacturing SMEs’ capital formation and turn-over fund. It was the state which, 
without meaning to, created a space for the social institutions to provide financial 
support to the SMEs. And this social dynamics which supported the SMEs financially 
in their post-war development continuously facilitated SME business operations 
across the Taiwan Strait under the government’s restrictions from the late 1980s to 
2000. The Taiwanese SME investment in China after the late 1980s questions the role 
of the state in the post-war development era. It shows that the state had only a limited 
influence on the manufacturing SME business because the manufacturing SMEs did 
not rely on state support, contrary to Wade and Amsden’s interpretation; instead, the 
reliance on social institutions for capital sources avoided the state’s constraints on 
their pursuing economic interest in China. The social dynamics of the social 
institution was inherited from the historical pattern and adapted it to the changing 
environment. 
The present dissertation has six parts. The first part provides a general 
historical background, literature review and theoretical framework for the structure of 
the dissertation. The second part traces a historical pattern from 1522 to 1945. The 
historical pattern concerns the operation of trade and business under different political 
and economic institutions in order to identify the function of social dynamics in 
Taiwanese economic history. The third part re-examines the role of the state, the 
market and social institutions in the rise and the development of SMEs from 1949 to 
1980. The fourth part shows the evidence that the government had only a limited 
influence on the further development of the Taiwanese SMEs. The fifth part then 
explains how and why the government had such limited influence. The sixth part 
concludes with the findings from this dissertation. 
 
4 
 
Chapter 1 Historical Background, 1949-1980 
The turning point in modern Taiwanese economic history was caused by two 
significant historical events: the political struggle between the two modern Chinese 
political parties: the Kuomintang (the KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (the 
CCP); and the U.S. intervention in cross-strait relations in 1950. The second Chinese 
Civil War broke out in 1945. 3 The CCP finally won the war and the KMT retreated to 
Taiwan in 1949.4 Political and military tensions, however, continued across the strait. 
In 1949 the Truman Administration decided not to intervene in the Chinese Civil War. 
However, the Sino-Soviet Treaty and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 
changed U.S. attitudes towards the KMT government in Taiwan. The Sino-Soviet 
Treaty was signed on 14 February 1950; it shows that the CCP government of the 
New China decided to ally itself with the USSR. The Korean War broke out on 25 
June and two days later the U.S. Seventh Fleet was deployed to the Taiwan Strait. 
Further allies and economic aid to the KMT government in Taiwan were 
implemented by the Eisenhower administration from 1953.5  The alliance with the 
U.S. and the economic aid played a significant role in Taiwan’s post-war economic 
development. The U.S. intervention created temporary peace across the strait and the 
economic aid stabilised the economic situation in the early post-war period. 6 From 
then on, the Cold War influenced the U.S. strategy in Far East Asia and the 
consequent changes facilitated Taiwan’s post-war economic development.  
 
                                                      
3
 The first Chinese Civil War began in 1927 and had an intermission in 1937 when the Japanese 
invaded China. From 1927 the KMT government castigated the Soviet Republic of China as rebels and 
began to wage war on bandits. In 1934 the CCP was forced to leave Jiangxi and began the ‘Long 
March’. This was the retreat movement of the CCP; the massive military retreat was from the east to 
the north and west and the troops traversed 8,000 miles over 370 days. The journey passed through 
some of the most difficult terrain in western China and finally the Communist army arrived in Shaanxi. 
The KMT army under the command of Chiang Kai-Shek continued to suppress the Communist troops 
until 1937 although during the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP and the KMT, at certain stages, 
cooperated and fought against Japan. Without cooperation, the Japanese empire would have wiped out 
both sides. For further details see Wang, Guande, Liu, Chenzong, Li, Huachen, Zhongguo 
gongchandan shi (Taipei, 2003); Dang De Wenxian Bianjibu, Zhonggong danshi zhongda shijian 
shushi (Beijing, 1993). 
4
 Yang, Zhenya and Su Zhongpo, Guogong liandan guanxi shi (Nanjing, 1990); Lin, Da, Guogong 
neizhan: huguo yu jiefan, (Taipei, 2006).  
5
 Garver, Joha, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in 
Asia, (London, 1977); Lasater, Martin, U.S. Interests in the New Taiwan (Oxford, 1993); Leffler, 
Melvyn, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952,” in the Cambridge History of 
the Cold War, eds. Leffler, Melvyn P. and Wesrad, Odd Arne (Cambridge, 2010) vol.1, pp. 67-89; Niu 
Jun “The Birth of the People’s Republic of China and the Road to the Korean War,” in the Cambridge 
History of the Cold War, eds. Leffler, Melvyn P. and Wesrad, Odd Arne (Cambridge, 2010) vol.1, pp. 
221-243. 
6
 Huang, Xiurong, Guogong guanxi qishi nian (Guangdong, 1998).  
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Taiwan’s economic development model was popular in the 1980s and the 
1990s. Much has been written about the successful model of the Four Asian Tigers. 
The focus of this research lies in the role of the state in leading economic 
development. Gerschenkron indicates that state intervention was a substitute for 
industrialization and economic development in backward countries. According to 
him, state intervention could compensate for the lack of the prerequisites for 
modernization, notably the inadequate supplies of capital, skilled labour, 
entrepreneurship and technology capacity.7 Moreover, he believed that institutional 
reforms could remedy some of the backwardness which retarded economic growth; 
and clearly, institutional reforms demand government participation.8 In the history of 
Taiwan’s post-war economic development, the KMT government usually fitted into 
the Gerschenkronian model. 
The present historical review is based upon the Gerschenkronian model in 
showing how the KMT government reformed institutions and compensated for the 
lack of prerequisites for the further development of the manufacturing SMEs at 
different stages; it is based upon the needs of Taiwan’s economy and the changing 
international economic environment from 1949 to 1980. This chapter outlines the 
history of Taiwan’s post-war industrialisation and economic development from 1949 
to 1980. It focuses on showing how the state began industrialisation, established a 
market and designed the development programme and how its development policies 
guided and assisted the rise and development of the manufacturing SMEs.  
 
1-1. Post-war Industrialisation of Taiwan 1945-1980 
After the war, the Taiwanese economy was in a bad situation. The first severe 
problem was inflation. In addition, the production of the two main agricultural crops, 
rice and sugar, had sharply declined in 1945, having gradually reduced from 1942.9 
Regarding the population, the defeat in the Chinese Civil War forced the KMT 
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officials, soldiers and their families to retreat to Taiwan.10 The economic inflation, the 
reduction in agricultural production and the sudden increase of population made the 
post-war situation very difficult.  
In these circumstances, the first step to restore the economy began with the 
adjustment of the agriculture sector. In 1945 77.6% of the arable land was dominated 
by the landlords who comprised only 2.03% of the total Taiwanese population. 
Conversely, the peasants dominated 88.3% of the total population but owned only 
22.4% of the arable land. 70% out of the total peasant population were tenant- 
farmers. Moreover, the rent for their land ranged from 50% to 70% of their total 
earnings.11  These statistics indicate that the high level of rent lowered the living 
standard of the peasants and reduced their incentive to increase production. Therefore, 
the aims of the government were to create such an incentive and to transfer the land 
capital to the industrial sector.  
There were four significant policies concerning land reform in Taiwan: The 
‘Land-to-the-tiller’ programme (in 1947), reduction of the farm rents programme (in 
1949), the programme to exchange of rice for fertiliser (in 1950) and the ‘sale of the 
Republic’s land’ programme (in 1951). 12  The land reform policies increased 
agricultural production and the percentage of tenant-farmers went down from 36% in 
1952 to 7% in 1980.13 Meanwhile, the landholders whose lands were purchased were 
compensated with government securities and bonds. The compensation included 70% 
of the government land bonds (ten-year liquidation with a 4% annual interest rate). 
The other 30% included the stocks of the four largest state-owned enterprises (the 
cement industry, paper-making, mining and forestry), which facilitated the subsequent 
privatization of these state-owned enterprises.14 The holding of government securities 
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and bonds led the landholders’ families to see it as tradable capital. The policy 
translated land capital into private business capital in the market; around seven 
hundred million Yuan of the land capital was transferred to the industrial sector.15  
The KMT government then saw the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) 
policy as the means to collect and transfer agricultural capital over to modern 
industry. In the early stage of the ISI policy, the main exports focused on agricultural 
products, in particular sugar (sugar was the main export in the 1950s accounting for 
50% of Taiwanese exports).16 The fundamental problem for ISI policies is that all the 
needed capital goods and raw materials for development have always had to be 
imported. The government needs capital to import these necessary goods. The export 
sector (in the early post-war stage, typically of primary commodities, because they 
were not needed for industrialisation) usually paid for the ISI programme through 
heavy taxes. Therefore, the incentives for exporting reduced when the need for 
importing increased. The situation can be found in most Latin American countries. 
Such problem did not occur in Taiwan because of government policies and the U.S. 
aid.  
The ISI programme was carried out in conjunction with other measures, such 
as tariffs, import controls and multiple exchange rates, in order to save capital and 
develop domestic industry. 17  The KMT government then transferred the foreign 
capital (earned from agricultural exports) and raw materials (or other necessary 
machinery for the development of modern industry) into developing light industries 
(in particular the textile industry) in Taiwan. At the same time, in order to increase the 
incentives for export, the government established the indirect tax rebate system for 
exporting industries.18 
Another significant factor is the U.S. influences on Taiwanese ISI. The U.S. 
aid during this period was vital in stabilizing and enhancing Taiwanese economic 
transformation.19 Figure 1-1 shows the allocations of U.S. economic aid by sector of 
the economy from 1951-1965. The largest amount of U.S. economic aid went to 
infrastructure; a large percentage of it was also spent on human resources and on 
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industry. Figure 1-2 shows the U.S. aid and foreign capital inflow as a percentage of 
domestic savings and domestic investment. The ratio of U.S. aid capital inflow to 
domestic investment dominated at 30% to 50%. Jacob indicates that the U.S. foreign 
aid helped pay for the imported goods and raw materials and the U.S. military 
assistance programme also helped to reduce unemployment and implemented local 
resources for infrastructure contracts.20  
 
Figure 1-1. Allocation of the U.S. Economic Aid by Sector of the Economy in Taiwan 
(%), 1951-1965 
 
  
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book, (Taipei, 1962 and 1966), p.121, p.136. 
 
Figure 1-2. U.S. Aid and Foreign Capital Inflow as a Percentage of Domestic Savings 
and Domestic Investment (%), 1951-1965 
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Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), 
National Income in Taiwan Area, the Republic of China (Taipei, 1981), p.249, p. 254. 
Note: 1. Domestic saving refers to savings generated domestically, exclusive of foreign transfer 
receipts. 2. As U.S. aid was terminated in 1965, column (2) includes only foreign capital inflow after 
1961; before this, it refers to U.S. aid. 
 
The impact of the land reform and the ISI programme on the early 
development of the SMEs can be appreciated from the rise of the small-scale 
processing industry and the labour surplus in the rural areas. There are two different 
opinions on the emergence of small-scale processing factories in the rural areas. 
Research by Park and Johnston indicates that in the mid-1950s, with the increase of 
rural income, the need for services and simple consumer goods increased. This led to 
the early stage of SME development in Taiwan, a stage which was mainly rural-based 
and to do with food processing. 21 
Nonetheless, some researchers indicate that, although the land reform policies 
and the improvement of agricultural technology increased agricultural production, the 
living standard of the peasants was not improved. The government, on the one hand, 
exploited the agricultural surplus by imposing taxes and exchanging rice for fertiliser. 
On the other hand, the government held down the price of agricultural products. 
Moreover, the ‘land-to-the-tillers’ programme scattered the cultivated land. The plots 
became smaller and the improvements in technology brought a labour surplus to the 
rural areas. This led people in the rural area to take part-time jobs. The research shows 
that the smaller the amount of cultivated land per family, the higher the percentage of 
part-time workers. In the mid-1950s this induced the emergence in the rural areas of 
food processing SMEs. 22 
The land reform increased the labour surplus for light industry and the ISI 
programme created a market for the development of the SMEs mainly in the food 
processing industry. Although the SMEs appeared in the mid-1950s, their scale and 
contribution were barely noticeable. The further development was affected by the 
policy changes in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
Some economic problems and external factors in the late 1950s led the ISI 
policy to change to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI). There are two popular 
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explanations for the policy changes in the late 1950s. The first concerns the problems 
of the domestic economy. Analysis shows that there was overproduction from the 
light industries because the domestic market was small and unable to absorb 
domestically produced goods. This caused an industrial slowdown in the mid- and late 
1950s.23 Meanwhile, the emergence of the SMEs in the food processing industry in 
the rural areas also implied the problem of a labour surplus. Figure 1-3 shows the 
unemployment rate in Taiwan from 1953 to 1980. It is clear that from 1953 to 1966 
the unemployment rate remained above 5%. The second factor is the adjustment of 
the U.S. policy. As Lin and Chen’s research indicates, the U.S. government re-
examined its economic aid policy in 1959 and began gradually to reduce its economic 
aid to Taiwan. This reduction gave the KMT government problems in the balance of 
payments of deficits and too little foreign exchange to continue the ISI policy.24 
 
Figure 1-3. Unemployment Rate in Taiwan (%), 1951-1989 
  
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Republic of China (Taipei, 1981), p.335. 
 
Both internal and external problems in the early 1960s affected the changes of 
policy to EOI. The EOI policy focused on attracting FDI to Taiwan and encouraging 
exports. With the rising production costs in some of the developed countries, such as 
the U.S.A. and Japan, these corporations began looking to invest where production 
costs would be cheaper. In order to attract FDI, the government launched a series of 
policies to control the price of agricultural products and maintain the standard of 
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living of the peasants at subsistence in order to push surplus labour forces in the rural 
sector to the industrial sector in which foreign enterprises were investing. 25 Figure 1-
4, below, shows that the largest amount of foreign investment lay in the textile, 
chemicals and electronic machinery sectors. These sectors are typically labour- 
intensive and require large numbers of cheap workers. The Taiwanese economy 
provided foreign firms with sufficient labour at a low cost, who came from the rural 
areas in particular. Moreover, the KMT government established Export Processing 
Zones (EPZs) for the FDI and encouraged exports through tax exemptions for 
exporters within the EPZs. The benefits of the foreign investment included technology 
transfers, the opening of the international market and gradually increased exports. 26 
 
Figure 1-4. Foreign Investment Commitments by Industry and Origin (%), 1952-1975 
 
  
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), Report of Economic Growth 
and Structural Change in Taiwan (Taipei, 1975), p.249. 
 
The EOI policy in the 1960s significantly influenced the rise of the SMEs by 
opening the export market and by the amount of knowledge transferred from the 
foreign factories in the EPZs. In the mid-1960s, the government encouraged SMEs to 
go abroad themselves with the support of special loans, technology, tax exemptions 
and preferential terms. At the same time, most of the SME owners in the early period 
of EIO policy learned skills and knowledge from the foreign factories in the EPZs. 
                                                      
25
 Shi, Jizeng “Nong gong buman jian gongzhi chayi yu laoli yidong-shuang xiang chuli zhi guanzi,” 
Taiwan renli zhiyuan huiyi lunwen (Taipei, 1979). 
26
 Gold, T., op.cit., pp.57-74.  
12 
 
Later, many of them started their own businesses. 27 When these foreign corporations 
found that the Taiwanese SME subcontracting system could provide cheaper 
production costs, they placed order within the subcontracting system rather than 
setting up their own factories in the EPZs. This change increased the numbers and 
profits of the Taiwanese SMEs. Although the 1970s saw an oil crisis and decline of 
FDI in Taiwan, the Taiwanese SMEs had replaced the large foreign enterprises and 
become the main contributor to the growth in Taiwanese exports. 28  
 
1-2. Results of the Economic Development and the Contribution of the SMEs to the 
Taiwan’s Rapid Economic Growth 
  In the late 1970s the major economic structure was transformed from the 
model of the early 1950s. Figure 1-5 below shows the growth rate of manufacturing 
industry by sectors from 1951 to 1979. It is clear that the growth rate of the food 
processing industry remained high from the early 1950s; and it was overtaken by the 
growth rate of electrical machinery at the end of the 1970s. The growth rate of 
electrical machinery showed a steep upward curve as time went by. Moreover, the 
export structures also responded to the changing structure of manufacturing industry. 
Figure 1-6 presents the export structure in Taiwan in 1953 and in 1979. It shows 
clearly that in 1953 the dominant group of exported goods was in processed foods; 
conversely, in 1979 export goods were dominated by industrial products.  
  The contribution of the SMEs can be analyzed from the changing export 
structure and the growth rate of manufacturing industry. Figures 1-7, 1-8 and 1-9, 
below, present the sources of manufacturing output growth by industry group from 
1956 to 1976. It is clear that the food processing industry contributed the largest 
percentage of export expansion; yet the largest percentage of export expansion in the 
1960s shifted to electronic machinery. In the 1970s, textiles, electronic machinery, 
and manufacturing rose quickly. Figure 1-10 below shows the export commodities 
from 1953 to 1970. The statistics indicate the commodities of different sectors for 
                                                      
27
 It is believed that employers would acquire wealth more effectively and rapidly than employees. This 
idea was also related to the historical lack of a social welfare system in Taiwan, which motivated 
people to earn more money and take care of themselves. For further details, see Kuo, Shirley W. Y. and 
Fei, John C. H., The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic 
of China 1952-1979 (Colorado, 1981). 
28
 Wang, Yiding “Maoyi zhengce,” in Taiwan jingyen Sishi nan 1949-1989, eds. Gao, Xijun and Li 
Cheng (Taipei, 1991), pp.204-231; Liu, Bangli, ‘Zhanho Taiwan weishanxin maoyi wanlu de jiango’, 
Taiyin jikan, vol.47, no.1 (1996), pp.125-150; Chu, Wan Wen “Japanese General Trading Companies 
in Taiwan,” ISSP Working Paper Series, vol.90, no.3 (1989). 
13 
 
export and the changing percentages making up the total of goods exported during 
this period. By tradition, sugar had always dominated the exported commodities and 
was always a vital economic crop for Taiwan from the colonial period. In 1970, 
however, the percentage of electrical appliances soared. As shown in Zhou and Lin’s 
book, from the 1960s to the 1990s, the SMEs dominated more than 90% of 
manufacturing industry.  Figure 1-11 shows the contribution of Taiwan’s SMEs to 
foreign exports. It is clear that SMEs accounted for 80%-90% of Taiwan’s foreign 
exports from the late 1960s to the 1980s.29 The evidence shows the significance of the 
SMEs in manufacturing industry and their contribution to Taiwan’s export growth. 
 
Figure 1-5. Rapid Growth Rate of Food Processing, Textiles and Footwear and 
Electrical Machinery Industries, 1951-1979 (1979=100) 
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Source: R.O.C. Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book, (Taipei, 1962, 1966 and 1980), p.14, p.14 and p.1.  
Note: FP= food processing industry; TF= textile industry; EM= footwear, electrical and machinery 
industries. 
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Figure 1-6. Comparison of Export Structure in Taiwan in 1953 and in 1979 (%) 
  
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book (Taipei, 1980), pp.203-204; Ministry of Finance, Executive Yuan R.O.C. 
(Taiwan), Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports, no. 101 (1978), pp.131-132. 
 
Figure 1-7.Sources of Manufacturing Output Growth in Taiwan by Industry (%), 
1956-1961 
 
 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book (Taipei, 1984), p.33-34. 
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Figure 1-8. Sources of Manufacturing Output Growth in Taiwan by Industry (%), 
1961-1971 
 
 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan R.O.C.(Taiwan), Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book (Taipei, 1984), pp.33-34. 
 
Figure 1-9. Sources of Manufacturing Output Growth in Taiwan by Industry (%), 
1971-1976 
  
 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book (Taipei, 1984), pp.33-34. 
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Figure 1-10. Major Exports of Commodities in Taiwan (%) 1953-1970 
  
 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book (Taipei, 1980), pp.203-204. 
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Figure 1-11. Imports and Exports of the Taiwanese Manufacturing SMEs (%), 1972-
1980 
  
Source: Bureau of Economic Research, Central Bank of  the R.O.C., The Survey of Industrial Financial 
Situations in Taiwan, Republic of China, 1973-1995, (Taipei, 1996), pp.15-37. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
  Discussions on Taiwan’s economic development have been popular since the 
1980s. These discussions has touched on the different disciplines of economics and 
political economy, mainly focused on explaining Taiwan’s success by clarifying the 
key factors which contributed its rapid economic growth. The conventional view 
usually highlights the significant role of government in its development process; the 
differences lie in the levels and means discerned of the government’s intervention. 
Two broad groups of writers may be identified on this basis: the neoclassical 
economists and the state-led development model of Robert Wade and Alice Amsden. 
  The neoclassical economists suggest that it was the free market economy 
established by the state that enabled private business to develop. These writers do not, 
however, specify the particular support that a free market might give to the rise and 
development of SMEs. They claim that the state created and maintained a suitable 
environment, but without picking any winners for the market. It was the mechanism 
of a free market economy that led to the development and prosperity of the SMEs. 
Robert Wade and Alice Amsden, however, argue that the state of the Taiwanese 
government did more than create a free market economy. The state governed the 
market and provided both direct and indirect support to the rise and the development 
of the manufacturing SMEs. These two theoretical frameworks are most popular in 
explaining Taiwan’s post-war economic success.  
  The state-led model of Wade and Amsden is the most used theoretical 
framework to explain why and how Taiwan enjoyed such rapid economic growth, in 
particular when Taiwan’s post-war economic development is compared with that in 
Latin America. They argue that the actions of the state made all the difference. This 
chapter reviews these two groups of theories with a specific focus on the impact of the 
state and of the market on the rise and development of the manufacturing SMEs. The 
first section reviews the general theoretical frameworks of the two groups for 
Taiwan’s growth. The second section then focuses on the way in which these theories 
explain the rise and development of the manufacturing SMEs in the post-war period. 
The third section raises questions based upon the review of the literature. Finally,   
hypothesis of this research is formulated on the basis of the questions and the 
literature on the two theoretical models. 
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2.1. The Role of the State and the Market in Taiwan’s Economic Development 
  The first group of writers analyses Taiwan’s economic development within the 
theoretical framework of neoclassical economists. One strand in this group, the free 
market (FM) theory, argues that Taiwan’s success was founded on the establishment 
of a free market economy. The success of a free market is that it efficiently allocates 
resources, encourages competition among private businesses and leads to rapid 
economic growth. Another strand, the simulated-free market (SM) theory, indicates 
that Taiwan’s success was attributable to the government which created an adequate 
environment for economic activity. In this view, the government controlled certain 
institutions in order to facilitate the allocation of resources. For example, Stiglitz 
indicates that the governments in North East Asia successfully create a suitable 
market, controlling banking and finance institutions and directing and supplementing 
the actions of the private sector in the market. Although this strand supports the idea 
that government needs to play a certain role in economic development, it believes that 
less government intervention and more liberalisation policies would speed up 
economic growth. The key point is that the government provides the climate for trade 
and economic activity, but does not replace the market.30  
  Some economic analysts support the neoclassical theory. Young, Kim and Lau 
clarify the dynamics of Taiwan’s post-war rapid economic growth in these terms. 
Their analysis shows that productivity was not the engine for East Asian rapid 
economic growth. 31  On the contrary, the rapid growth was contributed by ‘the rise in 
participation rates, investment to GDP ratios, and educational standards and the 
intersectoral transfer of labour from agriculture to other sectors with higher value 
added per worker’ 32 . These factors indicate the significant role played by the 
government in creating a suitable market. 
  The second group of writers does not accept neoclassical economists and 
usually condemns its approach for focusing on economic issues and performance and 
ignoring the impact of different types of political regime on economic development. 
Wade, for example, argues that both free market theory and simulated market theory 
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can explain only in part the Taiwanese development story. He indicates that the FM 
and SM theories ignore the impact of political arrangements on economic 
development and these liberalisation policies (or semi-liberalised policies) do not 
necessarily or automatically bring about economic growth (in particular when 
comparing different countries which also adopted liberalisation policies, since not of 
them manage to increase economic growth).33 But both divisions of the second group 
highlight the important role of the state in Taiwan’s economic development. 
  The first division focuses on the way in which the political system encouraged 
economic development by analysing the relations of the state and society from a 
historical perspective. Gold adopts the comprehensive approach which explains the 
internal relations between the political system and local society and shows how these 
relations influence the development and changes in the economic structure. This 
structure is therefore constructed by the changing relations between the political 
system and local society in history; and the historical legacy limits the changes in the 
economic structure.34  
  Taking this approach, Gold explains that the reason for the success of the 
KMT development policies in the post-war period was connected with the colonial 
legacy and the lack of connections between the KMT and the local Taiwanese society.  
Before the colonial period, Gold argues, there was no local capital in Taiwanese 
economy; during it, the Japanese colonial government intentionally depressed the 
development of local Taiwanese capital. In line with Gold, Booth argues that there 
was ‘no established class of industrial or financial entrepreneurs to feel threatened by 
new directions in economic policymaking’ and therefore the pressure from these 
groups on the KMT government was slight. 35 Both Gold and Booth indicate that the 
historical legacy encouraged the implementation of KMT’s development policy, since 
Taiwan had so few local industrial capitalists. Moreover, the lack of connections with 
the local society obviated the influence of other local interest groups on the early 
reform policies, such as land reform policy.  
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  Similar opinions can be found in Rodrik, Grossman and Norman, whose 
research shows a very low Gini coefficient for income and land distribution in 
Taiwan. They explain that the phenomenon resulted from the insulation of the 
government from local pressure groups. 36 In other words, the development policies 
were implemented successfully without interference from any interest group, because 
the KMT was able to reconstruct the society and with its authoritarianism maintain 
both political and social stability. Given this stability, the Taiwanese government was 
able to channel funds for investment, create a market system under state control and 
guide Taiwanese enterprises to the world capitalist system.37 Similar arguments can 
be found in Hossain, Gregor, Chang and Zimmerman and the investigation of the 
World Bank in 1995.38 
  The second division basically follows the idea of the first division that 
Taiwan’s type of political system made it easier to implement the state’s development 
policy. It focuses on the analysis of the policies implemented by the strong state and 
shows how these policies led to rapid economic growth. Wade proposes the Governed 
Market (GM) theory, which similarly holds that an authoritarian kind of state can 
carry out more efficient policies for development. The GM theory can apply to several 
development policies, including land reform, fixed agricultural prices and the control 
of FDI. Strong government leadership can be found only in certain heavy industries, 
which are capital intensive and related to national security.  
  Although the KMT was an authoritarian regime, the relations between it and 
the enterprises do not fit into the GM theory. The technocrats, when making industrial 
policies, did indeed consult with entrepreneurs, who found how the government 
would help them in their business. By this means, the KMT government gained the 
support of these capitalists and maintained political and social stability. Moreover, 
Wade’s analysis does not oppose all free market and simulated market theories. His 
analysis shows that Taiwan had free trade, a free domestic market, free labour market, 
unregulated curb market and government supply of primary public goods; these fit 
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into the free-market theoretical framework. In terms of the simulated-free-market 
theory, the KMT government had strict regulations on banking and, to enhance 
industrial competitiveness, promoted other industrial policies, such as education and 
R&D. He concludes that the story of Taiwan’s economic development cannot be 
explained by a single principle; but it is worth noting that what the Taiwanese 
government had done for economic development was more than the neoclassical 
economists had described.39 
  The economic analyses of Rodrik, Grossman and Norman agree that the role 
of government was significant, but they find it in a different field. According to their 
research, export growth was not the engine for Taiwan’s rapid economic growth, but 
an investment boom which induced an economic boom. They indicate that most of the 
development policies for encouraging exports were already made in the 1950s and the 
1960s, yet export growth did not occur until the 1970s. They argue that growth in 
Taiwan was ‘investment-led’; this required not only a suitable investment 
environment for the government to create, but also no impediments to take-off, and 
the provision of investment subsidies, administrative guidance and the use of public 
enterprises. This finding indeed strengthens the active and productive role of the 
government in Taiwan’s economic development. In addition, they agree that the 
stable political and social conditions were significant in supporting Taiwan’s 
economic development. 40 
  The neoclassical economists minimise the role of government in economic 
development and the other strand of literature criticised them for saying that the 
establishment of institutions does not automatically lead to growth. Therefore, the role 
of government began to appear significant in creating incentives, controlling 
institutions and guiding private sectors in the market. Whether and how far the 
government interfered or governed the market, most writers hardly specify the 
relation of the state and the manufacturing SMEs, nor the way in which these 
development policies or institutions assist the foundation of the private sectors, the 
manufacturing SMEs in particular. The question then arises, ‘was it these liberalised 
institutions and policies (as the neoclassical economists suggested) or the governed, 
guiding and directing policies (as the second group of writers argue) that 
automatically or efficiently led to the rise and the development of SMEs?’  
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2-2. The Role of the State and the Market on the Rise and the Development of the 
SMEs 
  The neoclassical economists do not particularly address the support of a free 
market economy to the rise and the development of the SMEs in post-war Taiwan. 
According to the theory, the market allows individuals participating and competing in 
the market. The market allocates resources based upon the competition. In addition to 
this, the government controlled the banking system and supply the market with key 
elements that facilitate private business. These elements include government’s 
investment in GDP and education and the transfer of labour. Particularly, the state 
successfully transferred labour surplus from agriculture to manufacturing industry; 
this provided SMEs with sufficient labour forces with lower cost. In addition to this, 
government’s contribution to education is also considered significant in providing 
SMEs with trained workers for manufacturing industry. In general, the neoclassical 
economists suggest that a free market economy with adequate supplies from the 
government facilitated the prosperity of the manufacturing SMEs in Taiwan. 
  Unlike the neoclassical economists, Wade and Amsden analyse how state 
support for the manufacturing SMEs led to rapid export growth in the 1970s and 
1980s. Wade actually indicates that the manufacturing SMEs usually complained that 
the government did not help them, although the government paid attention to the 
SMEs’ needs. 41  Field analyses how this ‘consultation’ actually worked. The 
government used the commerce and industrial organisations to collect the necessary 
information for further policy adjustment. However, the private sector had no 
influence on the subsequent policy. In other words, the relationship was hierarchical 
and distant.42 Both Wade and Field explain this distance in terms of ethnic problems 
between the mainlanders, the local Taiwanese. Meanwhile, this distance also created 
more freedom for the SMEs to operate in the market. In addition, Wade argues that 
government consultation and the support for the private businesses, however slightly 
could have enhanced the capitalist support for the KMT regime. 
  Since the relations between the state and the SMEs were hierarchical and 
distant, Wade’s analysis recognises that little support was supplied directly by the 
state to private businesses, in particular manufacturing SMEs. Nevertheless, Wade, 
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Amsden and Khan and Blankenburg all agree that state support indirectly benefited 
the development of SMEs. The government’s intervention in the development of 
certain large industries influenced the development of manufacturing SMEs by 
providing credit, technical assistance, raw materials, intermediated goods and a flow 
of skilled labour from large firms to SMEs. According to their research, the 
government’s indirect support to the SMEs has three separate aspects.  
  In terms of technology, the state played an important role in the technology 
spin-off from the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and large enterprises (LEs) to the 
manufacturing SMEs. The technology spin-off includes the flow of managerial know-
how and skilled personnel to the SMEs. That is to say, the SOEs and LEs provided 
trained high-tech personnel for firms participating in the market. Khan and 
Blankenburg further analyse the impact of Taiwan’s industrial policy on the 
development of small-scale industries by its support technologies through the rent-
management strategy from the 1950s to the 1980s. This suggests that the state 
licensed and subsidised technologies to the private sector. The success of the policy 
was in accordance with both the education policy and the separation of political and 
business sectors within Taiwanese society.43 
  The second aspect was to provide cheaper materials or intermediate goods to 
the downstream manufacturing SMEs. Amsden and Khan argue that the Taiwanese 
SOEs and LEs provided the SMEs with cheaper materials and intermediate goods. 
This was considered significant support for the manufacturing SMEs since it reduced 
the transaction cost of importing materials from abroad.44 The third aspect was related 
to financial support. There are two different opinions concerning this indirect aid. To 
begin with, Cheng indicates that the KMT was cautious in using finance as an 
industrial policy to support the selected industries, because big capital might 
challenge its authority. In other words, the KMT did not use a credit policy to shape 
Taiwan’s industrial development. Instead, it favoured and supported other social 
groups, such as manufacturing SMEs, to counter the development of big capital.45 
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This argument implies that the state’s indirect financial support for the SMEs resulted 
from the political concern of the KMT to maintain its political authority. 
  Still, the other group acknowledges that it was difficult for the SMEs to gain 
financial support from the state and the banks because there were so many SMEs. In 
these circumstances, as indirect financial support to SMEs the state provided credit 
capital. Since it was difficult for the SMEs to secure loans from the banks, the SOEs 
and LEs played a significant part in providing trade credit, equipment and working 
capital loans to the SMEs. This relationship was significant, since the SOEs and LEs 
provided capital flows to support the SMEs in their business operations.46 A similar 
argument can be found from the investment-led theory which brings out the 
significance of investment subsidies, administrative guidance and the use of public 
enterprises which indirectly provide credit and materials or intermediated goods to 
support the development of private enterprises and SMEs. 
 
2-3. Problems in the Existing Literature 
There are five problems raised in the existing literature.  
  The first problem is related to the market which was established and 
maintained by the state. The supplies provided by the state for the market’s use 
include investment, education and the transfer of labour forces. Although these are 
significant elements, it is not specified whether this market provided a source of 
financial capital to found SMEs. Regarding this issue, the neoclassical economists do 
not specify whether the market established by the state was able to provide necessary 
and sufficient credit to the SMEs.  
  The second problem concerns the historical perspective on the relations of the 
state and the society for the sake of economic development. The literature regards 
Taiwanese society as the passive receiver under an authoritarian regime. In addition to 
the historical legacy which forbade the rise of a capitalist class and the lack of 
connections between the KMT and the local society, Gold also contends that the 
culture of Taiwanese society more easily ‘accepted a moralistic authoritarian state and 
arrogant bureaucracy with a partner’s familiar concern for the citizens’ day-to-day life 
as normal’ 47 . Booth assumes that there were no well-established financial and 
industrial organisations in post-war Taiwanese society and this reduced the chance of 
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pressure from the local interest groups. This type of relationship helped the 
development policies to be implemented. 
  However, concerning the attitudes towards the authoritarian regime, Gold does 
not specify which part of Taiwanese culture more easily accepted the authoritarian 
state. Moreover, Lin’s research clearly indicates that there were well-organised local 
businesses and industrial groups in Taiwan before the colonial period. During this 
period, although the Japanese dominated the large enterprises, local industries and 
commerce were operated by the local Taiwanese businessmen. These groups even 
dominated cross-strait investment and trade and were considered modern enterprises. 
Evidence for this can be found from the tax records of the Japanese colonial 
government. The tax was mainly collected from customs or was indirect. 
Furthermore, Japanese enterprise was less involved in small and medium-sized 
factories and was not influential in the production and sales departments in certain 
industries.48   
  The literature considers that Taiwan lacked a capitalist class and that 
Taiwanese society was the passive receiver of an authoritarian economic policy 
because it ignores the history of Taiwanese society before the Japanese colonial 
period. The lack of historical analysis thus neglects some significant social relations 
and the development of the private business sector. In other words, the existing 
literature concerns only with the way in which the state stabilised the society so as to 
allow economic development; it ignores the dynamics of a society which facilitated 
and supported the rise and the development of the manufacturing SMEs.  
  The third problem is related to the impact of the interests of the authoritarian 
system on the formation of economic policy. Gold, Booth and Wade suggest that the 
authoritarian system played a significant role in Taiwan’s post-war economic 
development. On the one hand, they indicate that the authoritarian system which 
constructed the hierarchical and distant relations could avoid the problem of other 
interest groups influencing its policies. On the other hand, the authoritarian system 
controlled the resources, monopolised the market and dominated the institutions. The 
exclusion of other interest groups and the control exerted by the authoritarian system 
facilitated the implementation of the policies under government’s plans. This explains 
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why and how the development policies could be implemented successfully, leading to 
rapid economic growth. 
  Although the authoritarian system did possess more power to control the 
economy and plan for economic development, the existing literature does not specify 
the impact of the state’s interest on form of its development policy. They do not 
explain how the state’s interest influenced the formation of this policy and whether 
the state’s interest was responsive to the needs of the manufacturing SMEs in their 
operations, although Wade takes into account that the state’s support to the SMEs 
expected reciprocal support from them. 49  However, this argument disregards the 
limited local elections in Taiwan before the mid-1980s and does not clarify how the 
SME’s support can be evaluated without general or presidential elections in which 
they could show it under a one-party political system.  
  The fourth problem is related to the state’s indirect support for the 
manufacturing SMEs. Most researchers do not specify which industries benefited 
from the licensed technology spin-off from the state. This spin-off mostly benefited 
the high-tech manufacturing industries in the late 1980s. However, the traditional 
manufacturing SMEs did not necessarily benefit in the same way. Shieh indicates that 
most of the SME owners learned the skills from the places where they had originally 
worked, not always SOEs or LEs. Moreover, his research also describes how the SME 
owners upgraded their own new technology through their contractors’ networks.50 All 
this questions how far the government supplied these SME owners with skills and 
technology. 
  The analysis of Wade and Amsden indicates that the Taiwanese SMEs had 
difficulties in borrowing from the formal financial system. Their analysis challenges 
the neoclassical economists’ view that the market established by the state did not 
provide enough sources of credit sources for the SMEs.  Wade, Amsden and Rodric 
suggest that the state provided important indirect finance support for them. However, 
this ignores several aspects of the support and the investment subsidies. The research 
does not specify whether the investment subsidies went to the manufacturing SMEs or 
the large enterprises; or what kind of requirements was made for the private 
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enterprises to access this help. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the contribution of the 
SMEs to exports was higher than that of the large enterprises. If the government’s 
direct investment subsidies did not go specifically to the SMEs, it is difficult to argue 
that it supported their development. The main problem is not the policy itself, but 
rather the SMEs’ ability or eligibility to access the support. 
  Finally, there has been little analysis of the further development of 
manufacturing SMEs after the late 1980s. The research on Taiwanese economic 
development by Wade and Amsden shifts the focus to the rise and development of the 
high-tech manufacturing enterprises. This rise added more strong evidence to their 
state-led development model. However, in the late 1980s several significant changes 
occurred: the political transformation, the changing economic situation and the 
opening of China’s markets. These factors significantly affected the further 
development of the traditional manufacturing SMEs, which the existing literature 
does not trace.  
  In sum, the existing literature ignores the historical legacy before the Japanese 
colonial period, the dynamics of the society and the further development of the SMEs 
after the late 1980s. These omissions overestimate the support by the state for the 
SMEs and underestimate other dynamics which induced the rise of the manufacturing 
SMEs and facilitated their business operations. Therefore, the questions of the present 
dissertation are based upon the argument of the neoclassical economists on the role of 
the market and the argument of Wade and Amsden on the direct and indirect support 
of the government to the SMEs. How far did the market established by the state and 
the support of its development policy effectively facilitate the rise and the 
development of the manufacturing SMEs during the post-war period? How do the 
political transformation, the changing economic situation after 1980 and China’s open 
market after the late 1980s raise questions about the role of the state in the 
development of the SMEs at this time?  Finally, how do historical similarity and 
continuity account for the function of the social institutions which supported and 
facilitated business operation of the manufacturing SMEs in the changing 
environment? 
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2-4. Hypotheses  
The state has a significant influence on the entry requirements of the market.  
Although the state opened a market for the SMEs, this market did not provide any 
source of financial capital for the foundation and business operations of the SMEs.  
  The direct and indirect support of the state to the SMEs was limited. This 
being the case, it had limited influences on the further development of the SMEs in 
China after 1987.  
  The historical pattern opens a space for the functioning of social institutions 
and identifies the transformation and the support over time of the social institution for 
business operations within the changing institutional frameworks. The transforming 
social institutions, within the space created by the formal institutions, supported the 
development of the manufacturing SMEs in the post-war period and after the late 
1980s facilitated their work in China under the constraints of the Taiwanese 
government by providing essential financial capital for business operation.  
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Chapter 3.  Theoretical Framework and Methodology  
The existing literature focuses mainly on the significance of the market and 
the state in the case of the SMEs’ development.  However, the analysis of the state 
and market ignores the state’s interest in the formation of the development policies.  
This leads to leaving out how far the manufacturing SMEs benefited from the 
policies.  Moreover, the role of Taiwanese society in this process is usually ignored or 
it is considered a passive receiver. Some research has addressed the role of society in 
the development of the SMEs. Nevertheless, society is not independent of the market 
and the state and it fails to trace through history any way of accounting for the 
development and transformation of Taiwanese social institution. This leads to unclear 
relations between the state, the market and the social institutions and fails to show 
how the social institutions provided support to the SMEs.   
The theoretical framework of this research falls into two sections: the first 
focuses on the relations of the state, the market, social institutions and their impact on 
economic activity.  In order to clarify these relations, this section contains three main 
theoretical frameworks: New Institutionalism Economics (NIE), the sociological 
institutional theory and the approach of the historical legacy, in order to create a 
historical pattern which may clarify the dynamics of the social institutions in the 
formal institutional frameworks which facilitated and supported trade and business in 
Taiwan. The historical pattern also shows the continuity, discontinuity, similarity (or 
differences) and transformations of the social institution at different points.   
The second section focuses on the impact of the political system and the 
state’s interest on the formation of economic policy.  The existing literature usually 
agrees that the authoritarian system enhanced the state’s ability to implement 
economic policies efficiently, without exploring the power structure and the impact of 
this structure on the economic policy as it formed.  The three main theoretical 
frameworks in this section are the political theories of Huntington and Wintrobe, the 
economic voting theory and the theory of economic voting in a transition economy.  
The section first explores the structure of the authoritarian system and how it 
enhanced the state’s influences and control on the economy.  Then it focuses on the 
impact of the political transformation on the relations between the state and the 
society and on the formation of economic policy.  Since the theoretical framework in 
this section pays less attention to the historical legacy, the analysis of these theoretical 
frameworks is integrated into the historical pattern.  
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The methodology section integrates the theories reviewed in the two sections 
and is concentrates on three periods: the historical pattern of 1522-1945, the post-war 
period 1950-1980 and the further development after the late 1980s.  In each of these,  
the state’s interest, the impact of the state’s interest on the formation of the policies 
and the market, the impact of the state and the market on the function of the social 
institutions and the support of the social institutions for the SMEs (or business groups 
before 1950) under these formal institutions is analysed.  
 
3-1. The State, the SMEs and the Social institutions 
The NIE approach extends the analysis of the rational choices framework 
based upon the neoclassical approach.  It emphasizes the problems of asymmetrical 
information and transaction costs which this approach ignores. Coase indicated the 
critical role of institutional frameworks and transaction cost in economic activity.  
According to him, the existence of firms, organizations or institutions can be used as 
an effective way of minimizing transaction costs. 51 That is, an institution can be 
regarded as a rational entity which is designed to facilitate and regulate business 
transactions in order to maximize profits.  
Williamson indeed assumes that the relations of firms and markets are more 
complicated than even Coase stated. Williamson indicates that the framework of 
organizational failures derives from their bounded rationality, uncertainty, 
asymmetrical information and opportunism; integration and cooperation between 
firms emerged as a consequence. In these circumstances, relationships between 
specific suppliers and demanders are thus constructed and became significant. These 
relationships constitute special social networks, which are characterised by cultural 
norms and values and these to a certain degree enhance trust and minimise transaction 
risks.52 
North, expanding the analyses of Coase and Williamson, defines institutions 
as controlling the rules of a game which is used to reduce uncertainty and lower 
transaction costs. According to him, there are formal types of constraint (such as laws 
and regulations) and informal types (such as norms and conventions), both of which 
are components of institutions. In his opinion, these two types are interlocked and 
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delaminated and in them “the effectiveness of enforcement shapes the whole character 
of the game”53. In some circumstances, such as “high information costs, the absence 
of effective government, limited numbers of goods and limited trades, limited food 
preservation”54, the informal rules which are constructed by social networks may 
stabilise transactions. Consequently, informal institutions can be considered as 
“extensions, elaborations and modifications of formal rules”55.  
Sociologists have pointed out, however, that institutions as described by the 
NIE alone could not facilitate economic transactions.  The sociologists analyse the 
dynamics of the informal institutions mentioned by North at a deeper level.  They 
argue that economic activity is socially constructed and is significantly influenced by 
culture. Weber and Polanyi believed that institutions and economic activity were 
deeply influenced by social and cultural norms, since previous economic 
arrangements were embedded in social relations, whether familial, kinship, social, 
religious or other interactions and obligations. Therefore, the rules of reciprocity, 
redistribution and communal obligation replaced independent market functions.  
However, Polanyi, in contrast to Weber, held a very positive attitude to the function 
of social relations: in his view, this substitute for imperfect institutions helped a 
society function well.  But he assumed that the social networks would fade away with 
the emergence of capitalist society.56 
The social economists believe that institutions and economic activity used to 
be formed by inherited rules, beliefs and norms, whereas the new institutions are 
characterized by inherited cultural norms. Granovetter illustrated the “problems of 
embeddedness”57.  According to him, the economic relations between individuals and 
firms are embedded in social networks instead of in an idealised market.  
Furthermore, these social networks also generate generalised morality, which may be 
the self-enforcing mechanism in economic activity. Namely, these networks of 
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personal social relations discourage malfeasance. People make their decisions on the 
basis of past interactions with other individuals and continue to deal with those whom 
they trust.58 Consequently, Greif asserts that any enforcement institution “is a function 
of social, cultural and political factors”59. Neither legal enforcement, nor trust or 
reputation alone can facilitate transactions.   
Geertz, in agreement with Greif, stresses that the support of modern economic 
development (in the developing or underdeveloped countries in particular) requires 
responsive cooperation from the local culture. This can foster the process of economic 
development from two standpoints: (1) social values would enhance the decency of 
making a profit; and (2) local cultures could supply a specialized ethical code for 
economic activities, such as integrating commodity production and marketing 
strategies. These two points are not only connected with social and cultural norms, but 
also are essential conditions for economic development in the developing countries. 60  
3-2. The Role of Social Institutions in East Asian Post-War Economic Development 
Although the NIE and the social economists agree that culture and social rules 
facilitate economic activity, their research does not specify the types of culture and 
social rule that would tend to facilitate transactions and reduce uncertainty. Max 
Weber’s theory severely criticizes the reliance and the function of kinship networks in 
China, for instance, and imputes the backwardness of the Chinese economy to its 
culture, its kinship networks in particular. Nevertheless, Weber’s views were 
substantially challenged by the emergence of capitalism in the East Asian tiger 
economies during the 1980s; their rapid economic growth contradicted his theory of 
cultural barriers in Chinese societies. Polanyi’s argument that social networks would 
fade away with the rise of capitalist society also came into question. Some argued that 
during the 1980s the key element of the successful Chinese entrepreneurs in East 
Asian countries such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore was constructed on the 
basis of the Chinese family and Confucian ethics. Their success provoked an interest 
in analysing the influence of Chinese culture and social networks on economic 
development in these Chinese-based societies.   
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The cultural approach focuses on the use of social networks and the 
understanding of a Chinese-based social system. This explanation is similar to the 
approach of the social economists who view the economic system as a social order.  
The cultural approach highlighted the significance of the social order and shared 
values in Chinese business practice and structure. Luo argues that the Chinese social 
networks involve “the cultivation of personal relationships, networks of mutual 
dependence and the manufacturing of obligation and indebtedness”61. In other words, 
social networks are “a form of social capital which creates economic values”62. From 
the perspective of such writers, social networks are embedded in economic activities; 
they describe “the Chinese as deliberately and strategically manufacturing social 
relations for the purpose of economic gains”63. Therefore, among the crucial functions 
of social networks, recalling North’s views on informal institutions, are overcoming 
uncertainty and facilitating business transactions.64   
The book edited by Chang et al. analyses Taiwan, Hong Kong and China from 
a socio-cultural standpoint.65 They indicate that economic institutions are also socially 
constructed.  In their opinion, interests play a decisive role in economic activity; thus 
economic activity is also a social activity.  In other words, pursuing interests and 
allocating resources rationally are inseparable from the pursuit of power, status and 
social identity. Furthermore, economic activity is embedded in interpersonal social 
networks in three areas.  Economic transactions usually take place between connected 
individuals or groups; therefore, economic activity usually represents the 
characteristics of social networks.  Hence, in this book, they collect research papers 
concerning family networks, personal networks and group networks from these three 
countries; each story and analysis of social networks reflects a similar use of social 
networks in the business activities of the three societies. The analyses of Chinese 
social networks are composed of culture, language and an understanding of the way in 
which their society works. The literature shows the similarity of the societies: 
Chinese, Taiwanese and Hong Kong people operate businesses based upon similar 
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social orders.  Although the cultural approach analyses how social networks operate 
and facilitate business transactions in Chinese-based societies, it focuses only on the 
relations between social networks and the market without considering the relations 
between the state, the market and the social networks.  
The sociological institutional theory, founded mainly by the three scholars, 
Orru, Biggart and Hamilton, seeks to explain the economic success of some East 
Asian countries by analysing the relations between their economic, cultural and social 
structures.66  Based upon the theoretical framework of Granovetter and the socio-
economists, social institutionalism explains how East Asia succeeded by analysing the 
dynamics of social networks which are embedded in the society. They highlight the 
point that, although the governments established functional institutions for economic 
activity, rapid economic growth required cooperation from society, namely, the 
dynamics of social networks. This idea extends the argument of the NIE that 
institutions reduce transaction costs and facilitate business operations. The difference 
is that, in addition to firms, organisations and government institutions, social 
institutionalism highlights the dynamics and functioning of social networks in the 
economic development of these countries. Influenced by North’s view of the 
functions of formal and informal institutions, social institutionalism further explores 
the dynamics of social networks and the relations between state and society.  
Vogel and Oshima clarify the significance of government policy and show 
how the Confucian ethics and system combined with these policies to lead to rapid 
economic growth.67 Redding argues that business groups behave differently because 
culture matters. Economic culture based upon Confucianism has influenced the 
structure and the behaviour of Chinese business groups.  In his analysis, he elucidates 
the impulses and constraints of the Chinese economic culture which provided stability 
for Chinese economic life.68 Evans further argues that the relations of government and 
social capital can be understood as a ‘state-society synergy’. The synergy relations 
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include complementarity and embeddedness. The government establishes functional 
institutions in order to mobilise cooperation from social capital.69 
Similar ideas of ‘state-society synergy’ may be found in the work of Hamilton, 
who indicates that, during the Taiwanese development process, the government did 
not directly support the SMEs. The evidence shows that no specific government 
policies arose in support of SMEs. His research finds that the government provided 
them with infrastructure; the dynamics which supported the business operations of 
these SMEs lay in the functioning of the social relationships.70 Unlike general cultural 
explanations or references to Confucian ethics, Hamilton indicates that social 
networks are the key to supporting economic development in East Asia.  As he further 
argues, ‘how Asian economies actually develop and perform depends on the dynamics 
and effectiveness of the inter-firms networks themselves, rather than on the 
encouraging actions of government or on the entrepreneurial efforts of acquisitive 
individuals’71.  
The strong relational structure constructs a sophisticated subcontracting 
system which is composed of numerous manufacturing SMEs. Within the 
subcontracting system, the SMEs often rely on their social networks for obtaining 
supplies with guaranteed quality and quantity; moreover, their social networks also 
play a principal role in expanding their client base. Most importantly, the 
subcontracting system has developed special cooperation and coordination networks: 
contractor networks, satellite plants and marketing strategies. The cooperation 
between factories and these contractors and satellite plants is a form of horizontal 
integration which is based on social connections, such as kinship, friendship or trade 
unions.72  
Similar views can be found in Skoggard. He argues that, although the 
government policy is the visible hand in the market, the dynamics in Taiwan for the 
development and growth of a labour-intensive export industry lie in the local realm.73 
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The local realm he refers to is based upon Philip Huang’s concept of ‘the third 
realm’. 74  The third realm is ‘the realm between local society and government, 
including local elites, low-level government officials, [and] merchants who cooperate 
and get the work done’75. Unlike Hamilton, who highlights the significance of social 
networks between firms and organisations, Skoggard extends the social networks to 
the third realm which created the social dynamics for industrial development. Several 
works using the framework of social economics and social institutional theory 
confirm the strength and function of social networks in promoting Taiwan’s economic 
success.76 This research indicates the foundation of Taiwanese social networks, its 
origins, norms and rules and the way in which these networks facilitated and built up 
a subcontracting system for SME business operations which led to economic growth 
in Taiwan.    
 
3-3. Institutional Changes and Culture in Historical Contexts 
It is also worth noting that Biggart, Hamilton and Orru indicate that, although 
Confucianism plays a significant role in East Asian societies (mainly in the three 
countries which are the subject of their analysis: South Korea, Japan and Taiwan), 
there are many different factors in culture that contribute to the structure of social 
networks. Therefore, Hamilton and Feenstra comment that the social networks vary 
even in similar societies with similar cultural backgrounds and government-
development policies. Their theory is applied to the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, 
the two most successful instances of economic development in the post war period. 
The differences in the market hierarchies of these two countries were affected 
by history and geography. Moreover, these historical and geographical factors 
influenced the network structures within the market hierarchies. 77  Another 
comparison can be found in the banking structure in Taiwan and in Japan. The 
analysis shows that although the two societies are characterised by capitalism, 
Confucianism and strong family networks in business, differences in the inheritance 
systems have led to different types of business structure. In Japan, this difference has 
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meant that capital domination has been concentrated in the same families, explaining 
its Keiretsu and Zaibatsu (large corporation) systems. But in Taiwan, capital was 
distributed to male members of the family.  This explains the small and medium sized 
enterprises in the Taiwanese economy.78  
The same cultural factors are also applied to explain the structure of the 
business networks of Taiwanese SMEs. The analysis shows that the satellite assembly 
systems of Taiwanese SMEs are founded on different social relations, including 
kinship and friendship. These social relations have constructed social networks based 
upon the norms and order which promote the mutual well-being of all the members.  
79
 A similar comparison can be found in Olsen.  His comparison of the business value 
systems in Taipei and in Java shows that similar value systems based upon Chinese 
immigrant societies are nonetheless varied because they are influenced by different 
political and economic institutions.80 
The comparisons above show the significance of history and the changes of 
political and economic institutions which led to the changes in the social networks. 
North’s model of path dependence clarifies the process with which institutions change 
over time. The model assumes that the growing influence of economic change induces 
institutional changes, motivating the need for new arrangements for easing 
transactions and lowering risk; these new arrangements include modifying property 
rights, contractual agreements and enforcement regulations. Then, during the process, 
people became aware of their changing environment and this activates their reaction 
to the changes. The ideology and recognition which influence people’s reactions 
interact with morality or cultural values.81  
In addition, institutional change is a circulatory and inherited system: the first 
round of change is formed by a model of institutional change (such as economic 
reform) and the respondent organizations (such as enterprises).  The second round of 
change will in turn be confined to the first round model, due to the fact that the 
knowledge and skills of the subjective model will be accumulated and modified in 
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response to the changing environment. Therefore, the relationship of institutions and 
organizations generates the locked-in impact. The path dependence model points out 
the inherited institutional changes and people’s reaction to the changing environment.   
Based upon the model of path dependence, the social institutional theory 
further elaborates the significance of embeddedness and path dependence combined, 
in shaping economic and social structures. It explains why the differing development 
of social networks in East Asia (more specifically, in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) 
lay in historical contingencies and path dependence. According to the path 
dependence model, the changes of history are the external impact from which 
different political and economic institutions were constructed. The social structure is 
affected by the external conditions. Under the external impact, the social structure 
creates an economic system based upon early affinities in the social structure. The 
embeddedness here is similar to North’s idea of people’s reaction to the changing 
institutions based upon social values. Hamilton and Feenstra indicate that 
embeddedness does not have a specific feature: instead, it has ‘provided direction to 
trajectories of economic development’82.  
Jones more conceptually explored the interaction of institutional change and 
cultural adaptation. According to him, cultural practices are constructed on the needs 
of people in accordance with the living environment. Moreover, he assumes that the 
evolution of culture will be stimulated by the new forces which influence 
environmental change, such as competitiveness or the availability of access to 
information. 83 In other words, the cultural heritage is adapted to the changing system 
and substitutes for the shortcomings of newly-built market economies. By integrating 
these theoretical models, it is possible to conclude that every society develops its own 
unique social institutions although some societies have similar cultural values.   
The cultural adaptation and the character of embeddedness can also be 
explained by the characteristics of Confucianism. Tu in his many works reveals the 
transformation of traditional Confucianism to Neo-Confucianism which is correlated 
with the economic emergence of the East Asian countries. Although Confucianism is 
closely connected to Chinese culture, it has not always been the whole or the only 
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focus of this culture. Tu emphasizes that cultural reorganization is not sealed, but 
diversified and open.  
For example, Chinese culture is by tradition founded on three 
systems―Daoism, Buddhism and Confucianism. These never dominated one another, 
and other systems of belief were widespread in China, for example, Catholicism in the 
17th century and Islam in the 13th century. Furthermore, he argues that Chinese culture 
is ‘dialog China’. A basic value of dialogue is tolerance which is also the core virtue 
of Confucianism. Confucianism, instead of dogmatism, highlights the value of “ru 
shi” (statecraft), as the significance of governance, participating in society and paying 
attention to culture. That is, there is no single classic tenet of Confucianism that can 
be taken as absolutely authoritative and without question. 84  This ‘dialog’ notion 
reverberates to the concept of ‘embeddedness’ which does has no specific feature and 
also to Jones’ idea of cultural adaptation.   
Although the embeddedness approach and path dependence draw attention to 
the significance of history in bringing changes to institutions and causing the 
evolution of culture in the changing environment, few works in the existing literature 
have traced the historical continuity in institutional changes and cultural or social 
transformation. Kuznets, however, in his Post-war Economic Growth, points out the 
significance of the historical heritage in post-war economic development. 85  He 
explains that the historical heritage which created different political and economic 
institutions affected the pace of development in different countries. The historical 
heritage includes both external and internal factors which affected the course of 
Taiwan’s development. 
The external factors are the hegemonies and the regional/world trade systems 
which these hegemonies dominated at different times. Howe traces the impact of 
external hegemonies on Taiwan’s long-term economic development. The analysis 
includes the impact of different hegemonies on Taiwan from that of Imperial China in 
the 17th century, the Japanese colonial power in the early 20th century and the US 
hegemony in the post-war period. He argues that because of the small scale of the 
Taiwanese economy, these external hegemonies had no difficulty in influencing 
Taiwan’s development. In addition to the hegemonies, the regional or global system 
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which these hegemonies dominated and how and why they ‘invited’ Taiwan into the 
system are also important. 86  
A similar idea of the influences of these hegemonies on Taiwanese trade in the 
17th century can be found in Hamashita and Cao. Hamashita argues that the East 
Asian trade system was the tributary system founded on the market system; it had its 
internal order, which ‘constituted a network of tribute trade of a multilateral type, 
absorbing commodities from outside of the networks’87 . For centuries, the Sino-
centric system followed its internal order in the pursuit of trade.  Cao further indicates 
that the emergence of Taiwan in the tributary trade system in the 17th century was 
related to foreign disturbance of the tribute trade order.88   
The hegemony of the Japanese Empire in the late 19th century and the early 
20th century had considerable impact on the development of Taiwan’s economy.  
Sugihara analyses the intra-Asia trade and imperialism between 1860 and 1938. The 
analysis indicates that the role of Taiwan, as a Japanese colony, was to provide cheap 
food and raw materials for the development of Japan’s labour-intensive industry. At 
the same time, Japan created the market in Taiwan by establishing new institutions for 
its industrial exports. The needs of Japanese industrial development also created 
technological transfers from Japan to Taiwan. The pattern and the technology transfer, 
for Sugihara, can be found from rice cultivation and the sugar industry.89  
The historical heritage of Japanese colonisation on Taiwan’s modern 
development manifests itself in several ways. Kuznets argues that the primary 
foundation for Taiwan’s modern economic success lies in the historical legacy which 
enabled Taiwanese society to adopt new technology. When society accepted the new 
technology, it in turn would further change aspects of social structure, such as 
industrialisation and urbanisation. Howe explores the role of the Japanese colonial 
government in establishing a modern society in Taiwan. The establishment included 
the colonial government system, the public finance system, the sugar and rice 
industries, development of the private sector and improvement of education. It is also 
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worth noting that the colonial government put in place the necessary infrastructure for 
the development of the private business sector.90 In other words, the Japanese colonial 
government led Taiwanese modernisation before the KMT government came to 
Taiwan. Howe’s analysis shows that the modernisation process in Taiwan began in 
the colonial period.  
In the post-war period, the hegemony which affected the rise of the Taiwanese 
economy was the US. Later, the global system dominated by the US significantly 
affected Taiwanese economic development. Based upon the world system approach, 
the rise of Taiwan in the post-war period began with its participation in the world 
capitalist system in the 1960s. 91 This participation was invited in particular by the US 
and Japan, of the core countries. In the world capitalist system, Taiwan is on the semi-
periphery. Since it is a small-scale economy and relies heavily on trade, the core 
countries by bringing it into the system could exploit its cheap labour. From the 
perspective of the world system, the Taiwanese political and economic structure had 
to change in order for it to join the system.  
  The external factor highlights the significance of hegemonies and the systems 
which they dominate. The hegemonies and the systems were significant factors in 
inducing the rise and the decline of the Taiwanese market. In addition, internal factor 
also affected the internal institutional changes which connected the Taiwanese market 
with the hegemonies and their subject systems. These internal factors are the political 
powers in charge of Taiwan and the institutions which they set up to connect Taiwan 
with the hegemonic systems.  
The hegemonies, the systems under them, the political regimes in Taiwan and 
the institutions which they established together created the historical heritage for 
Taiwan’s post-war economic development.  However, the historical heritage approach 
mainly focuses on political and economic institutions. Although Kuznets and Howe 
set the scene for social changes and people’s adaptation to new technology, the 
approach still lacked the significant factor which facilitated trade and accommodated 
to the changing political and economic institutions. This analysis of historical heritage 
misses the fact that it was the heritage and transformation of social institutions that 
facilitated trade and business in Taiwan’s economic history.  
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3-4. Political Transformation and Its Impact on the Trade and Investment Policy 
  The existing literature indicates that the authoritarian system was significant in 
Taiwan’s economic development because it made sure that only limited interest 
groups were able to influence the making of the policy. This allowed the KMT to 
implement the development policies successfully. At the same time, the authoritarian 
system also implies that the state was able to monopolise the sources for development.  
It was able to allocate sources, control the finance system, protect the SOEs and LEs 
in the domestic market and manage the export market. However, there was significant 
political reform and political movement in Taiwan from the late 1980s. As the 
existing literature argues, the authoritarian system was important in post-war 
economic development; the changes in Taiwan’s political system would have been 
likely to influence the formation of economic policy and state-society relations after 
the late 1980s.   
There are three types of authoritarian regime: one-party systems, military 
regimes and personal dictatorships. Taiwan before the 1990s was usually classified as 
a one-party system. Huntington calls the origin of one-party systems as ‘the product 
of the efforts of a political elite to organise and to legitimate rule by one social force 
over another in a bifurcated society’ 92 . The bifurcation may be between social-
economic groups or between racial, religious or ethnic ones. Within a one-party 
system, only the chosen groups are allowed to take part in politics; other groups are 
excluded from political action. In this way, the chosen groups monopolise political 
power (as well as economic power) in a society.93 Huntington in his later book, The 
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, placed Taiwan in the 
category of Leninist party states. States in this category are characterised by a strong 
and complicated relationship between them and the ruling parties, in particular in 
terms of physical and financial assets. 94   
Close connections between party and state can be further elaborated from the 
totalitarian syndrome. Friedrich and Brzezinski define totalitarianism as a syndrome 
consisting of six interrelated characteristics: a single party typically led by one 
individual, a secret police force, the monopoly of mass communications, monopoly of 
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armaments, and state control of the economy. 95 Before 1990, the KMT regime, even 
though its political ideology clearly indicates democracy, was indeed totalitarian: the 
KMT was the only political party (before 1987) and was led by the Chiang family 
(Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo); it had the Taiwan Garrison Command (a 
secret police security organisation); all the mass communication was run by the 
government (namely the KMT); the armaments were the KMT armaments from 
China; and the economy was controlled and planned by the KMT government.  
Some Taiwanese scholars, basing their work upon the theory of the Leninist 
party states and the theory of the totalitarian syndrome, further analyse the KMT and 
argue that the KMT regime in Taiwan (more specifically, this regime from 1949 to 
1988), was ‘Party-State Capitalism’. Chen in Analysing the KMT Party-State 
Capitalism shows how the KMT built up a party-state institution in Taiwan; it not 
only monopolised political power, but also established the KMT business empire 
which dominated the Taiwanese economy and made large profits for the party.96 This 
party-state capitalism monopolised economic power in the country by controlling not 
only the SOEs but also the LEs which were owned by the KMT (or those owned by 
the KMT’s subsidiary companies). The SOEs and LEs dominated the sources and 
materials for economic development; the finance system was also under the strict 
control of the party-state. This authoritarianism and the party-state capitalist system 
formed the basis for a strong state to influence the formation and the transformation of 
the Taiwanese economy. Before the late 1980s political power of the KMT was 
supported by its monopolisation of economic power.   
How an authoritarian system is transformed into a democratic system has 
always been an important question in political science.  In the late 1980s, political 
reform gradually began in Taiwan. Huntington analyses the transformation process by 
comparing different countries. He points out three types of democratic transformation: 
transition through transformation, transition through replacement and transition 
through transplacement. Huntington categorises Taiwan’s democratic process as 
transition through a transformation in which the democratic transformation was led by 
the elites and intellectuals in power.97  
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A number of factors affected the political transformation from 
authoritarianism to democracy. Huntington analyses several significant factors that 
tend to affect the transformation in most countries in the third wave of 
democratisation. The most significant factor is economic development and growth.  
According to the analysis, an increase in wealth is correlated with democratic 
transformation. The increase in wealth improves the standard of education and fosters 
the popular understanding of a civil society and the rise of a middle class. What is 
more important is that most countries, in order to boost economic growth, then adopt 
a more open policy for trade, investment, technology transfer and tourism. The open 
policy has different impacts on different societies in encouraging the formation of a 
civil society.98  
A similar argument can be found from the analysis of Taiwanese scholars.  
They point out that rapid economic growth in the 1980s promoted Taiwan’s 
democratic transformation. In addition to economic development, the changing 
international relations and the changing cross-strait relations had considerable impact 
on the political reform in the 1980s because of the special political situation of 
Taiwan.99 
However, the analysis of patterns of political transformation takes no account 
of the impact of the struggle in the process of political transformation between interest 
groups and dictators (or leaders in the one-party system). Wintrobe explores how 
dictators monopolise political power. This reference may also be applied to Chiang 
Kai-Shek in Taiwan. 100  Wintrobe comments that although dictators may have a 
monopoly of political power, their policies are constrained by other actors, such as 
bureaucrats/administrators, the military and support or opposition from their subjects.  
These actors can be considered to form different interest groups, each with its own 
interests. These benefited from receiving a monopoly privilege or other rent from a 
political party and therefore immediately have some reason to believe that the 
political party will look after its interests in the future. Because rents can be 
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withdrawn in the future, politicians justify their belief that the favoured group will 
provide the politicians with loyal support in return.101  
Wintrobe argues that a dictator does not own the regime and does not have an 
inalienable right to transfer power.102 Thus, some challenges may appear during the 
process of power transformation. These interest groups may organise together to 
oppose dictators. It is this collective action problem in dictatorship that Wintrobe 
addressed. The best solution to prevent the collective action of the interest groups is to 
keep the groups numerous and unorganised. 103    
 
3-5. The Impact of the Changing Political System 
According to Huntington and Wintrobe, a one-party system or an authoritarian 
system is one of five kinds: personalistic actors (such as dictators and political 
leaders), traditional actors (the church or the monarchy), bureaucratic actors 
(administration, the police and the military), parliamentary actors and functional 
social-economic groups. 104  As noted above, the authoritarian or one-party state 
usually excludes other social groups from taking part in politics; only the chosen 
groups are allowed to do so.  
Political transformation has different impacts on society in different fields.105 
One of the significant differences is elections.  In the authoritarian system, there are 
no elections and only the chosen groups wield political power. Democratic 
transformation raises the significance of elections themselves, as well as including 
other social groups as participants in politics. When the ‘not-chosen’ groups acquire 
political power through elections, the political balance in a society changes. Before 
the political transformation, dictators, administrative officials and members of 
parliament monopolised political power. After the transformation and open elections, 
the political power which they used to monopolise is weakened.   
Huntington describes the relations between authoritarianism, democracy and 
elections: ‘elections are not only the life of democracy; they are also the death of 
dictatorship’106. In addition to the decline of dictatorship and the rise of democracy, 
what is more important in the rise-decline transformation process is that the 
                                                      
101
 Wintrobe, R., op.cit., pp.5-15, 29-32, 48-49, 148-170, 248-300. 
102
 Wintrobe, R., op.cit., pp.334-342. 
103
 Wintrobe, R., op.cit., pp.106-108. 
104
 Huntington, S., op.cit., 1970, p.7. 
105
 Huntington S., op.cit., 1991, p.189. 
106
 Huntington, S., op.cit., 1991, p.174. 
47 
 
monopolised political power should be shared by other social-economic groups in 
society.  In other words, political transformation not only changes the political system 
and society, but also re-distributes power in society.  
The significance of the re-distribution of political power in society lies in both 
political and economic issues.  In the past, both political and economic issues were 
dominated by a single political party and therefore the party always considered its 
own interests first. The considerations included how to maintain their power and how 
to distribute benefits equally to the chosen groups. After a political transformation, 
there is no longer a one-party system in society; competition and challenges by other 
political parties emerge. Under the new challenges, the political parties need to 
consider the interests of different social-economic groups if they want to win the next 
election and remain in power.   
 
3-6. The Impact of the Changing Political System on the Trade and Investment Policy 
The relations of trade and politics have always been a classic issue of political 
economy.  Hocking and McGuire remark that the problem of trade cannot be ascribed 
to any single factor that affects the adaptation of trade policy. The adaptation of trade 
policy is instead affected by various factors from different interest groups. A similar 
argument can be found in Dixit, who argues that in the policy-making process many 
different participants attempt by different means to influence the work of the 
policymakers.107 The participants who tried to affect the policy-making process in 
Taiwan in the era before its political transformation were not the same as those who 
had the same ambition afterwards. In the pre-transformation period, the participants 
included only the chosen groups. They tried to affect the policymakers by trading 
their support and loyalty to political leaders or dictators. In the post-transformation 
period, the participants now include the various social-economic groups who have the 
right to vote. The mechanisms for affecting the policy-making process thus became 
complicated.  The most direct way to affect policymakers is by elections.   
Elections with an economic basis can be analysed by the theory of economic 
voting. According to Bell, the theory of economic voting occurs when an economic 
performance influences an incumbent’s chances of being re-elected. Higher growth, 
larger incomes and lower inflation in the months before an election boost popular 
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support for the serving government, party and individual politician.108 It is clear that 
why these things should affect voters’ behaviour. Therefore, it may be asked, what 
voting behaviour do people exhibit when considering which party or individual 
politician to vote for?  
Before clarifying voting behaviour, Bell assumes that voters are rational. Bell, 
Doyle and Fidrmuc discuss in their articles the “rational voter hypothesis” 109 . 
Assuming that the individual voter is rational and is encouraged by his self-interest to 
vote for parties which best serve his maximum benefit, there are, according to these 
hypotheses, two types of voting behaviour in terms of economic issues. On the one 
hand, when voters consider economic issues, they may make national economic 
performance their priority because they take the “business cycle, economic issues of 
national importance and managerial competence of parties” more seriously than their 
personal financial situation.110 This type of voting behaviour is called ‘sociotropic’.111 
On the other hand, for others higher employment and the increase of personal income 
are the key factors influencing their decisions. Such voters pay more attention to their 
own wallets than to national economic performance. Hence, this is referred to as 
“egocentric” voting behaviour. 112 However, whether ‘sociotropic’ or ‘egocentric’, it 
is undoubtedly unemployment and changes in real income that are the crucial points 
for elections.113   
Voters’ behaviour is affected by the economic situation. Thus, the government 
has two ways to increase national income and wealth during election years in 
particular, in order to win more votes. The long run policies include “technology 
change and population growth”, both of which require a long development period.  
That is, it is difficult for any party in power to generate income and wealth with these 
long-term policies. 114  More importantly, the effects of long-term policies do not 
mature in time for the next elections.  
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However, as the elections approach, most incumbent parties adopt short run 
macroeconomic policies to boost their reputation. The incumbent parties sometimes 
change the inflation rate in order to reduce unemployment or manipulate the use of 
transfer payments. This may include increasing compensation and welfare for the 
unemployed, to make people feel that their living standards have improved. These 
strategies are considered the most frequent short run economic policies for 
governments to introduce in order to win elections. The implementation of these 
strategies indicates some concealed meanings. First, the economic situation of a 
country influences people’s electoral decisions and this is why governments try to 
apply policies to enhance economic performance. Second, the influence of the 
inflation rate, unemployment and income seems to be an index both of government 
policies and of voters’ preferences. 115  As McGillivray, Pahre, Mclean and 
Schonhardt-Baileyargue indicate, politicians usually adopt the policies and allocated 
resources which would increase the welfare of the majority of voters in order to 
maximise their political support. They adopt the trade policies which reduce political 
cost and benefit their political survival.116   
Several researchers have analysed the factors affecting the 1996 Taiwanese 
presidential election and indicated that party identification, the character of the 
candidates and national security were significant. Such research focuses only on 
political and social factors and pays less attention to economic ones. However, even 
the analysis of party identification and character of candidates is related to some 
economic factors. Chen analyses the factors affecting the success of Lee in the 1996 
election. His model shows that Lee’s ability (and also the KMT’s ability) to maintain 
Taiwan’s economic prosperity gained the support of a majority of uncommitted 
voters.117 This factor includes both the political and economic concerns of voters.  
Moreover, further research by Hsieh, Lacy and Niou indicates that in the prospective 
voting model, voters’ evaluation of Lee’s ability to manage the economy in the future 
was significantly correlated to their choice.118  
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Assuming that the free investment and trade policy was beneficial to the 
Taiwanese economy and that the economic voting model confirms that economic 
issues are significantly related to voters’ behaviour, the election results showed that 
voters were irrationally opposed to any new economic policy and that the economic 
issue was not as significant as the political conflict. The problem of the model of 
economic voting lies in the hypothesis that voters are rational and ignores the fact that 
there are different social-economic groups of voters who may have different 
incentives to support or oppose a certain economic policy. Different theoretical 
frameworks are used to explain the impact of different social-economic groups on 
government policy. These analyses particularly explore the incentives of different 
social-economic groups and explain how their self-interests affect their support and 
resistance to trade policy and economic reform policy.  
Rodrik analyses the struggle of economic reform in some transition economies 
in the 1990s. He sought to explain why most voters opposed beneficial economic 
policies. 119  In another work of Rodrik and Fernandez, they created a model to 
examine gains and losses by social groups both before and after economic reform.  
Their model shows that there are various factors which may lead different social 
groups to precisely calculate their actual gains and losses from reform because the 
transaction costs for different social groups vary. If the future gains cannot cover 
transaction costs or to bring a better life, most voters choose to retain the status quo.  
In other words, the uncertainty caused by transaction costs affects voters’ behaviour 
and preferences for new economic policy.120 Rodrik further notes that the institutions 
should try to cover the transaction costs for those who may lose from the reform.  
Nevertheless, these institutions do not always function properly and efficiently to 
cover the cost.121 
Based upon the work of Rodrik and Fernandez, Adams creates a model which 
examines the struggle between different social groups by evaluating the political 
weights of different groups and their preferences for different policies. His model 
separates society into nine groups: the external factor, a ruling group, a group of 
opposite politicians, a group of capitalists, a group of workers, a group of government 
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bureaucrats, students, rich farmers and the poor. His model gives each group different 
political weights and analyses their gains, losses and uncertainty in terms of three 
different economic reform policies. Finally, he concludes that a policy is postponed if 
it reduces the wealth of the majority social groups; that is, the larger the political 
weights that would gather if more social groups or powerful groups anticipated 
becoming worse off or were very uncertain about a new policy. 122  
 
3-7. Definitions of the Terminology  
Two terms in this dissertation need to be clarified.  There are several different 
definitions of ‘small and medium-sized enterprises’. The different explanations lie in 
the qualitative and quantitative criteria for the enterprises. According to the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, the definition of SMEs is based upon 
quantitative criteria―the number of employees―in the enterprises.123 Any which has 
less than one hundred employees is defined as an SME. In Taiwan, the official 
definition includes both qualitative and quantitative criteria, including the number of 
employees and the authorized capital. The standards are adjusted over time with the 
changing development policies (see Table3-1).  
In addition to the size of the SMEs, the present research mainly focuses on the 
manufacturing SMEs in traditional manufacturing industry. According to the 
definition of the Taiwanese government, manufacturing industry includes traditional 
industry, basic industry and skill-intensive industry. Based upon the Act to Encourage 
Industry, an upgrading programme in 1991 and 1999, the term ‘traditional industries’ 
includes three types of manufacturing industries as well as those which the Act 
explicitly supported, namely, precision electronics (including computer, 
communication and consumer electronics) and precision machinery.124  The definition 
of traditional manufacturing SMEs covers the SMEs in traditional industries and is 
not included in the programme of the Act to Encourage. 
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Table 3-1.  The Official Standard Definitions of Taiwanese SMEs in 1967, 1973, 1977 
and 1995 
Industry/Year 1967 1973 1977 1982 1995 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
Capital under 
NT$ 5 
million; and 
number of 
regular 
employees 
under 100 
people.  
Registered 
capital under 
NT$ 5 million 
and total assets 
under NT$20 
million; or 
number of 
regular 
employees:  
(1) Shoe-
making, 
garments 
and 
electronics
: < 300 
people. 
(2) Food 
processing
: <200 
people.  
(3) Others: < 
300 people 
 
Paid-in 
capital 
under NT$ 
20 million 
and  total 
assets 
amount 
under NT$ 
60 million. 
And the  
number of 
regular 
employees: 
< 300 
people.  
Paid-in 
capital 
under NT$ 
40 million.  
and total 
assets 
under NT$ 
120 
million.  
Paid-in 
capital under 
NT$ 60 
million. Or 
number of 
regular 
employees 
under 200 
people.  
Source: Small and Medium Sized Enterprises Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive 
Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), The White Paper of Taiwanese SMEs (Taipei, 2005), pp.261-262.  
In order to clarify the dynamics of social institutions in a historical context, 
this dissertation should first define how it uses this term. Different approaches use 
different terminology when analyzing the dynamics of society. For example, the NIE 
approach calls it ‘the informal institution’ (North); the social institutional theory 
highlights the dynamics of social networks in society.  However, on the one hand, the 
term ‘informal institution’ is very general. On the other, the term ‘social networks’ is 
too limited. Therefore, based upon the principles of these two approaches, the present 
research chooses the term ‘social institution’.  
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The foundations of social institutions have two aspects: the rules of the game 
and the structure of each social institution. According to Wells, the basic element of 
any social institution is its social structure, which consists of complicated social 
networks based upon social relations.125 According to Knight, the basic level of social 
institutions is composed of social conventions, rules and norms. The principle of the 
social conventions, rules and norm, in the Taiwanese case, inclines to Confucianism. 
126
 There are two accounts of the functions of social institutions. The first account 
considers social institution as a collective activity aimed at solving collective action 
problems and providing benefits for collective activity. The second highlights the 
function of distributing the benefits of social institutions in collective activity. The 
benefits of social institutions which are agreed on by the two accounts include 
‘efficiency (in terms of the allocation of resources or employment of scarce resources, 
social optimality (the maximization of social benefits), minimization of transaction 
cost, stability or the satisfaction of some other functional needs’127.  
In this dissertation, the principle, the elements, the structure and the function 
of social institutions cover both the NIE approach, with its ‘informal institution’ and 
the social institutional theory’s social networks. The dynamics of social institutions 
referred to here include the dynamics of the norms and values of Confucianism and 
the social networks which are constructed on the social relations. The aim of the 
social dynamics is to solve collective problems and the benefits thus include 
efficiency, social optimality, reduction of transaction costs and stability.  
   
3-8. Methodology 
The literature focuses on the political and economic institutions which 
influenced Taiwan’s economic development and the development of SMEs.  
However, similar political or economic institutions in other developing countries have 
not guaranteed economic growth. Moreover, research also confirms that the 
Taiwanese government did not directly support the SMEs. The social institutional 
theory goes further and explores the relations of the state, the market and social 
institutions.  The social institutional theory explains how and why the dynamics of the 
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society support the political and economic institutions to facilitate economic activity.  
Although both the NIE and the social institutional theory indicate the significance of 
the impact of external factors and the historical continuity of institutional changes, 
they do not trace the historical legacy of institutions. Attention to the historical legacy 
explains the impact of historical continuity on Taiwan’s economic development.  This 
impact includes the changes of political and economic institutions and the way in 
which these changes of institutions influenced economic development. However, the 
historical legacy approach fails to analyse the transformation of social institutions 
within the changing institutional framework over time. Therefore, the NIE and the 
social institutional theory are both included when analyzing the historical heritage.   
The analysis includes three different periods within the theoretical framework 
which concerns the interrelation of the political, economic and social institutions.  The 
first period covers Taiwan’s trade and economic history from the 16th century to the 
early 20th century, in order to identify the continuing social dynamics through history.  
The second period re-examines the development policies before 1980 which were 
considered significant in supporting the rise and development of the SMEs. The third 
period then shows the evidence that the government gave only limited support to the 
rise of the SMEs in the post-war development period by analyzing the further 
development of the SMEs in China after the late 1980s during political conflicts and 
government restrictions.  
The first period builds up a historical pattern in a historical context. The 
analysis first clarifies the political and economic institutions, the impact of the 
external hegemonies and the institutions, the demand and supply of the market which 
they dominated.  The clarification of the institutional frameworks seeks to show the 
difficulties (or chances) for business and trade. After clarifying the institutional 
frameworks, the analysis focuses on the way in which business and trade operated in 
the institutional frameworks from the 16th century to the early 20th century and 
compares the impact of the hegemonies, the changing institutional frameworks and 
the ways in which the social institutions supported and facilitated business and trade 
in Taiwan. The historical approach is taken in order to show the similarity and 
continuity of social institutions adapted to the changing institutional framework in 
Taiwanese economic history.  
The second period examines the role of the state policy, the market and the 
social institutions in the rise and the development of the SMEs during the period from 
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1950 to 1980. It first examines the political power structure of the KMT by tracing the 
foundations of its history. Based upon Wontrobe’s theory on the characteristics of an 
authoritarian system, the analysis seeks to show the state’s interest and the way in 
which this influences the formation of policies for economic development. In addition 
to the political power structure within the KMT, the distribution of the political power 
structure in Taiwanese society explains how the KMT remained in power for the 
following fifty years.   
On the basis of the categories of dictatorship and democratic systems of 
Huntington and Wintrobe, I categorise the socio-economic groups as follows. In 
Taiwan the traditional actors do not play as significant roles as traditional actors have 
done in Catholic and Muslim countries.128 Before the change of political system in the 
late 1980s, the chosen groups included dictators (political leaders), bureaucratic actors 
and parliamentary actors. The functional socio-economic groups, as Huntington 
defines them, comprise entrepreneurs, peasants, workers and intellectuals.129 These 
functional socio-economic groups were the excluded ones who held no political 
power under the KMT Leninist party state system.  This shows that the state’s interest 
did not necessarily comply with the economic interests of other socio-economic 
groups because the excluded groups could not influence the formation of the state’s 
development policy.  
Based upon the analysis of the state’s interest and the structure of political 
power, the section then examines the impact of the state’s interest on the formation of 
the policies and the institutions created for the different stages of SME development 
and ask whether these policies and institutions gave significant support to the SMEs.  
The analysis mainly includes the development policies and the legal regulations 
concerning commerce, enterprises and trade. The existing literature usually ignores 
the analysis of legal regulations; the significance of the legal regulations is that they 
clarify the degree and extent of government support for the SMEs before the 1980s.  
The analysis of the policies and the legal regulations shows the support and the limits 
of the government policies as perceived by the SMEs. The support and its limits then 
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identify the space for the support of the social institution; within this space, the 
analysis shows how the social institution supported SMEs’ business operations.     
The third period focuses on the further development of the SMEs in China 
after the late 1980s. There are three parts in the third period. The first part analyses 
the changing economic situation in the mid and the late 1980s; this part shows the 
needs and the interest of the SMEs in the changing economic situation. Here, the 
question is whether the state’s interest complies with the economic interest of the 
SMEs. The second part analyses how the political transformation influenced state-
society relations and how these changes affected the state’s interest and the formation 
of the new economic policy towards China after the late 1980s.   
The second part begins with the theories which explain the transformation of 
an authoritarian system to a democratic system. The focus is on the factors which 
induce change in the interest groups and socio-economic groups in an 
authoritarian/totalitarian system and in a democratic system. The significance of 
political transformation in a society from dictatorship to a democratic system lies in 
the general and presidential elections, when political power was re-distributed among 
the socio-economic groups. Based upon the model of transformation from an 
authoritarian to a democratic society, the thesis analyses how the transformation of 
the political system redistributed political power and created new socio-economic 
groups amongst which political power was shared.  
The redistribution of political power explains the impact of the changing 
political system on the formation of new economic policy. The model of economic 
voting indicates that economic issues are significantly related to voters’ behaviour.  
But it does not further clarify the different incentives and other details of different 
socio-economic groups which also significantly affect their voting behaviour. In other 
words, the economic voting model cannot fully explain why a new economic policy 
was opposed by a majority of voters. Based upon the model of Rodrik and Fernandez 
and Adams, the thesis calculates the political weights and traces the factors which 
may affect the amount of support or resistance to new economic policy from different 
socio-economic groups. It then accounts for the government’s interest and examines 
whether the interest address the needs of the SMEs.   
The third part examines the impact of the new economic cross-strait policy 
adopted, on the basis of the government’s interest in SME investment and business 
operation in China after the late 1980s. It first examines this policy and its impact on 
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the SME investment and business operation across the strait. Then it explains how 
trade was operated and business was run across the strait by the support of the social 
institutions under the formal institutions.  
In conclusion, the dissertation examines the state’s interest and its impact on 
the formation of the development policies within the historical pattern. The historical 
continuity, discontinuity, similarities and differences form the relationship of the 
state, market and the social institution.  The analysis questions the argument of Wade 
and Amsden and identifies how the social institutions provided support under the 
formal institutions.    
3-9. Scope Limitation 
The conventional view of Taiwan’s post-war economic development usually 
focuses on the factors contributing to rapid economic growth: a free market and the 
role of the state have been considered significant in the process of catch-up in the 
post-war period. This research neither tries to explore the new factors contributing to 
Taiwan’s economic growth nor tries to argue that the market and the state were 
insignificant. The focus is on the relation of the state, market and specifically the 
influences of the state and the market on the development of the manufacturing 
SMEs.  
Moreover, the social institutions include several different aspects, such as 
culture and social networks.  This research does not try to explain how or why these 
social and cultural elements of social institution support and facilitate business 
operations. The research regards the social institution as a whole and sees how it 
supported the manufacturing SMEs in the formal institutional framework.   
The scope of the research on the Taiwanese SMEs is from 1950 until their 
entry into China before 2000.  It does not try to evaluate the volume of cross-strait 
trade and investment because much research has already evaluated and analyzed 
economic cooperation across the strait. Moreover, it does not include the economic 
performance of the SMEs in China nor the SME contribution to the Chinese economy.   
3-10. Notes and Data Sources 
The primary data sources used in this dissertation are mainly from the 
government organisations in Taiwan, China and Hong Kong.   
The primary sources used in this dissertation include government publications 
of the R.O.C. (Taiwan) and the newspapers. The government publications include 
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statistics, journals, press release, investigations, reports, white papers and government 
websites. The sources of government statistics include: (1) Statistical Yearbook of the 
R. O. C. is published by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, R. O. C. (Taiwan).  Most of the data on the economic indexes are 
collected from various yearbooks. (2) The statistics on import and export is published 
by the Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), R. O. C.  
(Taiwan).  The major import and export data is based upon this official publication. 
(3) Monthly/Yearly Statistics on Foreign Investment is published by the Investment 
Commission, MOEA.  The Investment Commission is responsible for verifying 
investment (both inward and outward) cases.  The statistics concerning Taiwanese 
investment and foreign direct investment in Taiwan is based upon this series of 
publications. (4) The statistics on the sources of financial capital is based upon the 
publications from Bureau of Economic Research, Central Bank of the R.O.C. 
(Taiwan).  (5) Data and sources concerning cross-strait statistics are collected from 
the publications of the Mainland Affairs Council. The statistics is based upon the 
Cross-strait Economic Statistics Monthly and Preliminary Statistics of Cross-strait 
Economic Relations. 
The sources of white papers mainly from the White Paper on Small and 
Medium Enterprises in Taiwan which is published by the Small and Medium 
Enterprise Administration, MOEA.  The publication includes government’s policies 
on the development of the SMEs, statistics, investigations and research on the history, 
current status and future development of the SMEs.  Information regarding SMEs in 
this dissertation is primary, based upon successive editions of this publication.  
The sources and data for the Taiwanese post-war development are based upon 
Industry of Free China. This official publication is edited and produced by the 
Council for Economic Planning and Development. It includes discussions and 
suggestions for development policies by government economic officials, debates on 
development policies within the administration and opinions from the public on 
development policies. The debates and critical opinions clarify the difficulties of the 
economic situation, government’s interest, support and limits in the rise and 
development of the SMEs.  
The sources for government policies and regulations are collected from the 
Laws and Regulations Database of the R.O.C (Taiwan). This on-line database 
includes all the policies, orders and regulations of the R.O.C. (Taiwan).   
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The data and sources regarding China’s economic reform policy that is related 
to Taiwan and elections in Taiwan are collected from the National Chengchi 
University (NCCU). The Centre for China Studies at NCCU publishes the Journal of 
Economic Research on China, which includes some early economic situation in China 
in the 1960s and the 1970s. Since the late 1970s, the Centre has launched a series on 
China’s economic reform and political situations. Its research focuses on an analysis 
of the reform policies and economic performance and the impacts on Taiwan during 
the period. The Election Study Centre at NCCU compiles and collects opinion polls 
concerning parliament elections and presidential elections. In addition, the Centre also 
compiles opinion polls regarding significant government policies. It also publishes 
investigations and research on government policies based upon data and statistics 
from the elections.  
Sources for the history of the KMT are based upon its official publications and 
information on its official website. The official history of the KMT shows the power 
structure and the mechanism of the political party. Since Taiwan used to be a one-
party state, the political history of the KMT represents Taiwan’s political history 
before the late 1980s.   
Sources of newspapers are mainly from the United Daily Newspaper and the 
China Times. Both newspapers were issued in the early 1950s (the China Times in 
1950 and the United Daily Newspaper in 1951) and had the two largest volumes of 
circulations in Taiwan. The use of reports from newspapers and magazines aims to 
indicate what happened in Taiwan during the political transformation. Since there was 
severe media control, it is difficult to find from these reports any material dealing 
with the political struggle within the KMT before 1990.   
The sources based upon Chinese government publications include statistics 
and policies. Statistics regarding China’s economy, foreign investment and cross-
strait are collected from the China Statistical Yearbooks and China’s Customs 
Statistics (quarterly and monthly). The China Statistical Yearbook is edited and 
published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China; China’s Custom Statistics is 
edited and published by the General Administration of Customs of the P. R. C.. In 
addition to the national statistical yearbook, some provincial statistical yearbooks for 
selected years (published by the local government) are also used. Sources of Chinese 
policies and regulations are collected from the Gazette of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China (State Council Gazette), Orders of the State Council of the 
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P.R.C.  and Yearly Working Reports of the State Council of the P.R.C.; these are 
published by the General Office of the State Council.  
Sources based upon Hong Kong government publications mainly focus on the 
trade statistics it compiles from trade among Taiwan, Hong Kong and China. The data 
of transit trade between Taiwan and China are collected from Hong Kong 
Merchandise Trade Statistics-Imports, Hong Kong Merchandise Trade Statistics-
Domestic Exports and Re-exports and Hong Kong External Merchandise Trade. 
These three statistical books are edited and published by the Census and Statistics 
Department, the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.   
The statistics of Taiwanese FDI in China and cross-strait statistics are based 
upon sources from Taiwan, China and Hong Kong. The reason for using the data from 
these three places is that, before the Taiwanese government officially permitted 
Taiwanese investment in China, the statistics showed that small amounts were being 
invested there. Since there is no official record from the Taiwanese government, some 
FDI statistics from the Chinese government are used. Moreover, the statistics of 
Taiwanese FDI in China differ from the Taiwanese government’s and the Chinese 
government’s. This is affected by the Taiwanese restrictions on Taiwanese investment 
in China. In order to avoid government control, the investment usually transfers to 
some third place and thence to China. In these circumstances, the statistics compiled 
by the two governments differ. Similar problems exist in the statistics of cross-strait 
trade. Since direct transportation was prohibited, statistics from the two governments 
on imports and exports across the strait differ. The reason for using the trade statistics 
compiled by the Hong Kong government is that Hong Kong is the most popular 
transit place for cross-strait trade.    
The secondary sources used in this research project include historical texts, 
historical archives, memoirs and the reports and investigation that the government 
organisations authorised to the private economic research centre. The sources of the 
historical pattern are based upon the historical texts mainly from Fairbank (1969), 
Chen (1997, 2006), Cao (1997), Lin (1997, 2002) and the historical archives edited by 
the Academia Sinica, Academia Historica and National Palace Museum. Sources 
regarding KMT history and the political transformation are based upon the memoirs 
of significant politicians and government officials and the historical texts. The 
memoirs of politicians and government officials are significant for exploring the 
political struggle within the KMT. In addition to memoirs, the historical texts are 
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based upon Zhang (2003), Wang (1987), Wang (2003, Lin (1994)) and the Cambridge 
history of China. Information concerning Taiwanese investment, information 
regarding Taiwanese enterprises investing in China and cross-strait trade are based 
upon the investigations and reports of the Chun Hua Institute for Economic Research. 
The Chun Hua Institute for Economic Research is one of the largest independent 
research centres in Taiwan. The research centre is usually responsible for 
investigations and reports of the government projects. 
 
3-11. Notes on the Spelling of Chinese Names and Terms 
The Pinyin system has generally been used throughout this dissertation. Exceptions 
have been made for names that are universally known in the old Wade-Giles spelling, 
such as Chiang Kai-Shek.  
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Part II.  Constructing a Historical Pattern 
The traditional view of the rise of Taiwanese trade usually begins with the 
Dutch domination in 1624. As Lin argues, the limited records of cross-strait trade 
before 1600 relate to the supply and demand of the market before 1600, because 
Taiwan lacked valuable products for trade.  Did economic Taiwan emerge under the 
Dutch domination? Most of the existing writers mention the piracy in the region in 
sixteenth centuries, but few of them pay attention to the impact of the pirates on the 
emergence of Taiwanese trade.  What was the impact of the pirates on the emergence 
of Taiwan? What were the factors which drew Taiwan into the trading system? How 
did these pirates operate illegal business at sea? Whatever the facts here, in 1684 
Taiwan became part of the Qing Empire and in 1895 was colonised by the Japanese 
Empire.  These two governments established different institutions for trade and 
business in Taiwan.  What was the impact of the state policy on the formation of the 
market, trade and business operation? What was the pattern of trade and business 
during these two periods? What impact did the historical heritage have on the 
development of social dynamics in local society in Taiwan? The following chapter 
seeks a historical pattern, in order to identify the significance of market and social 
institutions for trade and business under different political institutions in Taiwan’s 
past.  
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Chapter 4.  Market, Trade and the Historical Heritage of the Social Institutions, 
1522-1945 
This chapter traces the history of the rise of Taiwan and the beginning of 
cross-strait trade in order to identify the dynamics which have sustained trade and 
business operations in Taiwan and across the strait from the 16th century to the early 
20th century. The focus is on the impact of the formal institutions on the market and 
the role of social institutions in supporting and facilitating trade and business. The 
analysis has three sections: the first covers the three periods between 1522 and1864 
when the political status of Taiwan remained uncertain. The first section identifies the 
dynamics of the market and the social institutions by tracing the pattern of the rise of 
Taiwan in the regional and international trade systems. The second and the third 
sections cover the periods when Taiwan was dominated by the Qing Empire and the 
Japanese empire.130 The second and the third sections contrast the state policies of the 
two empires and look at the impact of these policies on the market, trade and business 
society in Taiwan and across the strait. The comparison then leads to a question on the 
dynamics which supported businessmen in making their investment and trade under 
different institutional arrangements. Finally, the chapter proposes a historical pattern 
in order to identify historical similarities and a historical heritage which continuously 
facilitated business operations in response to the changing environment.  
 
4-1. The Tributary System and the Rise of Taiwan 
The sea bans are usually considered the main factor inducing pirate activity in 
the Ming dynasty. However, sea bans were merely one part of the system by which 
the imperial court managed trade and national security. The monopolisation of the sea 
trade was indeed operated under the Chinese tributary system. According to Fairbank, 
tribute was a China-barbarian institution. It had been jointly created on the Sino-
barbarian frontiers of China and jointly operated as the medium for Sino-foreign 
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intercourse over the centuries’131. From the 8th to the 13th century, the tributary system 
was no longer politically oriented; various trade activities usually accompanied the 
paying of tribute. During this period, some of the coastal ports prospered because 
international trade brought profits. 132 In the Ming dynasty, the imperial court 
continued the tributary system in order to manage foreign relations and increase tax 
revenue.133 
The Ming imperial court further systematised the tribute, including the 
exchange of envoys, the reception of diplomatic missions, regulation of trade and 
extradition procedures; all these activities were regulated, controlled and supervised 
by the imperial court.134 The court asked the envoys and the merchants (both private 
and official) to disembark only at the open ports. Then the envoys headed to Peking 
(Beijing) and presented themselves to the court. The merchants stayed at the ports to 
trade with local merchants in the authorised markets. The envoys who went on to 
Peking were allowed to trade there with authorised merchants at authorised markets.  
These trade regulations were designed to manage national security and to make sure 
that the profits of foreign trade went to the court. The foreigners complied with the 
Chinese tribute system for the sake of their strong trade interests in China. The 
imperial court was aware of the profits brought by trade; yet consolidating political 
power was far more important to it than trade interests. In these circumstances, the 
tributary trade system was the best way to manage international relations and trade.135 
However, the monopolisation of international trade threatened other people’s 
living.  From the 8th to the 13th century, sea trade prospered in the coastal areas.  For 
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centuries, the Fujian traders relied heavily on sea trade because of their geographical 
location and history. From the 10th century, Quanzhou (a city port in Fujian) had been 
used as one of the international trading ports (the customs) for the imperial dynasties.  
The Italian merchant, Marco Polo, in his Travels, recorded the prosperity of 
Quanzhou in the 13th century. Various merchant ships from different countries, 
including India and Arabia, came and went through this port.136 Before the Ming 
dynasty, both the Sung and Yuan imperial courts established international sea trade 
systems in Fujian.137 
The prosperity of sea trade in the previous century and the geographical 
location were responsible for the foundation of sea trade guilds in Fujian, which 
before the Ming dynasty were very active.138 However, the sea bans affected their 
way of life, because the imperial court prohibited all private sea trade. Despite 
prohibitions, smuggling was widespread in the late 16th century according to historical 
records as a large illegal sea trade with foreigners in the Fujian coastal area.139 The 
first and primary foreign trade partners were the Japanese pirates; the rise of the 
Japanese pirates was related to Japan’s internal political conflicts and the changing 
attitudes of the Ming imperial court towards trade with it.  
The Ming imperial court conferred on the Japanese Muromachi Bakufu the 
title ‘the Kingdom of Japan’ and permitted official trade with its official merchants.  
The official trade with Ming China was controlled and managed by specific families 
in Japan. In 1467, internal disturbances weakened the power of the Ashikaga 
Shogunate; other families then tried to carve up the huge profits of trade with China. 
140
  Different families then sent their own envoys to China in order to claim legitimate 
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status as representatives of the Kingdom of Japan.  The domestic political conflicts 
extended to foreign trade.  In 1523, two Japanese envoy ships (sent by different 
families) fought each other in Ningbo, before the Japanese envoys were killed by 
Ming officials. 141  After the Ningbo skirmish the Ming imperial court strictly 
controlled Japan’s tribute trade in China. Yet similar skirmishes over tribute trade 
continued. In 1557 the Ming imperial court refused to receive Japanese envoys and 
halted both official and private trade with Japan.   
The significance of Formosa emerged under the tributary system and the 
economic interests of the Fujian merchants and the Japanese merchants. In addition to 
the demand and supply which provided trade incentives for both the Japanese and the 
Chinese pirates, the geographical location of Taiwan also significantly affected the 
pirates’ activity. Moreover, Taiwan was a barren island without a strong integrated 
political power to dominate trade; this prevented piracy from yet another political 
power. However, incentives and geographical locations alone were not enough to 
bring successful trading, least of all when the trading was prohibited by law. The 
successful operation of illegal trade was founded on the organisation of the Chinese 
pirates.   
The dynamics of the Chinese pirate/merchant networks can be traced back to 
the development of piracy in the early Ming period. Indeed, it is inadequate to 
describe these Fujian pirates as organised criminals only; in fact, most of them were 
originally merchants. They broke the state law and, without the state’s protection, 
they established their own armed forces to protect their private trade. As Jiang and 
Fang write, ‘pirates and merchants are all the same people; when markets are open, 
pirates become merchants and when markets are closed merchants become pirates’142. 
The fine line between pirates and merchants was also closely bound up with the 
structure of these pirate organisations.  
According to historical sources, most of the pirate organisations were 
supported by the local gentry, the powerful and wealthy families and even the local 
officials. Some of these big families and local gentry accumulated their wealth by sea 
trade. But the Ming sea bans reduced their profits. These influential families and 
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gentry then became the main financial backers of the pirate organisations. Such 
support was crucial, since the pirates required money to build ships and buy firearms 
for trade. Moreover, the role of local officials was significant since it was they who let 
these merchants loose to trade at sea. The local officials were basically shareholders 
of the organisation; the organisation offered them shares in exchange for protection.  
The final tier of the organisation was the people who were conducting trade at sea.  
These people were originally sailors, fishermen or merchants who had lost their 
employment through the sea bans. Joining a pirate organisation would enable them to 
make a living and they were familiar with the work before the bans were enforced. 143  
The dynamics of pirates’ organisations continued to play a significant role when the 
European forces tried to join in the tributary trade system.   
 
4-2. The Tribute Trade and the European Forces 
For centuries, the Chinese imperial courts and their subordinates complied 
with the tribute rules in order to maintain security and trade. However, newcomers 
were ambitious to join the system and share in the trade profits. These newcomers 
came from Europe; their thirst for trade began with the Age of Discovery in the 15th 
century.144 The pattern set for these Europeans’ participation in the East Asian trade 
system can be found by examining how the Portuguese and Spaniards entered the 
trade system before the Dutch came to dominate Taiwan. This pattern further explains 
the impact of the tributary system on the rise of Taiwanese trade in the Dutch period.  
During the Age of Discovery, the Portuguese were the first Europeans to come 
to China (in 1514) to trade with the Ming dynasty. Although the Ming imperial court 
initially prohibited direct trade with the Portuguese, from 1557 the Portuguese joined 
the Chinese trade system, taking Macau as their trading base.145 From 1557 to 1578 
the Portuguese were allowed to trade with Chinese merchants at the border. Not until 
1578 did the Chinese court officially permit the Portuguese in Canton (Guangdong) to 
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trade directly. The changes of policy towards the Portuguese ensued after the Ming 
imperial court halted Japanese tributes in 1557. This special authorisation to trade was 
related to China’s need for silver. Although the Ming halted Sino-Japanese trade, the 
requirement for silver continued. Therefore, the Chinese used the Portuguese as 
brokers to continue trade with Japan.146 The need for silver and the changed policy 
towards Japan gave other Europeans the opportunity to enter the Chinese trade system 
as well.   
During the Age of Discovery, the main competitors with the Portuguese were 
the Spaniards. Before these two nations arrived in the East Asian seas, they had 
competed with each other in the Americas and they continued to compete in East 
Asia. Both nations tried to negotiate with the Ming imperial court so that they could 
engage in direct trade with Chinese merchants. As in the Portuguese case, the Ming 
court did not promise the Spaniards anything. Obstacles were set to direct trading and 
the Spaniards followed the Portuguese to set up a trade base in Manila in 1565 in 
order to comply with this Sino-centric system. The Manila Galleon trade began with 
the Spanish domination of Manila and lasted until 1815.  
The Manila Galleon trade was the most famous silver trade route in history.  
The Spaniards transported South American silver and traded it with the Chinese 
merchants. According to historical sources, the Spaniards were not sure what kind of 
trade products would be most useful at the beginning when they conquered Manila. 
They were thinking about cinnamon; but cinnamon production was insufficient and 
unreliable.147 They were certain only that they ought to trade with China in order to 
obtain silk, porcelain and other valuable products. However, they had at this point 
neither ideal export products nor connections with the Chinese. In the early stages, the 
Spaniards did not make a profit. After 1572, however, these difficulties were ironed 
out when the Spaniards built such good connections with the Chinese merchants who 
traded in Manila that the Spaniards made profits.148   
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The Spaniards followed the Portuguese in establishing a trade base and 
transiting different products among different countries to earn profits. It is worth 
noting that neither the Portuguese nor the Spaniards produced merchandise for trade.  
They operated a transit trade by transiting commodities within the regional trade 
system. It is also significant to notice the pattern of their trade with China: they 
needed to find a third place as their transit point to trade with China because the Ming 
imperial court did not allow foreigners to stay in Mainland China. Further, 
geographical locations and trade connections mattered. The Portuguese dominated a 
good position (Macau) located just next to the Chinese border. This gave them easier 
access to the Chinese merchants. The Spaniards had a more distant base which made 
it more difficult for them to link to the trade connections in the beginning. After 
establishing the connections with the Chinese merchants, they made trade profits.  
Both locations and the Chinese merchants played a crucial role in bringing these 
Europeans into the trade system.  
The pattern of participation by the Portuguese and the Spaniards in the 
tributary system indicates two significant factors for the European forces who wanted 
to join the trade: the location, which was either permitted by the Chinese imperial 
court or did not belong to the imperial court; in the latter case, it had to be open for 
trade without the restrictions or controls of any other political power. Second, the 
connections with the Chinese merchants were the channel for acquiring Chinese 
luxuries. These two significant factors also influenced the Dutch domination of 
Taiwan and the rise of Taiwan in the trade system.   
The Dutch first occupied Penghu Island in order to participate in the Sino-
trade system. The Fujian officials negotiated with the Dutch to move from Penghu to 
Formosa and promised to provide them with a quantity of silk and porcelain for trade. 
149
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according to the system there. Although it is not clear whether the Ming imperial 
court expelled the Dutch from Penghu Island by military force or whether the Ming 
officials negotiated with the Dutch and asked them to leave, their departure indicates 
that the political status of Taiwan was uncertain. The political uncertainty also implies 
that there was no solid and integrated power in charge of Taiwan during this period.  
This implies that Taiwan was open for trade without restrictions or control by any 
political power.   
However, the Dutch still found it hard to acquire Chinese products in the early 
period of their rule in Taiwan. Although the Dutch traded with the Japanese 
merchants and pirates for Japanese and Chinese products, the Dutch still did not have 
the permission from the imperial court to trade directly with the Chinese merchants. 
150
 This limited the chances for the Dutch to acquire Chinese products. Therefore, the 
Dutch decided to occupy Penghu and Amoy again. However, in 1633 they were 
defeated by Zheng Zhilong in Liaoluo Bay. This defeat obliged the Dutch in the 
following decades to rely heavily on Zheng’s trade groups for Chinese products (and 
even Japanese products).151  The Chinese business connection with the Dutch was 
founded on Zheng’s supply of Chinese products. The power of Zheng Zhilong and the 
success of his pirate trading were related to the constructions of business networks in 
Fujian.   
 
4-3. The Dynamics for Zheng’s Trade and the Continuing Support for Ming Zheng 
Trade in Taiwan 
At the end of the 16th century, piracy was rampant and the Ming imperial court 
gradually lost control of it.152 From 1600 onwards, the court began to offer some of 
the powerful pirates an amnesty, together with the opportunity of enlistment. The 
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imperial court usually offered such people official positions locally in order to use 
them to control and manage the coastal areas where they had once used dominated.  
This policy was not, unfortunately, altogether effective in reducing illegal sea trade.  
What changed was that this illegal trade (which was controlled by the pirates) became 
legal, but these pirate-officials were still in charge of it. Some of them made a fortune 
from their dual status, in particular Zheng Zhi-Long, a pirate who became a Ming 
official in 1628. The Ming imperial court relied on him to stabilise the coastal area.  
Before submitting to the court, Zheng Zhi-Long was already in control of most of the 
South China and Japanese private trade. In other words, he not only had a monopoly 
of the Fujian coastal trade but also traded directly with the Japanese.153  
Zheng Zhilong organised his own trade organisation Wushang (the five 
commerce). The Wushang was separated into ‘mountain routes’ and ‘sea routes’; each 
route was composed of five branches. The mountain routes consisted of five main 
wholesale departments, which were responsible for purchasing for export silk, 
porcelain and other valuable products from the Chinese mainland. These wholesale 
branches were located in Jiangnan. The sea routes were protected by five merchant 
fleets. These took charge of exporting products, purchasing foreign merchandise, a 
labour agency (bringing in people to work in the countries of South East Asia), 
passenger transport and even collecting the taxes levied on the private sea trade.154 
The base of the sea routes was established in Amoy. The foundation of the Wushang 
organisation strengthened Zheng’s power in both trade and armed men because it 
dominated the sources of the export products and controlled the sea routes for 
transporting them. This also explains why the Dutch tried to attack Penghu and 
Amoy; they were not able to make more profit under the domination of Zheng’s 
family in the South China coastal areas.  
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The golden age of Zheng Zhi-Long began after he defeated the Dutch in 1633.  
When the Dutch were defeated, they had no choice but to rely on his trading groups 
for Chinese and also some Japanese products (the Spaniards relied on Zheng’s trading 
groups, as well).  The rise of Zheng Zhilong was significant for the history of Taiwan, 
since his son (who was also his successor) Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) continued to 
dominate the Fujian coastal area for decades. The fortune collected by Zheng Zhilong 
from the coastal trade and what Koxinga added to it supported their sea forces against 
the Qing dynasty for many years. The trade area ruled by Zheng’s family in the Ming 
dynasty included the Fujian coastal area (in particular Amoy and Quanzhou), the 
Taiwan Strait, Formosa, Japan and even the Philippines and other South East Asian 
countries.155  
In 1644 the Manchurians took over Beijing and dominated China proper. The 
change of dynasties in China in 1645 caused military opposition between the Qing 
dynasty and Ming Zheng that was based in Amoy and Taiwan. After the leader of 
Ming Zheng, Koxinga, lost a significant battle and retreated to Taiwan, the domestic 
political conflicts in China extended across the Taiwan Strait. In 1661 Koxinga 
expelled the Dutch and took over Zeelandia; this was the beginning of the Ming 
Zheng in Taiwanese history. Zheng’s government first opened up a series of 
uncultivated areas by using troops to enlarge the arable land and increase the yields of 
rice.156  
In addition, to obtain the necessary goods and materials and, in particular, to 
acquire military supplies, they needed to trade. Some difficulties were experienced by 
Ming Zheng’s merchants (these merchants belonged in one way or another to Zheng’s 
family and were officials of Ming Zheng). In the past they had carried Chinese 
products from mainland China and traded with foreigners at sea. However, after the 
change of dynasty, the sources of their Chinese products (particularly Chinese silk) on 
the mainland were cut off by the Qing court.157 To make matters worse, Formosa 
                                                      
155
 For details of the trade networks in the 17th century in Taiwan, see Chen, Guodong, “Jindai chuqi 
dongya de maoyi wanlu,” in Ilha Formosa: The Emergence of Taiwan on the World Scene in the 17th 
Century, ed., Shi, Shouqian (Taipei, 1997), pp.17-24. 
156
 The Ming Zheng dispatched the troops to open up ground for rice-growing. A proportion of this 
newly cultivated land was taken into government ownership and the remainder distributed to the 
soldiers who cultivated it. These cultivation policies effectively increased productivity. For more 
details, see Liu, Ninyan, ed., Taiwan kaifa shihua (Taizhong, 1985); Xue, Huyuan, Taiwan kaifa 
shihua (Taipei, 1999). 
157
 The Qing imperial court, at an earlier stage, had enforced the negative policy (Great Clearance): 
forcing the coastal residents to move 25 kilometres inland as they did in several provinces, such as 
73 
 
required certain articles, such as cloth for daily use. In the circumstances, the Ming 
Zheng regime dealt with the difficulties in two ways.  
One way in which it could obtain the products from mainland China was 
through connections (particularly the Wushang organisation).  An alternative way was 
to cooperate with the Europeans. In 1661 Koxinga expelled the Dutch from south 
Formosa (Anping), but the Ming Zheng allowed the Dutch to stay in Northern 
Formosa (Keelung) for trade. In 1670 when Zheng’s troops took over Amoy and other 
small islands in the Fujian coastal area, they allowed both the Dutch and the British to 
set up trading companies in Amoy. Zheng’s government also signed business 
contracts with the Dutch and the British in order to ensure military supplies for the 
Ming Zheng.158 
By using these alternatives, the Ming Zheng in Formosa also enlarged the 
Formosa trade networks in the late 17th century. The trade connections with Japan had 
for decades been dominated by Zheng’s family. According to the historical records, 
after Zheng’s family left Amoy, the number of Chinese trade junks operating from the 
mainland to Japan was sharply reduced. By contrast, the number of Chinese junks 
coming from Formosa and South East Asia increased. This trade route with Japan, 
again, was almost monopolised by Zheng’s family during the period. In addition to 
the northern routes, the Ming Zheng also extended the trade networks to the south, in 
particular to Manila. In the late 1660s the Spanish governor in Manila sent envoys to 
Formosa in order to discuss trade between his people and Formosa. In the 1670s many 
Formosan junks and Chinese junks (from Fujian and Guangdong) traded in Manila.  
The extension of the Manila trade networks created another source for Chinese 
products.159 The prosperous trade with different countries in the region demonstrates 
that Taiwan was at the time very open to this activity because the political power of 
Ming Zheng required support from trade.  
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4-4. The Impact of the Qing Policy on Taiwanese Trade and Business Society, 1684-
1985 
In 1684 the Qing Empire absorbed Formosa into its territory, although the 
imperial court was not interested in running the island.160 Its political purpose was 
uppermost. In the early Qing period, the imperial court forbade immigration to 
Taiwan and also blocked the coastal areas to sea traffic and sea trade. Therefore, trade 
in Taiwan shrank at this period because of the restrictions on immigration, traffic and 
trade across the strait. In the late 18th century, more Han Chinese emigrate to Taiwan 
because of the imperial court’s relaxation of the sea bans. These immigrants (Hoklo 
people) came mainly from the province of Fijian, but some came from the border of 
Fujian and Guangdong (Hakka people). With the increase of population in Taiwan, 
the need arose for a number of products. Since Taiwan was still an immigrant society, 
most of the labour force was still engaged in the cultivation of rice and sugar, with 
little development of handicrafts.  Therefore, the Taiwanese economy looked to China 
for such things.161  
The products exported from Taiwan during the mid-Qing period were mainly 
rice and sugar. These were first exported to Fujian and then transported to the central 
or northern provinces (in particular Shanghai and Tianjin) where they were in 
demand.162 The need for rice and sugar in these places resulted from an increase in the 
Chinese population and the incidence of famines in the 18th century. 163  In these 
conditions, cross-strait trade prospered in the mid Qing period. Yet, unlike the Dutch 
and the Ming Zheng periods, this time Taiwan’s only trading partner was Mainland 
China. Before 1860 (the year when the European powers forced the Qing imperial 
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court to open trade ports), the export market of Taiwan had dwindled to the Chinese 
market alone.164  
The re-emergence of trade across the strait was founded on the supply and 
demand of the Chinese and Taiwanese markets. Taiwanese guilds (which were called 
‘Jiao Shang’) were formed to meet the needs of both the Taiwanese and the Chinese 
markets. Jiao Shang was groups of people who operated cross-strait business. Both 
the social structure and religion influenced the structure of the Taiwanese Jiao Shang.  
The social structure was based upon kinship groups. In the mid-18th century, the two 
largest immigrant communities in Taiwan were from Quanzhou and Zhangzhou (both 
located in Fujian province).165 Within these two communities, different clans were 
identified by their surnames. The places from which they had come and their 
surnames formed the first classification of the Taiwanese Jiao Shang. In addition to 
their places of origin and their kinship groups, various lines of business categorised 
the different guilds. What is interesting is that the guilds usually set up their head 
offices in the temples. They were usually headed by the chief celebrants at religious 
ceremonies.166  
The Taiwanese guilds at this time had several functions.  As mentioned above, 
the Qing imperial court did not have an established local government in Taiwan. The 
guilds managed the market and dealt with security by themselves. Most of the guilds 
monopolised the lines of business they were in. The monopolisation let them 
manipulate market prices. Moreover, these guilds cooperated to set up standard 
weights and measures for their lines of business.  In this way they tried to facilitate 
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business transactions in the Taiwanese market.  The guilds also established their own 
board of arbitration. The board was responsible for dealing with business disputes and 
had the right to decide and enforce punishments.167 Finally, the guilds were also the 
channel of communication with the local government. 168  During the mid-Qing 
dynasty, trade across the strait was operated on the basis of the Jiao Shang system and 
the needs of the Taiwan-China markets. In the late Qing dynasty, foreign forces 
impelled the changes in Taiwan’s trading and business society.   
In 1860, the Qing imperial court was forced to open trading ports in Taiwan.  
Between 1860 and 1863 Tamshui, Takao (Kaohsiung), Keelung and Anping (Tainan) 
became international trading ports. Foreigners and foreign companies were now 
allowed to invest and trade freely in Taiwan. 169  These changes in international 
relations brought Taiwan back into the world trade system. According to Ling’s 
research, the policy of opening ports transformed the rice-sugar economy into a tea, 
sugar and camphor economy. 170  This transformation was, as Lin argues, market-
oriented. The market was no longer limited to China; the transformation was affected 
by the needs of an international market.  
Although Lin’s research clarifies the changes to the Taiwanese economy, it 
did not highlight the continuity of social dynamics which competed with the foreign 
forces in the Chinese market or the foreign market, either. The dynamics of social 
institutions persisted up to the late 19th century when the local Taiwanese traders 
competed with the foreign companies. The competition in the open market reveals 
two significant strengths of the social dynamics.  
There is clear evidence of the strength of the business connection shown by 
the sugar industry in the late 19th century.  Foreigners could not enter the sugar market 
in China, since the Taiwanese Jiao Shang dominated the market for decades with 
strong business networks. The other clear evidence is the dynamics of financial 
sources which can be found from the investment of these Taiwanese merchants and 
compradors in the tea trade in the late 19th century. The money which the foreign 
                                                      
167
 For further details, see Zhuo, Kehua, Qingdai taiwan de shanzhan jituan  (Taipei, 1990). 
168
 The local government in Taiwan before 1885 did not support these guilds very well. On the one 
hand, the local officials were junior officials and could not make any significant changes. On the other 
hand, the imperial court did not pay attention to the development of Taiwan.  
169
 The Qing Imperial Court was forced to open Taiwanese ports for international trade under the 
Treaty of Tianjin which was signed in 1859 because the Qing was defeated in the Second Opium War 
(1856-1860) by the Western powers. 
170
 For further details, see Lin, Man-houng, Tea, Sugar Camphor and the Social Economic 
Transformation in Taiwan 1860-1895, (Taipei, 1997), pp.19-104.  
77 
 
companies loaned tea producers came from their banks in China. The Amoy 
merchants, local guilds and local compradors had sufficient capital in hand.  
According to the sources, most tea production loans did not come from banks but 
from the purchasers of the products. 171  This implies that the local guilds and 
compradors dominated the source and process of production and marketing.172  
Indeed, the evidence of the tea and sugar industries implies that both financial 
capital and business connections were to the advantage of these traditional 
Chinese/Taiwanese businessmen in their competition with the foreign banks and 
enterprises. This competition was, as Lin points out, affected by the demand-supply of 
different markets. What was more important was their business connections with the 
market. This, for the case of the Chinese and Taiwanese merchants, was related to the 
social dynamics which supported them and let them prevail in international trade.   
In addition to the changes of the trade market induced by the foreign forces, 
these changes also led to the rise of new types of merchant who were rivals of the 
Taiwanese Jiao Shang. The foreign merchants began new business in Taiwan and 
planned to compete with the Chinese and local Taiwanese merchants in the sugar and 
camphor trade. Their competitors included the local guilds and the Taiwanese 
compradors whom they hired. These Taiwanese compradors first worked for the 
foreign companies, charged with finding the sources for products, then purchasing 
them and arranging for their transportation. Once the compradors had made a certain 
amount of money they started their own business. Since they were familiar with the 
whole process, it was easy for them to run businesses of their own.  These compradors 
then became the main competitors for the local guilds. 173  The rise of the new 
compradors shows the significant impact of an open market on social changes. Before 
trade was opened to foreigners, the market was dominated by Jiao Shang. When trade 
opens, more participants were allowed to participate in the market. 
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4-5. The Impact of the Japanese Colonial Policy on Taiwan’s Trading and Business 
Society 
The Japanese empire created several new market and trade systems in Taiwan 
in order to assist Japanese industrialisation and establish the market for the resulting 
industrial products. Under these established institutions, Taiwan, as Lin argues, was 
modernised under Japan’s colonial development policies. One of these policies aimed 
at reducing the amount of Chinese capital in Taiwan, because it derived from the 
cross-strait business connections in the Qing dynasty. The tea and sugar industry in 
Taiwan was dominated by Taiwanese Jiao Shang, whose financial capital depended 
on business connections from Amoy or Fujian. The Japanese colonial government 
tried to dominate primary industry in Taiwan, the sugar industry in particular, in order 
to import capital from the Japanese Zaibatsu. Under this  policy, the level Chinese 
capital in the Taiwanese market gradually declined and was replaced by capital from 
the Japanese Zaibatsu. Another factor affecting the decline of Chinese capital in 
Taiwan was related to the collapse of the Chinese guilds in the early 20th century.174  
Despite this action by the Japanese government, considerable Taiwanese 
investment in China began in the early 20th century. The largest amount of Taiwanese 
investment was focused on Fujian province. These investments were made in several 
industries. Moreover, close trade between Taiwan and Japan showed that the 
Taiwanese businessmen operated well despite the sensitive relations between China 
and Japan in the 1920s and 1930s. Lin’s research clearly indicates that cross-strait 
trade did not decline under the colonial regime; on the contrary, trade across the strait 
showed only changes of comparative advantage between Taiwan and China and the 
transformation of the Taiwanese economy during the colonial period.   
However, one question may be asked about the economic transformation. If 
the main financial sources for the Taiwanese businessmen were cut off, what were the 
other financial sources that supported their investment and trade in Fujian in the early 
twentieth century? When the colonial government cut off Chinese capital, it 
established several modern financial institutions in Taiwan. However, the modern 
banks only did business with privileged Taiwanese businessmen and the Japanese 
enterprises. Although the Japanese colonial government did not provide significant 
financial support for the Taiwanese investors, Lin’s research explained it by insisting 
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that the Taiwanese businessmen had collected sufficient funds from international 
trade since 1860.  
  More clear evidence can be found from the early years when the Japanese 
colonial government allowed the Taiwanese to choose whether to stay in Taiwan.  
Before the enforcement of the citizenship policy, the colonial government allowed 
two years for the Taiwanese to choose to remain there or else move back to China.  
After two years, most of the Taiwanese moved back to China. The first factor 
affecting the Taiwanese who moved back was the difficulty of integrating and 
adaptation in Fujian. Archival evidence shows that some of the Taiwanese merchants 
were not familiar with their original homes. Although they had Fujian business 
partners and no problems with the language, it was still difficult for them to integrate 
in the local society.  
The evidence can be found from the family letters of Taiwanese merchants 
which shows their wish for Taiwanese food (such as pickled cucumbers or other dried 
and preserved food) and their prayers for the local temple in Taiwan (instead of Fujian 
temples). The second factor was related to the location of their significant assets. The 
property and money capital of these Taiwanese guilds was in Taiwan, rather than in 
China. What they possessed in China were some business branches. Their business 
letters confirm that the Taiwanese businessmen possessed sufficient funds during this 
period. Yet Lin’s research does not clarify the dynamics of the financial sources from 
the social institution. The financial capital which enabled the Taiwanese to invest and 
trade in Fujian was not dominated by individual families; some of the investment was 
in heavy and capital intensive industries which required large amounts of financial 
capital.175   
Not until 1920s did the local Taiwanese big families set up their own modern 
banks. The shareholders of these banks had in common strong kinship relations.  
These banks supported and made possible large amounts of investment in China.  
Before the set up of local Taiwanese banks which were operated and owned by the 
local Taiwanese, the common Taiwanese businessmen relied heavily on the credit 
cooperative associations. Until the colonial government institutionalised the credit 
cooperative associations, similar types of credit union existed in Taiwan. The 
associations were informal financial organisations operated by their own members, 
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who usually came from similar industries, such as agriculture or fishing. These 
members saved their money in the organisations and the elected members used the 
savings to make loans to other members. The interest earned by the organisations was 
shared every year among the members.   
In 1913 the colonial government issued the regulations of an Industrial 
Corporation, which aimed to formalise credit cooperative associations and to 
encourage business development in Taiwan. The credit cooperative associations did 
not prosper until World War II. Before and after the institutionalisation of the credit 
cooperative associations, the characteristics of the associations were similar. They 
were characterised by particular industries and geographical locations. These 
characteristics were similar to those of the Jiao Shang and the business groups in the 
late 19th century in Taiwan.   
The local Taiwanese banks, the credit cooperative associations and Taiwanese 
investment in China imply that, although the Japanese government set up formal 
institutions, such as the market and the financial system, to develop the Taiwanese 
economy, the social dynamics still played a significant role in facilitating and 
supporting business development in Taiwan and business transactions across the 
strait. Without the supply of financial capital from the social institutions, the 
development of business in Taiwan and business across the strait could have suffered.  
  
4-6. Conclusion 
The tributary system is usually ignored when analysing Taiwanese economic 
history in the early period. Based upon the tributary system and its pattern and rules, 
this chapter clarifies that Taiwan’s political status was uncertain. This was important 
since the beginning of trade across the strait was affected significantly by the tributary 
system even though it was founded on the demand-supply of the market. In other 
words, the emergence of Taiwan as a trading base for the pirates and the Dutch was 
thanks to its exclusion from the tributary trade system. The exclusion from the 
tributary system implies that there was no solid and integrated political power 
dominating Taiwan and paying tribute to the Chinese empire in exchange for 
permission to trade.  
There is absence of evidence showing whether the aboriginal kingdom of 
Taiwan paid tribute to the Chinese Empires. The uncertain political status also 
demonstrates another significant factor in the rise of Taiwanese trade in the region.  
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Since there was no integrated political power to manage trade, Taiwan was open for 
trade. Therefore, the factors inducing the rise of Taiwan in trade were its geographical 
location, unclear political status and free trade.   
Another factor is the role of Chinese pirates/business connections. The 
Portuguese, Spaniards and the Dutch were able to operate the business because the 
Chinese pirates and merchants traded with them instead of through the formal 
tributary trade system. This implies that under the impact of the existing institutional 
framework (the tributary system), the crucial dynamic which supported and facilitated 
illegal trade across the strait was the Chinese pirates/merchants business connections.  
Under the control of the Ming Zheng in Taiwan, international trade in Taiwan 
prospered. This was related to the Ming Zheng’s need for the profits and supplies 
from trading to support its army and its resistance to the Qing imperial court. The 
success of Zheng’s family relied on the structure of the old-pirate organisation, free 
trade, their familiarity with sea trading and with foreign merchants. Therefore, the 
closing of the Chinese coastal area did not damage Zheng’s trade. On the contrary, the 
loss of the Chinese coastal market provided Zheng with a new opportunity to enlarge 
the profits from the sea trade. Given the economic interest and political concerns, 
trade played a significant role in supporting the subsistence of the Ming Zheng.   
According to the analysis of trade history from the 16th century to the 17th 
century, the rise of pirates’ trading and the Dutch participation in the regional trade 
system brought Taiwan into the regional trade system. Trade further prospered when 
the Ming Zheng dominated Taiwan. One important similarity can be found shared by 
the trade and business of the pirates, the Dutch and the Ming Zheng. Under the 
constraints of the tributary system, it is essential to enlarge business connections in 
order to increase trade opportunities and profits. Therefore, during the early period, 
Taiwan was very open for trade. This is also related to the fact that there was in the 
early period no strong political power to integrate and take charge of trade in the local 
Taiwanese society.   
It is also worth noting that the people who operated business in Taiwan did not 
comply with the formal institutional rules. On the contrary, under the influence of the 
system, their business was supported and facilitated by the social dynamics through 
business networks. The success of the Dutch business and the success of Konxinga’s 
trade in Taiwan both relied on Zheng Zhi-Long’s business connections. This explains 
how these political regimes were able to continue to trade when they were prohibited 
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from trading with China. The key point is that if they had not been able to acquire 
valuable Chinese luxuries by trading with China, the operation of their business could 
not have been profitable because of the demand and supply in the regional market.  
Moreover, it is worth noting that these significant business connections were founded 
on social institutions which were characterised by close geographical and kinship 
relations in the earlier period of the Fujian sea merchant groups and the pirate groups.   
There were three developmental stages for Taiwanese trade during the Qing 
dynasty. The Taiwan market stagnated in the early Qing period because of political 
concerns. The changes of policy in the mid-Qing era revived the market. The policy 
increased the population, induced the market and formed the South-China type guilds 
in Taiwan. The Taiwanese/Fujian guilds played a significant role in the Taiwanese 
economy and trade with China. It established a system which operated business in 
different industries; this system included weights and measures for business 
transactions, price controls in the market, transportation and dispute settlement. Yet 
the trading partnerships during this period were limited to China.  
The joining of foreign forces in the Taiwanese market in the late Qing period 
not only induced a market transformation, but also restored the open trade system in 
Taiwan. The transformation and the links with the world trade market also created 
new groups of Taiwanese compradors. The rise of new compradors in Taiwan also 
indicates that more open trade allows new participants in the market. It is worth 
noting here that the power of the Chinese/Taiwanese guilds and compradors was 
greater than the power of these foreign companies. This also shows that more open 
trade did not necessarily weaken the competitiveness of the traditional business 
groups. 
Another important dynamics to identify from the Qing period was the bans 
and the opening up of trade. In the early period when the Qing imperial court 
prohibited emigration to Taiwan, the market was closed and trade shrank. In the mid-
Qing period when the Qing imperial court once more allowed immigrants to Taiwan, 
trade increased and the local market gradually developed. In the late Qing period 
when the Qing imperial court was forced to open the ports for foreign trade, business 
prospered. This shows that the state had a significant impact on the opening of the 
market and trade. The more Taiwan opened for trade, the more the Taiwanese 
economy prospered.  
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During the Japanese colonial period, trade continued despite the hatred 
between China and Japan. Although the Japanese colonial government constrained the 
level of Chinese capital in Taiwan, in terms of Taiwanese trade with China and other 
countries in the region, the colonial government was prepared to open up trade 
channels and Taiwanese outward investment. Although there was no specific policy to 
encourage or support Taiwanese investment in China, a large amount of investment 
went to Fujian. This implies that the dynamics of the open market facilitated 
investment and trade across the strait.  
Although cross-strait trade prospered and the largest proportion of Taiwanese 
investment went to Fujian, some significant social transformation occurred. The 
business connections between Taiwan and China became more business-oriented: on 
the one hand, intensive kinship relations between Taiwan and China diminished after 
generations. On the other, after generations and the development of Taiwanese 
market, some valuable assets remained in Taiwan rather than in China. The 
accumulation of capital strengthened the trade power of the local Taiwanese business 
groups over time. These local business groups showed that the social institutions 
played a significant role in collecting financial capital to support and facilitate 
business for these Taiwanese businessmen. This evidence also indicates that the 
formation of Taiwanese local society strengthened. Although the kinship relations 
between Taiwan and China diminished, some Chinese social characteristics continued 
to support business in Taiwanese society. These characteristics can be surmised from 
the financial sources for business operations in society during the colonial period.  
The transformation of import-export of financial capital which they indicate not only 
changed the trade relations and economic structure, but also Taiwan-China social 
relations.   
The Qing government, as compared with the Japanese colonial government, 
was reluctant to encourage economic development in Taiwan. Although it can be 
blamed for the lack of formal institutions, the market, trade and strong business 
groups were founded during the Qing dynasty. In contrast, the efficient Japanese 
colonial government can be credited with establishing some institutions in Taiwan 
which enabled the Taiwanese to invest in China. The comparison of the actions of the 
governments in the Qing dynasty and the colonial period shows that whether the 
governments were efficient or inefficient at setting up institutions to benefit business 
operation, trade prospered as long as Taiwan was open for trade. It indicates that 
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government played a significant role in opening or prohibiting markets and trading.  
The more Taiwan was open for trade, the better Taiwan’s economy fared. The 
comparison also demonstrates that the social dynamics supported businessmen by 
facilitating their investment and trade, whether the formal institutions were under-
developed or well-established, as long as the state did not block trading.  
The historical pattern shows that the significant impact of the state on the 
Taiwanese economy lay in its power to open up or clamp down on trade. Despite the 
restrictions or the arrangements of the formal institutions, as long as the demand and 
supply of the market existed and Taiwan was open for trade, the business groups in 
Taiwan could rely on the social dynamics (mainly the business networks) to support 
and facilitate their business within the grey areas created by the formal institutions.  
Furthermore, the history also shows that the foreign forces and the changes in China 
significantly affected the market and the trade environment in Taiwan. Regardless of 
the intended or unintended consequences created by the government policies, the 
social dynamics continued to support and facilitate business transactions in different 
ways with the changing environment. Finally, the changes in the Japanese colonial 
period clearly indicated that solid social institutions had been established in local 
Taiwanese society.   
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Part III. Where Did the Support Come From? The Rise and Development of 
Manufacturing SMEs, 1950-1980 
The relaxations on the control of imported materials, the foreign exchange 
system and the export-oriented industrialisation policy of encouraging exports have 
always been considered significant in speeding up Taiwan’s economic growth. The 
beginning of the EOI policy and other later policies in the 1970s and 1980s are 
usually considered successful government interventions in the process of 
development. The government support and guidance to the development of private 
enterprises (including LEs and SMEs) are regarded as the key to economic growth. In 
terms of the development policies for assisting SMEs, most of the existing literature 
highlights the indirect impact of these successful policies on the founding and 
development of the SMEs. Did these direct or indirect supports based upon the state’s 
development policies encourage the foundation of the SMEs and facilitate SME 
business transactions? What was the state’s interest in implementing these 
development policies? If the state’s interest was not in developing the SMEs, to what 
extent did these policies provide support for them? If the government support to the 
SMEs was limited, what played a greater part in supporting the founding and business 
transactions of the SMEs? Finally, in what circumstances did this other support 
emerge? 
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Chapter 5. The Role of the State in the Rise of SMEs, 1950-1970 
The authoritarian system was considered significant in making Taiwan’s post-
war economic development possible. The argument mainly focuses on the power of 
the government to control the institutions and to implement development policy 
efficiently. Since the government dominated both political and economic power in 
Taiwan, its development policies played an important role in inducing the rise and the 
development of the SMEs. Taiwan’s export-oriented industrialisation policies, 
including the EOI policy, have always been considered significant in leading the 
successful growth of the exporting SMEs. In terms of the specific government support 
to the SMEs, most of the existing literature highlights the indirect impact of these 
successful policies on the foundation and development of SMEs. 
Instead of examining how powerful the state was at dominating and 
controlling the institutions in line with its development plans, this chapter looks at the 
way in which the state’s interest influenced the formation of the development policy 
and how far these development policies supported (both directly and indirectly) the 
rise and the development of the SMEs from 1950 to 1970. It begins with an analysis 
of the political power structure in order to explore the state’s interest from the 
perspective of political power. Although the KMT government was able to avoid 
disruptions from local Taiwanese interest groups, the party itself contained several 
different interest groups. The interests of these internal groups influenced the nature 
of the development policy.   
The second section sub-divides to focus on an analysis of the policies and the 
impact of these policies on the SMEs. The development policies are divided into two 
categories. Before the mid-1960s there were no specific regulations aimed at 
supporting the SMEs. The first category of the development policies comprises 
general development policies, which do not specifically aim at supporting the SMEs. 
However, the second category consists of the policies which particularly focus on 
assisting the SMEs’ development. The first period begins with the government’s 
policy change from ISI to EOI. Some economic difficulties occurred in the mid-1950s 
which forced the government to adjust the ISI policy. The first sub-section discusses 
the economic problems and examines how the government’s changing attitudes 
towards them influenced the later development policies and the rise of the SMEs. In 
1959 the government launched a series of new policies in order to change the 
direction of economic development. This second sub-section examines the impact of 
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the second period of policy changes. In the first two periods of policy change, most of 
the disputes regarding government development policy mainly focused on 
encouraging the development of the private enterprises, the liberalisation of foreign 
trade and encouragement for foreign direct investment in Taiwan. These policies are 
usually considered a significant indirect influence on the rise of SMEs in the 1970s 
and the 1980s. Therefore, the first two periods examine the extent to which these 
general policies contribute to the rise of the SMEs. 
The third sub-section then focuses on the specific programmes, policies and 
government organisations assisting the development of the SMEs. The government’s 
assistance was given in several ways; the examination of this period focuses 
particularly on tax exemption, export promotion and financial assistance from the 
state. Finally, the chapter explores the way in which the state’s interest influenced the 
formation of the development policies; this explains why the development policies 
with an indirect or direct influence on the rise of SMEs were to some degree limited. 
Moreover, the analysis and evidence also demonstrate that the significant impact of 
the state policies on the development of the SMEs lay in its power to open or restrict 
the market. Yet the market which the government controlled and created did not 
provide important financial support to the SMEs in their business operations. 
 
5-1. The Rise of Chiang Kai-shek and the Construction of the Party-state Institution 
The period of strong influence from the KMT’s political power on Taiwan 
began in 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek was defeated by Mao. The foundation of 
Chiang’s power within the KMT was considered significant since the model of his 
power structure persisted in Taiwan until 1975. Regarding the rise of Chiang Kai-
shek, one must look at the political situation several years before and after the death 
of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. According to the Cambridge History of China, the KMT in 1923 
was not a well-organised political party. Apart from its headquarters established in 
Guangzhou, there was only one branch in Shanghai. The number of KMT members 
was not clear. The historical sources point out two difficulties for Dr. Sun in 
establishing a well-organised and powerful party. First, the KMT lacked stable 
financial sources with which to run. Second and in consequence, it could not build up 
a powerful army. Finance and the army were two significant pillars for maintaining 
political power in China in the 1920s. For one thing, different warlords were 
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dominating the Chinese regions. Without powerful military support, the KMT could 
easily have lost its political power in South China (mainly in Guangdong).176  
In 1924 Sun published new party regulations to set up the power centre of the 
KMT, namely, the Central Committee. The core of the Central Committee was the 
Political Committee. Moreover, the KMT set up in 1924 a military school, Whampoa 
Military Academy, to train its own army. After setting up these bodies, the regulations 
also reformed the management of the military and finance. After Sun’s death in 1925, 
Chiang Kai-shek was not assigned a place in the Political Committee. He was merely 
a member of the Military Committee and the Principal of the Military Academy. In 
1926, when the political committee appointed Chiang Kai-shek as commander for the 
Northern War, the rise of Chiang in the KMT began.177 
Since the control of the military was the most significant element in gaining 
political power, Chiang Kai-shek had an advantage, as the principal of Whampoa and 
the commander for the North War. For the duration of this war, Chiang Kai-shek 
dominated Shanghai, because it yielded greater tax revenue to support his army.178 In 
1927, he married Soong May-Ling whose family was influential in business and 
finance dealings in Shanghai. This marriage brought Chiang Kai-shek stronger 
financial support and also initiated his relationship with the U.S. government.179  
In addition to these external relations, Chiang Kai-shek established several 
groups to support his own power within the KMT. The first group considered 
significant for Chiang Kai-shek’s rise in KMT was the Whampoa clique. His political 
power was thus founded on his military power. The second group was the ‘C.C. 
clique’ which was named after two significant members of the KMT: Chen Kuo-fu 
and Chen Li-fu. The Chen brothers organised the KMT, dominating the party and 
established significant financial foundations for KMT to operate. The cooperation of 
Chen’s brothers and Chiang Kai-shek was founded on the need to have military power 
and control over the party. The third group was the elite. They had no power over the 
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KMT and had no close relations with the Whampoa and C.C. cliques; but they worked 
in the administrative systems. Chiang Kai-shek’s political power within the KMT was 
founded on and supported by these three main cliques.180 
With the help of different groups, Chiang Kai-shek’s power within KMT was 
consolidated. In 1928 China was united and the Nationalist government was 
established in Nanking. The infrastructure of the nationalist government in Nanking 
was the foundation of the KMT government in Taiwan after 1949. The party-state 
institution was significantly affected by Sun’s idea of establishing a new China. 
According to the Fundamentals of National Construction written by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, 
China had to be led to a democratic and constitutional nation in three stages. The first 
would involve military rule. This stage (from 1926 to 1928) aimed at unifying China 
despite the warlords dominating different regions of the country. The second stage 
would be political tutelage. During this period, the KMT would have to lead and 
guide the people to practise using political power and participating in democratic 
politics. The final stage would be constitutional government. The construction of a 
new China relied on the leadership of the KMT.181  
When the Nationalist government was set up in Nanking, it was the second 
stage of the National Construction. During this period, five principles were employed 
in the running of the country. First, the KMT national representatives stood for the 
national assembly and led people to practise using political power. Second, the 
national assembly asked the KMT Central Committee to exercise administrative 
power in China. Third, the administrative organisation was under the control of the 
nationalist government. Fourth, the KMT Central Political Committee supervised the 
nationalist government. Fifth, the KMT Central political Committee was responsible 
for legislation. Finally, the aim in this period was to train people to practise political 
power. According to these five principles, the administrative system was supervised 
by the party and the parliament was dominated by party members. To sum up, these 
principles constructed the foundation of the KMT as a party-state institution.182 
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Some findings can be drawn from this history. First, the rise of Chiang Kai-
shek was related to the support of various interest groups as head of the army. These 
interest groups cooperated with Chiang Kai-shek and gave him their loyalty because 
he satisfied different interests. Second, the party-state institution was the product of 
China’s particular situation. It integrated the state with the party. Since the party was 
dominated by the small circle of people (such as Chiang Kai-shek and the C.C. 
clique), it was this small group of people that dominated the country. These factors 
made dictatorship the characteristic of the KMT. Third, although Chiang Kai-shek 
was the leader within the KMT, without the supports of these groups, Chiang Kai-
shek’s political power would have been unstable. 
 
5-2. Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT in Taiwan, 1949-1975 
When the KMT came to Taiwan in 1949, some party members asked for the 
re-organisation of the party because of its defeat in China by the Chinese Communist 
forces. The reorganisation of the party excluded from its power centre its main 
members from the C.C. clique. According to the membership list of the Central 
Committee in 1952, the Whampoa clique controlled seven seats out of thirty-two. The 
elites from different fields controlled thirteen. 183  The list of committee members 
implies that the Whampoa clique and the Political Study clique dominated the centre 
of the KMT. This was not only related to the internal power struggle within the KMT, 
but also reflects the need for the KMT to restore its reputation and to control Taiwan. 
Thus, in the early period, the military and elites who operated the administrative 
system were considered crucial. 
The government structure in Taiwan was almost the same as that of the KMT 
government in Nanking. 184  However, the clear separation of political power and 
governance and the well-organised administrative system did not function as a 
democratic system in Taiwan before the 1990s. On the one hand, the KMT in Taiwan 
still maintained the period of political tutelage. In other words, the administrative 
system was in the charge of the KMT Central Committee. Its operation and 
supervision were controlled by the party. On the other hand, since the KMT 
dominated the government system, some special regulations restricted or excluded 
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political power from the people. Two significant regulations ensured the KMT’s 
sovereignty in Taiwan. 
As a result of the Chinese Civil War in 1945, the KMT enforced the 
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilisation for 
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion in Nanjing (10 May, 1948). The aim of the 
provision was to extend the powers of the President (vice president) to deal with 
emergencies, such as wars and economic crises, by simplifying the administrative 
procedures of the Constitutions.185 In addition, the Temporary Provisions have been 
considered significant in strengthening the KMT’s domination, for Chiang Kai-shek 
in particular. The provision allowed the President (vice president) of the Republic of 
China to be exempted from the two-term limit. Chiang had five times been re-elected 
President by the National Assembly between 1948 and 1975. In addition to the 
presidential terms, the general elections for the National Assembly were suspended. 
In 1951, the Judicial Yuan decided to defer the parliamentary election since Taiwan 
and China were still in a state of war; it then announced that the elected members 
could remain in office until an election could be held on the mainland.186 In other 
words, the representatives of the National Assembly remained in power from 1948 to 
1991.  
There were two significant impacts of the Temporary Provisions on Taiwan’s 
politics. On the one hand, the suspension of general and parliamentary elections 
ensured Chiang Kai-shek’s political power in both the KMT and the government. On 
the other, the suspension of general and parliamentary elections maintained the 
KMT’s political power in Taiwan. In terms of population structure, the KMT and the 
mainlanders who came to Taiwan after 1949 (called ‘Waisheng ren’) formed only 
13% of Taiwanese population. The Hoklo and Hakka people (called Bensheng ren) 
provided 85%. The KMT’s concern to suspend elections was also related to the ethnic 
conflicts between the Waisheng ren and the Bensheng ren in 1947. 
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The ethnic problem came to a head in the 2/28 Incident in 1947.187  This 
incident, in the conditions of civil war, was seen as a riot. The Taiwanese provincial 
governor, Chen Cheng, enforced martial law (19 May, 1949) in order to quell the anti-
government rising. During periods of martial law, people were not allowed to form 
associations or political parties, publications were supervised by the police and 
military organisations; and citizens who broke the law were brought to trial under 
military law rather than under civil criminal law. The strict control under martial law 
constrained people’s freedom, in particular freedom of speech and freedom to 
participate in political activity. Not until 1987 did President Chiang Ching-Kuo lift 
martial law.188 Under the Temporary Provisions and martial law, the Waisheng ren 
dominated Taiwan’s politics until political reform in the 1970s. 
In addition to the control of the party, politics and military, the KMT was 
considered successful in running party-state enterprises. The monopolising of party-
state enterprises aimed at supporting the KMT’s political power. Indeed, the 
construction of investment relations for state enterprises and party enterprises had 
already begun in China by 1947.189 The party and these large state enterprises set up 
joint ventures, which are now recognised as a cover for party-owned enterprises. 
Because of their links with the party, these joint ventures usually undertook the 
contracts from the state enterprises and most of their profits went to the party. Critics 
of the party point out that when the KMT took over property and capital from the 
Japanese colonial government, a considerable amount of land, property, capital and 
other enterprises came to be run by the party but not the government. 190  
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From 1949 to 1975, when Chiang Kai-Shek died, the political power structure 
within the KMT and the Taiwanese government were both dominated by the core 
members of the Central Committee. It is worth noting that the KMT government 
launched local elections in the 1950s. However, the local elections include only 
representatives below county level and in every county hall. These elections in the 
local areas had no impact on local governments, not to mention the central KMT 
government. The head and chairman of the county assemblies were appointed by the 
central government. These local elections and the representatives for whom people 
voted had no authority over the local governments, because the local governments 
were directly responsible to the central government rather than to the local voters. In 
other words, these local elections were toothless, because they could not affect the 
authoritarian power. The political power structure in the first period of KMT 
domination in Taiwan can be separated into nine groups with different political 
weights. The given political weights are based upon the degree of each one’s 
influence through elections on the country’s decision-making system. 
Table 5-1 shows the political power structure in Taiwan from 1949 to 1970. 
The first group is the ruling elites in the country, during the Chiang Kai-shek period 
those on the KMT Central Committee. They wholly dominated the military, politics 
and economy of Taiwan and have 10 points of political weight. The second group is 
the government bureaucrats who were responsible for implementing policies. This 
group of people, under the regulations of the Fundamentals of National Construction, 
was under the control of the KMT Central Committee. Therefore, they have 7 points 
of political weight. The third group was the urban capitalists who were the 
entrepreneurs. They had limited influence on government policies. This can be 
ascertained from the fact that of the members of the Central Committee there were 
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few (almost no) members who were entrepreneurs. Therefore, they had 0 points of 
political weight. The fourth group was the urban politicians. The anti-KMT 
movement, called the Tangwai movement, began in the 1950s; it opposed the KMT’s 
authoritarianism. However, under martial law, people were not allowed to organise 
opposition political parties nor to take part in politics. Therefore, although opposition 
forces existed, they had limited (or almost no) influence on Taiwan’s government. 
Other socio-economic groups, such as students, workers, the poor and peasants, were 
all excluded from politics because the Temporary Provisions suspended elections. The 
political weight of these socio-economic groups was zero. 
 
Table 5-1. Political Weight of Different Social Groups in Taiwan 1949-1975 
Social groups Political weights  
KMT ruling elites 10 
Government bureaucrats  7 
Entrepreneurs 0 
Urban politicians 0 
Urban workers  0 
Urban students 0 
The poor 0 
Farmers 0 
 
The history of the foundation of the KMT constructed the political power 
structure of Chiang Kai-shek. His rise depended on the support of different interest 
groups, both within the KMT and outside. This political power structure and the 
membership list of the central committee indicate the interests of the KMT after they 
fled to Taiwan. The military and the elite groups held a majority in the central 
committee. This implies that, under the threat of the CCP, the national security and 
the political stability in Taiwan were the primary interest of the KMT. But the party-
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state system established in China before 1949 also influenced the outlook of the KMT 
in the formation of its early development policy. The party-state system had to wield 
great economic strength in order to support the KMT; the concern of economic 
support was related to the early foundation of the KMT when it could not afford to 
raise its own army.  
Concerned by the conflict with the CCP and the need for political stability, the 
KMT needed support from the SOEs and the LEs which were owned by or related to 
the party. What is more important is that the KMT legitimated its political power 
without general elections by enforcing the Temporary Provisions and martial law. 
These two regulations prohibited other social groups from participating in politics. 
For this reason, other groups in Taiwan’s society could not influence the formation of 
the government’s policy. In these circumstances, it can be argued that the formation 
of the economic development policy was mainly attuned to the interests of the KMT 
in order to maintain political stability by developing the SOEs and the KMT-related 
LEs. Its party-state capitalism also implies that the KMT had great control over the 
Taiwanese economy. 
 
5-3. The Changing of Development Policies: from ISI to EOI, 1954-1959 
The principle of the ISI policy was to develop local industries to produce the 
country’s basic requirements. Under this principle, the Taiwanese government strictly 
controlled and allocated imported materials to chosen industries, giving priority to the 
SOEs in the early ISI period. For other private enterprises, the government in the 
1950s issued regulations concerning the allocation of industrial raw materials. The 
conference record of the Development Hall of Taiwan, the provincial government, 
specified its control of the allocation of raw materials for private enterprises. In 
principle, the allocation of raw materials was based upon production and business 
achievements but did not lose its sense of free competition, since the private 
enterprises were permitted to import raw materials from abroad. However, the amount 
of the imported raw materials was controlled by the government.191  
It is also worth noting that Taiwan lacks natural resources and had at this time 
too little foreign exchange to import raw materials; these significant difficulties forced 
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the government to control the raw materials for industrial production. Economically, 
the control on the import quota for private enterprises and the protection for them in 
the domestic market were reasonable steps in the foundation and early development of 
enterprise. Yet it is also possible to argue that the KMT’s support for the SOEs was an 
attempt to stabilise politics by controlling the economy. 
Meanwhile, under the principle of the ISI, the government in 1951 also issued 
regulations on foreign direct investment in Taiwan. The regulations focused on 
attracting funds from U.S. and overseas Chinese investors. According to the 
investment guarantees signed by the U.S. government and the Taiwanese government, 
the profits of U.S. investors could be transferred to the U.S. embassy in Taiwan and 
the U.S. government in turn would pay the profits to the designated payees. This 
regulation implies that the foreign exchange system was tightly controlled by the 
Taiwanese government. In other words, the U.S. investors could not transfer their 
money freely. Moreover, the U.S. Security Council guaranteed the U.S. investors in 
Taiwan against damage and loss. Meanwhile, the overseas Chinese investors did not 
benefit from any parallel agreement.192 
However, in the 1950s Taiwan’s policy attracted very little FDI. Newspaper 
editorials in 1954 and 1955 indicate that the failure of the policy was related to the 
severe control and restrictions on the foreign exchange system, restrictions on the 
import of raw materials, higher prices for local raw materials, taxes and obstacles to 
impede exporters. 193   
The ISI policy, with its high level of controls caused economic difficulties in 
Taiwan in the mid- and late 1950s. Figure 5-1 shows the trade deficit from 1950 to 
1970. There were trade deficits in each of these twenty years (except for 1963, 1964 
and 1970). In particular, there was a severe trade deficit in 1954. The slump from this 
trade deficit was related to the changing U.S. policy which would gradually reduce 
the aid to Taiwan. Figure 5-2 shows U.S. aid as the financial source for imports. With 
the reduction of U.S. aid as the imported financial source, the KMT government had 
to deal with the trade deficit on its own. The newspaper editorials of the time 
discussed the impact of the reduced U.S. aid and most of them suggested to the 
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government that in addition to cutting budgets, it was significant to attract foreign 
investment and encourage exports to withstand the financial deficit and shortage of 
foreign exchange.194  
Amid these increasing economic problems and the failed FDI policy, in 1954 
Yin Kongyong, a high-level economic official in the government, published a 
discussion on industrial policy for Taiwan. This discussion concentrates on the 
restrictions on the development of private industry. It points out that the most 
effective way to solve the problems of a trade deficit and shortage of foreign 
exchange is to enhance industrial development in order to increase production.195 The 
KMT high officials had long been reluctant to promote the development of private 
enterprise under the principles of the Constitution, which in Article 142 restricts 
private capital. Although in Article 145 it indicates that the state respects private 
property and enterprises; still, ‘the state shall restrict them by law if they are deemed 
detrimental to a balanced development of national wealth and people’s livelihood’.196 
The General Secretary of the Council for International Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Tao Sheng-Yang, finds that the attitudes of government officials 
towards private enterprise adjusted gradually and only after the mid-1960s.197  
Many people considered Yin a liberal economist because he strongly 
encouraged the development of private industry and the establishment of a free 
market. The critics of Yin’s policy suggestion focused mainly on governmental 
controls. The newspaper editorials argued that these sound policies for industrial 
development and the significant role of government to create the environment were 
indeed ‘plans’, ‘controls’ and ‘restrictions’. The government decided the type of 
investment, allocated the raw materials for production and controlled the import of 
raw materials and the foreign exchange system. Under these policies, the government 
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decided on behalf of private enterprises what and how much to produce. This was not 
a free economy.198  
Yin’s discussion of industry policy is not against government intervention in 
economic development. Indeed, he supports government intervention. At the end of 
the discussion paper he clarifies his strong advocacy of the role of government: 
“…the Government should take steps to determine the direction, types and extent of 
industrial development, to draw a line between public and private enterprises, to 
coordinate the policies of protection, controls and free competition, to renovate 
equipment, technique and enterprise management and to improve the industrial 
environment”. 199 
The new policy suggests a different direction for the government’s control and 
planning. The new direction is to create a market system controllable under the 
government. Yin’s suggested policy also implies that the market in the 1950s was 
mainly monopolised by the SOEs and a few LEs; in other words, the remaining 
private enterprises were unable to compete in the market. On the one hand, the SOEs 
and certain LEs were protected in the domestic market; but, on the other, the control 
on the imported resources and the foreign exchange system blocked the access to 
imported resources for production. Although the state did not deliberately stifle the 
private sector of the market, the development of the private sector was impeded by the 
protection and encouragement of the SOEs and LEs. 
Although the government was aware of the problems caused by the ISI, the 
government was slow to adjust the restrictions. As reviewed in Chapter 1, in the late 
1950s, the economic situation deteriorated and the unemployment rate increased. The 
newspaper editorials commented that 197 private enterprises went bankrupt in 1957-
8. They indicated that the problems causing these frequent bankruptcies were related 
to the shortage of circulating capital (turnover funds), the small scale of the market 
and the heavy taxes.200 In the late 1950s, most critics of the government economic 
policy again focused on the restrictions on imported materials for industrial 
production and the control of the foreign exchange system and export trade system, 
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because these constraints led to the problems of frequent bankruptcy and an 
increasing unemployment rate.201  
Finally the government launched new policies. In 1959 the ‘Nineteen Points of 
Financial and Economic Reform’ was promulgated. Within these nineteen points, 
some policies, such as encouraging investment, developing privately-owned 
enterprises, improving the investment environment, freezing the national defence 
budget, improving the tax system, adjusting the foreign exchange system and 
encouraging exports were considered significant in creating export-led growth in 
Taiwan. The Nineteen Points of Financial and Economic Reform was considered to 
have changed the policy from ISI to OEI.202 
 
Figure 5-1 Value of Imports, Exports and Trade Balance (USD$ 1,000), 1950-1970 
 
Source: Economic Research Centre Council for U.S. Aid , Executive Yuan R.O.C.(Taiwan), Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book (Taipei, 1962, 1971) , p.111, p.130. 
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Figure 5-2. Percentage Distribution of Financial Sources of Imports in Taiwan (%),    1950-
1970 
  
Source: Economic Research Centre Council for U.S. Aid, Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Taipei, 1962, 
1971) , p.112, p.132. 
 
Among these development policies, the ‘Act Encouraging Investment’ was 
first enforced in 1960 in order to encourage private investment and speed up 
economic development. This Act was implemented for around thirty years and was 
abolished in 1991. By the Act, the government encouraged production in various 
types of corporation, including manufacturing, agricultural processing industries and 
machinery and construction, etc. The preferential mode of the Act on the types of 
industries encouraged by the government was exemption from taxes. This initiated the 
government’s support for privately-owned enterprises in Taiwan.203 In addition to the 
encouragement for private enterprises, the government in 1965 issued the ‘Statute for 
the Establishment and Administration of an Export Processing Zone (EPZ)’. The 
Statute was targeted at attracting investment and expanding international trade in the 
export processing zones by providing preferential and tax exemptions for exporting 
enterprises. The policy of the EPZs is considered successful, since foreign investment 
increased in the 1960s. 204  In addition to these two new policies and the 
encouragement of the FDI regulations, other policies, such as export loans, 
depreciations of NTD against U.S.D., tax exemptions for exports and the 
simplification of export processes were implemented, together with the nineteen-point 
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reform policies, in order to speed up industrial development and to encourage 
exports.205 
The government’s report showed how the government assisted the 
development of private electrical enterprises in Taiwan in the early 1960s in the 
reform policy framework. In the early 1960s, the foreign companies (mainly from 
Japan and the U.S.) provided Taiwanese electrical factories with electrical 
components; the Taiwanese factories assembled these components and exported them 
back to Japan and the United States. Later, the government encouraged FDI in Taiwan 
and connected the industrial relations of foreign investors with the local factories. The 
establishment of EPZs enhanced the connections. With the increase in foreign 
investments, exports gradually increased. 206  
Although the export of electrical products increased from USD 10,000 to USD 
700,000,000 in the period 1963-1968, the newspaper editorials disagreed with the 
government’s strong support for the development of the electrical industry. The 
evidence can be found from import taxes and the administrative process for tax 
exemption. In addition to the complicated nature of the latter, it required a large 
deposit. The import tax on finished products and electrical components was 15%; in 
contrast, the import tax on raw materials for producing electrical components was 
30%.207 The details in practice of implementing the policy were not as helpful as the 
government described. 
Moreover, the newspaper editorials criticised the government’s 
‘encouragement’ and the ‘principles’ of EOI strategy. The original goal of these was 
to remove some restrictions and facilitate business procedure. However, they usually 
stood as exceptions to the existing rules; in other words, the encouragement and 
principles were exceptional.  There were few qualified private enterprises within the 
exceptions and only a limited minority benefited from them. This was against the 
spirit of free competition. The fundamental problem was the restrictions of the laws 
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themselves. Adding encouragement and principles did not solve the problem; instead, 
it created other privileged groups.208   
The evidence of the critics can be found from the cases of SMEs which were 
difficult to help by these means. For example, although the Act Encouraging 
Investment had been implemented for thirty years in order to promote the 
development of private-owned enterprises (not SMEs in particular), most SMEs were 
not benefiting from the encouragements because they were  identified as corporations, 
even though, according to the government statistics, over 65% of SMEs were sole 
proprietorships rather than corporations. This excluded them from the tax exemptions 
of the Act to Encourage.209 
The evidence shown in this section suggests that the environment created by 
the government was not a ‘free market’ economy in which to compete. In the light of 
different political and economic concerns, the government gradually seemed to relax 
its restrictions by launching encouragement policies and principles. But, given the 
framework of controls, encouragement policies and principles, only certain groups 
benefited and went on to engage in competition. The evidence here also demonstrates 
the significant impact of the state on the openness of the market. Although the export 
market was open and the foreign exchange system was adjusted, protections and 
preferential terms for the SOEs and LEs still existed. In these circumstances, the 
policy adjustment to allow the general private enterprises to develop still depended on 
the state’s interest in supporting the SOEs and selected LEs.  
 
5-4. Direct and Indirect Support for the Development of SMEs 
In 1966 the first official organisation ‘Workshop for assisting SMEs’ aimed at 
assisting SMEs was set up. The aim of the workshop was to provide small-scale 
industrial loans and revolving business loans. In 1968 and in 1970, the small 
workshop expanded into an assistance bureau and set up a unified service for the 
SMEs. The assistance bureau provided technological aid and consultancy services. 
The service centre established a research centre for technology management. The 
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function and programme of these organisations focused on assisting techniques and 
technology for the foundation of SMEs.210  
Nevertheless, the primary problem was not technological or to do with 
management support; instead, for the SMEs the primary difficulty lay in obtaining 
loans from formal financial institutions. The borrowing difficulties for the SMEs can 
be analysed from three points of view. The first is related to the banking system and 
the government’s development policy which excludes SMEs from loans. In the 1950s 
the KMT government set up different state-owned banks for the Taiwanese financial 
system. From 1950 to the early 1970s, the highly centralised control of banking 
operations was in the hands of the KMT government.211  
Meanwhile, some reports do not strongly support any encouragement for the 
development of SMEs in the late 1960s. Lin and Yang argue that the advantage of 
cheap labour could not last long in the international market; the focus of a 
government’s development policy had to be on the development of LEs because of 
their economy of scale and the accumulation of capital for further investment. 
Government’s support for SMEs should focus on certain industries which might assist 
the development of LEs.212  
A similar idea can be found in Warmelo’s research on Taiwanese industries 
during this period. He argues that what the government should have done was help 
SMEs to improve their production techniques to increase production and raise 
quality.213  These reports and suggestions were published in government industrial 
journal which suggested what direction government should take to assist the 
development of SMEs. Under the principles of the development policy, only state-
owned enterprises and special LEs could receive loans from these public commercial 
banks. The loans for these large private enterprises were part of the protectionist 
policy aimed at establishing Taiwan’s modern industrial sector.214  
                                                      
210
 Small and Medium Enterprise Administration, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan 
R.O.C. (Taiwan), http://www.moeasmea.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=554&CtNode=553&mp=1. (accessed 20 
June 2011).  
211
 For more details concerning the banking system, see Zhang, Shaotai, Taiwan jingrong fazhan 
shihua (Taipei, 2005); Lai, Yingzhao, Taiwan jingrong bantu zhi huigu yu qianzhan, (Taipei, 1997); 
Yu, Zhongxian  and Wang Jinli, Taiwan jingrong tizhi zhi yanbian (Taipei, 2005). 
212
 Lin, Haida and Yang, Zongze, ‘Zhongxiao qiye zai Taiwan jingji fazhan zhong zhi diwei’, Industry 
of Free China, vol.28, no.2 (1967), pp.10-13.  
213
 Warmelo, W. Van, ‘The development of Taiwanese SMEs’, Industry of Free China, vol.28, no.4 
(1967), pp.15-20. 
214
 Some argue that the protectionism policy and the financial policy to make loans to these large 
private enterprises were influenced by political power. In other words, politics dominated the 
104 
 
At the same time, the local banking systems (the credit cooperative 
associations) did not to any great extent help the SMEs, either. The local credit 
cooperative association was embedded in complicated local social networks and 
political forces which might bias the direction of their granting loans to enterprises 
which had good social connections or strong political relations rather than to 
enterprises which would make larger profits. For example, in the research of Zhou 
and Chen, a local SME owner whom they interviewed argues that it would be easier 
to borrow loans if one were running a campaign and were elected councillor. The 
quota of loans for a councillor is fifty million. 215 The statement shows that political 
connections and power were believed to help in obtaining loans. The evaluation of the 
amount of loans was determined by political and social power rather than by the 
profits made by the SMEs. The structure of the formal banking system, including the 
commercial banks or the local banking system, shows that SMEs were required to be 
among the ‘privileged’ ones in order to receive a loan from the formal banking 
system. 
The second problem was that the SMEs usually lacked what banks would 
count as valuable collateral; this issue made it difficult to grant them loans because of 
formal regulations and market perspective. Li Kuo-Ting states that the Civil Law 
restricted the ability of the banks to grant business loans and reduced the chance for 
private industry to obtain them. The restrictions came from the regulations that only 
real estate can be mortgaged; there was no chattel mortgage. Moreover, even though 
the government encouraged exports, the machinery imported for private enterprises 
were not accepted as security for instalments of customs duties.216 Although Li does 
not focus particularly on SMEs, the difficulties which he indicates apply more to 
SMEs than to LEs.  
In another article, Li suggests what government should do to create a 
favourable environment for the development of private enterprises. This includes two 
main recommendations: the simplification and liberalisation of government controls 
and the removal of restrictions, while increasing the available funds for investment 
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and credit facilities.217 The latter suggestion refers in fact to another restriction of the 
financial market in Taiwan. The restrictions lie in the small size of the stock and bond 
market and the government’s intervention in controlling prices in the financial market. 
The controlled financial market hindered the free flow of capital. Therefore, the 
financial market could not provide financial support for the SMEs.218 Meanwhile, 
government strictly controlled the foreign exchange system. The strict control on the 
foreign exchange system closed access to the foreign capital market and hindered 
firms seeking loans from overseas. 
The restrictions thus hampered the attempts in the 1960s of the private 
enterprises to raise funds from the market and the development of an investment 
market in Taiwan. Evidence can be found from the low percentage of domestic 
investment in GDP in 1967; it was only 22.5 percent of GDP.219 From the business 
perspective, equally, the lack of valuable guarantee increases risks for banks which 
grant loans to SMEs. Most of the SMEs could only raise short-term loans from banks. 
The strategy of short-term loans was also profit-oriented, because banks earn higher 
interest rates from them.  
Under the restrictions of the banking system and the formal regulations, from 
a business perspective, the press suggested that the government should set up an 
insurance fund in order to support SMEs which sought bank loans as capital.220 This 
indicates the difficulties for such SMEs. The Ministry of Economics, in order to assist 
the SMEs to get credit and insurance funding, set up the Credit Guarantee Fund, but 
with limited functions. Newspaper editorials indicated that although the government 
had had a policy to grant loans to SMEs since 1954, in the next 16 years fewer than 
1000 SMEs had been eligible to benefit from this policy. 221  The report and the 
editorials indicated the difficulties of raising the necessary capital to start and operate 
as an SME. In other words, the direct support of government in financial capital was 
restricted.  
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The SMEs were not only restricted in obtaining loans from the formal 
financial institutions, but also found it difficult to secure revolving business loans 
from banks. Since financial capital plays a significant role in starting and operating a 
business, some indirect support from government policy was assumed to be helpful in 
lifting some of the financial difficulties of the SMEs. According to the existing 
literature, the business credit loans from the SOEs and LEs played a major part in 
assisting the SMEs’ business operations and reducing the stress over cash flow. 
However, the impact of the business credit loans on SME financial support was not as 
profound as it was described.  
The SOEs were privileged in borrowing and importing raw materials and were 
protected from competition in the domestic market. In principle, the SOEs were able 
to assist the development of SMEs by supplying cheaper raw materials to lower 
production costs and business credit loans to facilitate business transactions. Figure 5-
3 and Figure 5-4 below show a comparison of the estimated wholesale price of 
selected raw materials in Taiwan and in Korea. The selected raw materials are the 
important raw materials for the popular industries in which the SMEs engaged. Cotton 
yarn, nylon filament fibres and polyester were the main raw materials for garment 
manufacturing; PVC powder and PVC resin were the main raw materials for 
manufacturing shoes and toys. The comparison demonstrates that the wholesale prices 
of these raw materials in Taiwan were generally higher than in Korea. This 
contradicts the argument that the SOEs indirectly helped the SMEs by reducing 
production costs through their cheaper raw materials. In other words, the government 
did not get the relative price altogether wrong in terms of providing raw materials and 
intermediate goods to the SMEs in these main manufacturing industries.  
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Figure 5-3. Estimation of the Price of Cotton Yarn and Nylon in Taiwan and in Korea 
(USD$), 1967-1981 
  
Sources: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Industry of Feee China, vol.42, 
no.1(1974), pp.164-168; vol.43, no.4 (1975), pp.160-166; vol.45,no.2 (1976), pp.166-172; vol.55, 
no.6(1981), pp.186-192; vol.65, no.4 (1986), pp.204-214; Economic Planning Board, National Bureau 
of Statistics, ROK,  Monthly Statistics of Korea, 1971, vol.7, pp.78-80; 1975, vol.7, pp.81-84; 1980, 
vol.1, pp.110-112; 1981, vol.7, pp.110-112; 1986, vol.1, pp.118-120. 
Note: The original data of the price of Taiwanese cotton yarn (20 counts/180 kg) and nylon (70 denier) 
were recorded in NTD. The price of Korean cotton (23 counts/100kg) and nylon (70 denier) was 
recorded in Korean won. The estimation of the price in Figure 4 was converged from the NTD and 
Korean won into USD. based upon the foreign exchange rate per year from 1967 to 1981. The price of 
Taiwanese cotton yarn was divided into 100 kg in order to compare it with Korean cotton yarn. There 
were no records in the original data of the price of Korean nylon in 1969 and in 1973. 
 
Figure 5-4. Estimation of the Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) in Taiwan and in Korea 
(USD$) 1973-1979 
  
 
Sources: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Industry of Feee China, vol.42, 
no.1(1974), pp.164-168; vol.43, no.4 (1974), pp.160-166; vol.45,no.2 (1975), pp.166-172; vol.55, 
no.6(1981), pp.186-192; vol.65, no.4 (1986), pp.204-214; Economic Planning Board, National Bureau 
of Statistics, ROK,  Monthly Statistics of Korea, 1971, vol.7, pp.78-80; 1975, vol.7, pp.81-84; 1980, 
vol.1, pp.110-112; 1981, vol.7, pp.110-112; 1986, vol.1, pp.118-120. 
Note: The original data of the price of the Taiwanese PVC (meter ton) and the Korean PVC (meter ton)  
was recorded in NTD and in Korean won. The price is converted into the U.S.D. based upon the 
foreign exchange rate each year against the USD PVC= Polyvinyl Chloride. 
 
In terms of business credit loans, this programme is usually implemented with 
the Credit Guaranteed Fund. The SOEs did loan SMEs through business credit or 
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trade credit under the insurance of a Credit Guaranteed Fund. Nevertheless, the 
process of entering or engaging in a business/trade credit loan is more complicated. 
Usually the SOEs recommend a SME which is qualified to grant business/trade credit 
loans to banks and insurance companies. Then the banks and the insurance company 
evaluate the qualification of the SME. Guaranteed by the insurance company and the 
banks, the SME is granted a business/trade credit loan by the SOEs. The 
business/trade credit loans are usually short-term, ranging from three to six months. It 
is worth noting that the ‘qualified’ SMEs are those which have purchased raw 
materials or intermediate goods from the SOEs for a certain period. In other words, 
these SMEs must accumulate business credit from their business transactions with the 
SOEs for several years. During this process, the SMEs cannot enjoy any 
business/trade credit loans; they usually pay the SOEs in cash. This process again 
endorsed the criticism that the encouragement or principles of the government tended 
to create a new privileged group. 
Therefore, before the SMEs became eligible for borrowing from the SOEs, 
how did these SME candidates raise funds and manage the cash flow for their 
turnover funds? According to Liang, most private enterprises in the 1960s borrowed 
chiefly from the private free market; interest rates on such loans were nearly fifty 
percent per year. The shortage of available financial funds can be traced to the 
government deficit and therefore the SOEs were privileged to grant limited loans from 
the formal financial institutions.222 Analysis of the evidence demonstrates that the 
market which the government controlled and established did not provide significant 
finance support to the setting up and operation of the SMEs in business.  
 
5-5. Conclusion 
The analysis of the government’s policy in the early 1950s is usually ignored; 
in particular the government’s interest in the development of the private enterprises. 
The structure of political power within the KMT in the 1950s identifies the state’s 
interest. Most of the members of the central committee belonged to the military or 
administrative elites. During the struggle with the CCP, national defence and political 
and economic stability were the main concern of the state. The state’s interests and 
the structure of the KMT’s party-state capitalism influenced the early formation of 
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development policy. The evidence shows clearly that with the state’s interests, the 
government was reluctant to support private enterprises at first, for both political and 
economic reasons. The economic reasons were related to the shortage of funds and the 
scarcity of natural resources in Taiwan. The political concerns were related to the 
KMT’s control on the SOEs and LEs, a control which supported and stabilised its 
political power in Taiwan.  In these circumstances, the market was monopolised by 
the government and the priority for resource allocation was held by the SOEs and 
LEs.  
In the mid- and late 1950s the government relaxed some restrictions regarding 
tax refunds, controls on imported materials and the foreign exchange system in order 
to attract FDI to Taiwan. However, many restrictions still remained. Evidence shows 
that from 1954 to 1968 the critics still focus on the heavy taxes, the controls on 
imports and the foreign exchange system. The case of the tax on imported materials 
for electronics in the 1960s indicates that these were still taxed highly. This 
demonstrates that the government did not relax the restrictions much in the 1950s; the 
policy adjustments were still composed of many controls and restrictions. Therefore, 
it is difficult to argue that most of the policy adjustments regarding export 
encouragement were made in the 1950s and the early 1960s. 
Although the state did not prohibit private enterprises from trading, the 
protections and encouragement policies for the SOEs and LEs hindered other 
enterprises in the market. In other words, the protections and encouragement for the 
development of the SOEs and LEs restricted the development of the private sector, 
because the market was monopolised by the SOEs and LEs. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the changes of policy in the 1960s focused only on relaxing some 
restrictions (or reducing the level of protection for the SOEs and LEs) for the sake of 
solving the economic problems. The relaxation of the restrictions on the market 
gradually included certain private enterprises qualified to participate in the market. 
From this point of view, the opening of the export market in the 1960s should 
be considered in the light of a partial restoration of the market mechanism rather than 
a move to establish a free market. In particular, the domestic market had been 
controlled by the government until the 1980s and the competition in the domestic 
market was not within the framework of a free market. The protection of the SOEs 
and LEs in the domestic market during the EOI period shows that the state’s interest 
still focused on developing the SOEs and LEs. The aim of the government was to 
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build up a controllable market economy. Under these principles, the impact of the 
‘liberalisation’ policies created only limited space for the development of private 
businesses. This also implies that the state held most of the control over the openness 
of the market; and this openness significantly influenced the rise of the SMEs. 
In addition to the limited space for the development of the private business, in 
the 1960s not many private enterprises, let alone SMEs, that could qualify for the 
category which enjoyed preferential treatment. The existing literature usually ignores 
the details of the encouragement policy and generalises the effect of it on the rise of 
the SMEs. The evidence shows that the implementation of the policies was more 
complicated than this literature might suggest.  
In the mid-1960s the government launched a series of support programme to 
develop the SMEs. The evidence indicates that the interest of the government in 
supporting the SMEs was that it would support the SOEs and LEs to do so. Therefore, 
the support mainly focuses on technology and quality control. However, the evidence 
demonstrates that the primary difficulty of the SMEs was their inability to raise the 
first round of money capital to start up; they found it difficult to access turnover funds 
for business transactions. Moreover, the indirect support from the SOEs and the LEs 
was not as sound as it appears in the literature. Evidence shows that the SOEs and 
LEs did not necessarily provide the SMEs with materials at cheaper prices. Yet in 
order to borrow from the SOEs and LEs, the SMEs needed to develop long-term 
business credit with them. In other words, SMEs needed to survive on their own 
before they get support from the SOEs and LEs. This implies that the market which 
was controlled and created by the state did not provide significant financial credit to 
the SMEs.  
This chapter analyses the power structure of the KMT in order to clarify its 
interests and the impact of them on the formation of the development policy. 
Evidence shows that the state’s interest sustained the development of the SOEs and 
LEs for both political and economic reasons. Meanwhile, the policies implemented to 
protect and sustain the SOEs and LEs hindered the early development of private 
businesses in the market. Under the subsequent economic challenges, the government 
gradually relaxed the restrictions entailed by protecting the SOEs and LEs. Its 
relaxation policies created some space for the rise of the private business and the 
SMEs; and the relaxations included newly qualified participants in the market. This 
111 
 
evidence also highlights the significant power of the state to open, restrict and block 
the market; when it opened the market, it allowed the development of the SMEs. 
 Apart from their influence on the market, the policies considered important in 
encouraging and supporting the SMEs had certain limits. On the one hand, the early 
relaxations and policy adjustments to tax exemptions, the control of imported 
materials and the foreign exchange system did not entirely relax the controls in the 
1950s and the early 1960s. Evidence shows that until the mid-1960s the criticism of 
these three aspects of policy remained. This demonstrates that the policy was adjusted 
but with many conditions. On the other hand, evidence shows that the encouragement 
policies and the direct and indirect support were given only to the eligible SMEs (a 
minority); hence the support of the state to the SMEs was limited. Therefore, the 
increase of government investment to subsidise tax refunds and export growth, or the 
policy of ‘getting the relative price wrong’ made no difference did not matter to the 
SMEs because they either derived no benefit from the ‘getting the relative price 
wrong’ or else the price was not relatively ‘wrong’ for the SMEs. In addition, the 
major difficulty of the SMEs lay in problems of finance. The evidence presented in 
this chapter demonstrates that the market established by the government did not 
provide financial support to the SMEs because they could receive financial support 
only after becoming eligible to do so. The question then is ‘How did the SMEs start 
up in business and survive before they became qualified to enjoy preferential 
treatment and obtain the support of the SOEs and LEs?  
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Chapter 6. The Role of the Market and the Social Institution in the Rise and the 
Development of the SMEs, 1950-1980 
The evidence of the previous chapter shows that the general development 
policies and the particular policies to assist the SMEs gave limited support to the 
capital formation of the SMEs. In particular, it was difficult for the SMEs to receive 
loans from banks and the SMEs were not qualified to access the financial support 
from markets which were governed by the state. If the state, the formal financial 
institutions and the government-controlled market had little input in the capital 
formation of the SMEs, what was the source of this capital formation until the SMEs 
could obtain support from the state? Instead of examining the policies and support 
that the government provided for such capital formation, this chapter explores the 
institutional framework in which a space was made for the social institutions to enable 
capital to be found for the SMEs. This chapter begins with an analysis of the 
industrial structure and the legal regulations based upon the state’s interest in 
sustaining the development of the SOEs and LEs.  In the institutional framework, the 
following two sections then show how social institutions supported the foundation 
and business operation of SMEs. The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates 
that the SMEs did not rely on government support for most of their capital formation. 
 
6-1. The Formal Institutions and the Development of the SMEs 
The state’s interest was to accelerate the development of the SOEs and LEs in 
order to build up Taiwan’s industries. The industrial structure was founded upon this 
principle. Table 6-1 shows the units of selected industries and commerce in Taiwan 
before 1954 by type of ownership and the size of unit. In the textile industries, there 
were no SOEs in the towel-weaving mills, knitting mills and the industries’ bleaching, 
dyeing, printing and finishing units. Moreover, there were no SOEs in apparel 
processing, repairing and other fabricated products. These manufacturing industries 
were seen in the industrial structure as downstream. The upstream industries in these 
manufacturing industries, such as textile fibres and cotton, silken and woollen 
products, contained numerous SOEs.  
In addition to the textile industry, there were 87 SOEs in the chemicals and 
allied products industry. There were numerous SOEs in the machinery manufacturing 
and repairing industries; but the electrical machinery and appliances manufacturing 
and repairing held few. The domination of the SOEs in these three industries was 
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important. Comparing the industrial structure with the FDI industrial structure in the 
1960s, it is clear that most of the FDI investment focused on the downstream 
industries, where Taiwanese SOEs were able to provide materials or intermediate 
goods from upstream. The industrial structure and the FDI investment structure 
created a small market for the small private businesses.223 
At the same time, the completion of the commerce statistics also points to the 
registration law which facilitated the foundation of the SMEs. During this period, it is 
difficult to ascertain the number of SMEs in Taiwan. In Table 6-1, the statistics come 
from the government-compiled numbers of ‘enterprise units’ and ‘established units’ in 
the industry and commerce census. ‘Enterprise units’ can be defined as  corporations 
composed of several different branches operating in one or several different 
businesses, while the definition of ‘established units’ indicates ‘one factory’ or ‘one 
branch’ and covers both individually-owned enterprises and branches of corporations. 
The statistics do not classify enterprises by size. The investigation of private 
enterprises was affected by the early commercial law in Taiwan. According to the 
Commercial Law, before 1958 factories which  had more than 30 employees and a net 
capital greater than 10,000 NTD were required to register and apply for the 
‘registration certificate’ from the government of their province. Other factories 
without these qualifications needed only to apply for a ‘production certificate’ from 
the local council. After 1958 the registration regulations adjusted the amount of net 
capital to 100,000 NTD.  
 
Table 6-1. Industry and Commerce Census in Taiwan: Units for Industry and 
Commerce, 1949-1956 
 
  
 State-owned 
  
  
 Private-owned 
  
  
enterpri
se units 
establishm
ent units 
technic
al units 
enterp
rising 
establis
hment 
tech
nical 
Manufacturing             
textile industry             
textile fibres 0 6 6 11 13 14 
yarn mills 3 8 8 9 11 11 
thread mills 0 1 1 88 93 101 
                                                      
223
 For more details regarding FDI structure in Taiwan, see Chapter 1. 
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cotton silken woolen products 3 14 14 358 416 417 
towel weaving mills 0 0 0 24 26 26 
knitting mills 0 0 0 159 174 177 
bleaching, dyeing, printing, finishing 
textiles 0 0 0 67 75 77 
cordage, rope and net products 0 2 2 78 89 92 
miscellaneous. textile products 0 2 2 1213 1218 1230 
apparel processing, repairing and 
other fabricated products 0 0 0 5030 5078 5216 
rubber products 1 1 1 319 333 338 
chemicals and allied products 7 35 45 1261 1343 1457 
machinery manufacturing and 
repairing (ex electrical  
machinery manufacturing and 
repairing) 1 15 17 1043 1058 1113 
electrical machinery and appliances 
manufacturing and repairing 0 3 3 729 751 886 
Source: Directorate-General of Budgets, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), 
Statistical Abstract of the ROC (Taipei, 1957), pp.108-119. 
 
The data of the industrial structure shows that the space made for the SMEs 
lay in the downstream industries. These downstream industries, such as processing 
factories, required low skills and low technology, requirements which made it easy for 
the SMEs to participate in the processing business. Moreover, the government 
regulations to do with factory registration and the completion of statistics implied that 
the government paid little attention to the SMEs; this neglect facilitated the 
establishment of small and medium-sized processing factories in rural areas. The 
Commercial Law stipulating registration reveals the unintended consequences of an 
industrial policy which made space for the development of the SMEs. The simplified 
registration process and the industrial policy in the early period lowered the entry 
barrier for SMEs in Taiwan. The formal institutional framework, including the 
industrial structure, development policies and commercial laws, created space for the 
social institutions to function.  
 
6-2. The Capital Formation of the Manufacturing SMEs 
The evidence in Chapter 5 indicates that the major difficulty for the SMEs lay 
in sourcing the capital for themselves from the formal banking system and the state-
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controlled market. Figure 6-1 below shows the cost of borrowing from the formal 
banking system compared with the cost of borrowing from the unorganised money 
market. It is clear that the latter was almost twice as high as the former. This shows 
that the government got the relative price wrong, in order to provide cheaper credit for 
the private sector. However, the question again is whether the SMEs relied on the 
cheaper credit from the government. 
  
Figure 6-1. The Comparison of the Interest Rates on Unsecured Loans of Banks and 
in the Unorganised Money Market 
 
  
Source: Directorate of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), Statistical 
Yearbook of the R.O.C. (Taipei, 1984, 1986), P.197, pp.199-200.  
Note: 1. The original data did not record the interest rate in 1978. 2. The rates on loans of banks were 
recorded in per cent per annum; the per cent that presented in the table was divided by twelve months. 
 
There are two significant parts to the structure of the source of capital for the 
Taiwanese SMEs. The first part is the internal capital, the entrepreneurs’ own capital 
for setting up a business, together with the external capital, namely, loans from other 
organisations. The second part is the borrowing credits of enterprises, which are 
normally used as short-term turnover funds for business. These two parts composed 
the financial structure of the Taiwanese SMEs.   
Figure 6-2 below shows an estimation of the internal structure of the source of 
capital for private enterprises in Taiwan from 1973 to 1990. The government statistics 
show that the capital formation came mainly from members of the founder’s family, 
which includes relatives and friends. It is worth noting that the capital in this category 
accounted for more than 80% of the capital structure of manufacturing industry from 
the 1970s to 1990. The high and stable percentage of family capital in the total capital 
formation implies the weakness of public financial institutions in supporting 
manufacturing industry and the great strength of social institutions when it came to 
providing necessary capital for businesses.  
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Family capital includes funds from personal savings and from the informal 
financial system. Much research in development studies indicates that Taiwan has a 
very high savings rate compared with other developing countries. This rate also 
contributes to the initial capital formation for SMEs. This may also explain why so 
much capital for SMEs has come from the family. There are two types of informal 
financial system. The first type consists of rotating credit associations, known as 
‘Biaohui’ 224  in Chinese. The rotating credit system has been very popular in 
Taiwan.225  However, the ‘Biaohui’ have experienced many problems, since some 
members have absconded with large sums raised from other members (known as 
‘Daohui’). When ‘Daohui’ takes place, the victims cannot look to the law to have 
their contributions restored. The operation of the ‘Baohui’ system is based upon trust 
between the members.226  
Another type is formed of local private financial groups or individuals who 
professionally lend capital to the SMEs or to individuals and make their profits from 
higher interest. This is, of course, related to the legal framework for private borrowing 
and lending. However, again, it is difficult to regulate and monitor private borrowing-
lending behaviour when most of the informal financial organisations are not operated 
as corporations. These two types of informal financial system are also categorised 
under family capital, because the system of ‘biaohui’ is operated on the basis of 
relationships with family, neighbours or friends; borrowings from private financial 
groups or individuals are usually entered into by recommendation from relatives, 
friends or acquaintances.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
224
 Biaohui is commonly used as a system for saving, investing and loaning in Taiwanese society. For 
further details regarding the unregulated finance market in this society, see  Kan, Hanzhen, ‘Guanxi 
faze yu falu de bianyuan yunzuo: Taiwan xiaoxin qiye fezhengshi ronzi huodong de yangjiu’, Taiwan: 
a Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, vol.17(1994), pp.1-40. 
225
 In 1985 an investigation showed that around seventy per cent of adults had experience of biaohui. 
For further details, see  Lin, Rongyao ‘Taiwan diqu minjian hehui xiankuang zhi yianjiu’, Fawubu 
qishisan niandu yianjiu fazhan xianmu baogao (Taipei, 1985). 
226
 For further details, see Luo, Jarder, ‘The Savings Behaviour of Small Investors: A Case Study of 
Taiwan’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol.46, no.4 (1998), pp.771-788. However, the 
limitation of this evidence is that it is difficult to trace how much of the savings flowed to funds for 
setting up SMEs. 
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Figure 6-2. Estimation of the Internal Capital Structure of the Taiwanese 
Manufacturing SMEs by Financial Source (%), 1973-1990 
  
Source: Bureau of Economic Research, Central Bank of the R.O.C., Report on the Source of Capital of 
Public and Private Enterprises in Taiwan Area (Taipei: Central Bank of the R.O.C., 1976, pp.4-6; 
1978, pp.6-8; 1980, pp.13-16; 1983, pp.12-13; 1985, 10-13; 1987, p.59, p.77; 1988, pp.60-62; 1989, 
pp.59-61; 1990, 1991, pp.61-63). 
Note: 1. From 1993 the categories in the statistics of the Reports combine ‘government’, ‘state 
enterprises’ and ‘public financial institution’ together as ‘government and public financial institutions). 
2. The original government data list only the source of capital in manufacturing and various other 
industries. The estimation is calculated on the basis of the statistics of manufacturing industry, times 
90% for the SMEs in manufacturing industry. 
 
6-3. The Subcontracting System and the Social Institutions 
The second part of the capital formation is the formation of external capital for 
turnover credit. This source of credit is closely related to the subcontracting system in 
Taiwan. The two main characteristics of the Taiwanese subcontracting system are a 
sophisticated division of labour and family- (kinship)-based social networks. Much 
has been written on these features. 227  Here, it is worth noting that the subcontracting 
system was not led and integrated vertically by the SOEs and LEs. On the contrary, 
the subcontracting system was horizontally integrated among numerous SMEs. The 
foreign buyers and the trading companies placed their orders with the medium-sized 
factories and the medium-sized factories subcontracted the work to other, smaller 
factories. This is different from the type of Japanese subcontracting system which is 
vertically integrated by the LEs. This phenomenon is very important, since it shows 
that the relationship of the SOEs/LEs with the SMEs was of a more usual kind, such 
                                                      
227
 Hamilton, Gary G., Business Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia, 
(Hong Kong, 1991). Ho, Samuel S. P. (1978) Economic Development of Taiwan 1860-1970 (Yale, 
1978), pp.186-211. For further details regarding the SME subcontracting system, see Chen, Jiexuan , 
Bandi yu laoban: Taiwan qiye zuzhi nongli zhi fazhan (Taipei, 2001); Chen, Jiexuan, Xeli wanlu yu 
shenghuo jiegou: Taiwan zhongxiao qiye de shehui jingji fenxi (Taipei, 1994). 
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as selling-buying raw materials and intermediated goods. The SMEs did not rely on 
the orders from the SOEs and LEs. Moreover, the horizontal integration of numerous 
SMEs questions how much support was offered by the SOEs and LEs to the SMEs. 
The following quotation from the manufacturing industry shows the functioning of 
the Taiwanese SMEs: 
 
The Lee Wei factory is a medium-sized factory, which produces machines. It is a 
traditional Taiwanese firm, which was founded on a family basis and it has, of course, 
its own social networks from suppliers to clients. The owner of the Lee Wei factory 
shared one of his successful experiences concerning a valuable deal with a Japanese 
firm, which depended on the industrial structure of the factory and its social network: 
“This Japanese firm is a large enterprise in the lathing industry; they developed a plan 
which demanded lathes of a special standard. The Japanese executive manager came 
to Taiwan and paid an official visit to my factory during the day. To end an official 
day-time visit, it is routine for us to take our important clients for drinks and 
relaxation. Afterwards, the executive manager gave me his firm’s draft for the 
machines with the special standards they required. He hoped that I could provide a 
quotation for these lathes. When he handed me the draft, it was two o’clock in the 
morning; I submitted my quotation for these machines to him after seven hours―at 
nine o’clock in the morning, before he left the hotel to go to the airport. He was very 
surprised by our high-speed operating system, because other factories usually hand in 
their quotations after seven days; but we finished it quickly and comprehensively in 
seven hours. Of course, he was satisfied with our prices and plans and I won the 
business. What did I do during these seven hours? As soon as I got the draft in hand, I 
called my contractors and suppliers immediately. It was not easy to do this because it 
was two o’clock in the morning; nevertheless, most of these contractors and suppliers 
are my relatives or old friends with whom I have cooperated with for more than ten 
years. Accordingly, they came to my office in the middle of the night and we worked 
together until the morning. The reason why we could quote good prices within seven 
hours is that every one of them is experienced and is specialized in different parts of 
lathes.”228 
                                                      
228
 Chen, Yizhong, ‘Jiating gongchan zuodao quanqiu disida’, Jin zho kan, vo.447,   
http://www.businesstoday.com.tw/v1/content.aspx?a=W20050700152&p=3. (accessed 18 May 2009). 
For further details of cooperation within the subcontracting system, see Xia, Linqin and Zheng, Cunqi, 
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As the example above shows, the Lee Wei factory specializes in assembling 
all the components of machines; other contractors have small-scale plants which 
specialize in producing designated components. Due to the closely-defined division of 
labour, every factory and every contractor is highly professional. It is worth noting 
that since each contractor is small and is specialized in certain particular components 
only, it would be highly unlikely for the small contractors to receive technological 
lenience from the SOEs and LEs. Moreover, these businessmen who were willing to 
get up and work in the middle of the night were basically motivated by two things: 
first, they were driven by money. Each one of them is the owner of a small or 
medium-sized plant; hence, every deal means profit for them. Second, as the owner of 
the Lee Wei factory pointed out, the crucial reason why he dared to call other people 
to his office to work through the night was that, regardless of their business relations, 
they have different degrees of social relationship.  
The example of the Lee Wei factory is only one such success story in 
manufacturing industry in Taiwan. In fact, its manufacturing industry, in particular its 
machine production (instrumental tools, such as lathes and punching machines) is 
growing by nearly 20% a year. Furthermore, Taiwan has become the fourth largest 
producer in the world (after Germany, Japan and Italy) and exporter of these tools.229 
The account above shows how the pattern and the subcontracting system of the SMEs 
function in Taiwan. It illustrates that, although the size and capacity of the SMEs are 
limited, cooperation enhances their competitiveness in the global market. What is 
more important is that the example shows the limited role of the government, the 
SOEs and the LEs in guiding or leading SME operations. 
The sophisticated division of labour and social connections have been the two 
major dynamics within the subcontracting system; the hidden factors for these 
dynamics include economic profit and social relationship. The combination of these 
two factors played a further significant role in providing financial support for SME 
business transactions within the subcontracting system. Figure 6-3 below shows an 
estimation of the structure of external credit to the manufacturing industry in Taiwan 
from 1973 to 1990. The greatest amount of external credit came from the categories 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Yige xiaobaochan de anli diaocha: jiating guanxi yu guyong guanxi de jiaohu zuoyong, Taiwan: a 
Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, vol.2, no.3,4(1989), pp.189-215.  
229
 Shieh, Minray, ‘Taiwan jixie gongye de fazhan’, in Jixie chanye fazhan de huigu yu zhanwan, 
Kexue fazhan, vol.457 (2011), pp.39-42, http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/091/FM-R-091-
009.htm. (accessed 11 January 2010). 
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of private enterprises and families. The category of private enterprises includes loans 
from private enterprises and the workings of the credit system between private 
enterprises.  
Furthermore, the statistics also demonstrate that the percentage of turn-over 
credit loans from the public financial institutions has increased. The banks were more 
willing to grant turn-over credit loans to the SMEs may be related to the fact that 
these loans were mainly short-term credit loans on which higher interest rates were 
charged. The evidence shows that the SMEs did not rely heavily on the formal 
institutions for turn-over credit funds. Instead, they relied on credit from private 
enterprises and family. The subcontracting system provides a foundation for the 
financial support based upon mutual economic interests and social relationships.  
 
Figure 6-3. Estimation of the External Capital Structure of the Taiwanese 
Manufacturing SMEs by Financial Source (%), 1973-1990 
 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Research, Central Bank of the R.O.C. (Taiwan), Report on the Source of 
Capital of Public and Private Enterprises in Taiwan Area (Taipei: Central Bank of the R.O.C., 1976, 
pp.4-6; 1978, pp.6-8; 1980, pp.13-16; 1983, pp.12-13; 1985, 10-13; 1987, p.59, p.77; 1988, pp.60-62; 
1989, pp.59-61; 1990, 1991, pp.61-63). 
Note: 1. The original government data list only the source of capital in manufacturing and other 
different industries. The estimation is calculated based upon the statistics of the manufacturing industry 
times 90% for the SMEs in manufacturing industry. 
2. The formal institutions include the government, the SOEs and the public financial institutions. 
 
6-4. Conclusion 
The state interest influenced the formation of the economic policy which 
focused on sustaining the development of the SOEs and LEs. The industrial structure 
was formed on this principle. According to the government statistics, most of the 
SOEs dominated the upstream industries which were concentrated in the textile and 
121 
 
chemistry industries. The industrial structure and the FDI investment industries 
created a market for the SMEs. This market is limited to certain industries where the 
Taiwanese SOEs could provide materials or intermediate goods from the upstream 
industries.  
At the same time, the legal regulations for corporate registration facilitated the 
registration process for small factories in the rural areas. These lowered the entry 
barriers so that SMEs could set up factories and begin work. These policies and 
regulations did not, however, specifically focus on helping to found SMEs and their 
foundation should be considered an unintended consequence of economic policy. The 
unintended consequence of the policy and regulations also created space for social 
institutions to function.  
The cost of borrowing from the unorganized money market was twice the cost 
of borrowing from the formal banking system. The government did provide cheaper 
credit for the private sector. However, the SMEs could not benefit from this provision. 
Evidence shows that the largest percentage of the sources of capital for the SMEs 
came from the private sector. Since the market created by the state policies lowered 
the entry requirements and facilitated the administration process and the downstream 
industries required only a small amount of financial capital to start business, SME 
owners were able to collect the necessary capital through family (relatives and 
friends). The evidence shows that most of the SME capital had this origin and the 
percentage of family funding has remained high over time. This is the clear evidence 
of the strength of social institutions which supported the founding of SMEs as 
businesses in the market.  
The strength of the subcontracting system of the SMEs has been regarded as 
significant in enhancing competitiveness and reducing transaction costs for the SMEs. 
The structure of the subcontracting system demonstrates that the system is 
horizontally integrated and that no SOEs or LEs led or integrated the system 
vertically. The example in this chapter shows that the dynamics of the subcontracting 
system include the division of labour, social networks and economic incentives. This 
example of the function of the social institution further questions the argument that 
the state indirectly issued technology licenses more cheaply to the SMEs. The size of 
the SMEs and the skills and techniques required for SME business was unlikely to 
have acquired a technology license. Furthermore, the combination of economic 
interest and the social relations of the subcontracting system provide important turn-
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over credit funding for SME business transactions. The evidence shows that the SMEs 
relied on private enterprises and family for their operation. Without the financial 
support, the SMEs would have found financially difficult to operate. 
This chapter shows that the state’s interest influenced the formation of the 
development policy and the formal institutions, based upon these policies, 
inadvertently created a market for the SMEs and a space for the social institutions to 
function. Although the cost of borrowing from the government was much less than the 
cost of the borrowing from the unorganized money market, the SMEs were not able to 
access the cheaper credit. The sources of capital for the SMEs show the strong 
support for them from social institutions. The structure of the subcontracting system 
also questions the support given them by the SOEs and LEs.  
Based upon the present analysis, it is possible to argue that, without the market 
or the space created by the formal institutions, the social institutions would not have 
been able to provide significant support to the SMEs. It is worth noting that, although 
the government-controlled market provided cheaper credit, the SMEs did not rely on 
bank loans. In these circumstances, it may be argued that, without the significant 
support of the social institutions, the SMEs could have found it financially difficult to 
participate in the market and to operate business transactions. The evidence of the 
sources of capital for the SMEs also confirms the importance of qualifying for and 
being able to access government support.       
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Part IV. The State’s Influence: the Conflict of Interest between the State and the 
SMEs, 1980-2000                                                                                                     
After the late 1980s, research on Taiwan’s economic development changes its 
focus to cross-strait economic relations. The transformation is related to two 
important changes. On the one hand, Taiwan’s rapid economic growth brought about 
economic challenges to the SMEs; this implies the changing economic structure in 
Taiwanese society. On the other, China’s economic reform in 1979 significantly 
influenced both political and economic relations across the strait. These two changes 
have attracted attention to the economic relations and political conflicts between 
Taiwan and China. Much has been done, for example, on Taiwanese FDI in China, 
comparative advantages, the economic integration of Taiwan, China and Hong Kong 
and the contradictions between political conflicts and economic prosperity.  
However, some questions have been ignored, despite their importance in 
examining the role of the state in the rise and the development of the SMEs since 
World War II. What economic challenges influenced the SMEs’ economic interests? 
What was the government’s interest after 1990? What influenced the state’s interest in 
drawing up the cross-strait economic policy? Did the economic interest of the SMEs 
conflict with the state’s interest after the late 1980s? Was the state’s intervention in 
the SMEs conditions effective?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
Chapter 7. The Changing Market and the Economic Interest of the SMEs, 1980-
2000 
The 1970s and the 1980s were the Golden age of the Taiwanese 
manufacturing SMEs. However, economic prosperity brought about economic 
changes affected their further development. This chapter first shows the contribution 
of the SMEs to the Taiwanese economy; the contribution of the SMEs indicates that 
their prosperity depended on the export market and on the labour force. The 
dependence led to the economic challenges to the SMEs in the late 1980s. The second 
section then clarifies these challenges and their impact on the business of the 
Taiwanese manufacturing SMEs. The analysis of the economic challenges suggests 
that the government had a significant impact on the market by controlling the foreign 
exchange rate; this influenced the environment for the SMEs’ business operations. 
The third section then sees how the government dealt with the difficulties and 
assisted the SMEs to remedy them. The government launched two sets of policies to 
meet the challenges and to upgrade the economic programme further. On the one 
hand, it imported foreign workers from Southeast Asia; on the other, the new 
investment policies set up the regulations for Taiwanese outward investment in 
Southeast Asia and in China. These policy adjustments were considered a more open 
procedure, instead of providing support to the SMEs in the changing market. 
Moreover, the determinants of the Taiwanese FDI demonstrate the economic interest 
of the Taiwanese SMEs in a market which was changing in response to the state’s 
policy changes.  
 
7-1. Taiwan’s Economic Miracle and Worries under the Prosperity 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, Taiwan’s GDP and rate of export growth 
increased. Table 7-1 below shows an estimation of the proportion of Taiwanese 
manufacturing SMEs in Taiwan’s total GDP from 1951 to 1985. In the 1950s and 
1960s, the manufacturing SMEs contributed only around 10% to 20% of Taiwan’s 
GDP. After 1970, the manufacturing SMEs contributed more than 30% to it. 
Moreover, the manufacturing SMEs played a significant role in providing job 
opportunities in the economy. Table 7-2 below shows the estimation of the proportion 
of employment in SMEs in the country’s total employment. It is clear that from 1970 
the employment of the manufacturing SMEs occupied around 20% to 30% of the 
Taiwan’s employment force. Therefore, in addition to the significant contribution to 
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GDP, the manufacturing SMEs gave work to more of the Taiwanese labour force than 
any other sector. The economic prosperity also implies that the SMEs, in their turn, 
relied heavily on the export market and the labour force. 
 
Table 7-1. The Estimation of the SMEs’ Contribution to Taiwan’s GDP (%), 1951-
1985 
 Year 
GDP total(NTD) 
(A) 
Share of 
manufacturing 
industry to 
Taiwan’s GDP 
(NTD) (B) 
Share of 
manufacturing 
industry to Taiwan’s 
GDP (%) (C= (B/A 
x100%) 
Share of SME 
manufacturing 
industry to Taiwan’s 
GDP (%) (D=C x 
90%) 
1951 12259 2122 17.3 15.57 
1952 17166 2679 15.06 13.55 
1953 122863 3328 14.5 13.05 
1954 25087 4794 19.1 17.19 
1955 29838 5598 18.76 16.88 
1956 34219 6799 19.86 17.87 
1957 39936 8298 20.7 18.63 
1958 44683 9121 20.41 18.36 
1959 51525 11551 22.4 20.16 
1960 62170 13500 21.71 19.53 
1961 69677 15158 21.75 19.57 
1962 76762 17429 22.7 20.43 
1963 86823 21641 24.92 22.42 
1964 101476 26318 25.93 23.33 
1965 112089 29100 25.96 23.36 
1966 125440 32544 25.94 23.34 
1967 145162 41594 28.65 25.78 
1968 169153 52501 31.03 27.92 
1969 195940 65637 33.49 30.14 
1970 225695 75682 33.53 30.17 
1971 262247 94149 35.9 32.31 
1972 314301 122853 39.08 35.17 
1973 407535 172854 42.4 38.16 
1974 545024 214260 39.31 35.37 
1975 584494 214314 36.66 32.99 
1976 701117 276844 39.48 35.53 
1977 816943 327129 40.04 36.03 
1978 970269 408725 42.12 37.9 
1979 1164073 495832 42.59 38.33 
1980 1442870 599595 41.55 37.39 
1981 1703818 677130 39.74 35.76 
1982 1899971 668934 35.2 31.68 
1983 2100005 754729 35.93 32.33 
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1984 2343078 879455 37.53 33.77 
1985 2473786 929142 37.55 33.79 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), 
Quarterly National Economic Trends (Taipei, 1984, 2001), pp.32-33, pp.38-39. 
Note: According to the Taiwanese government statistics, the Taiwanese SMEs dominated around 90% 
of manufacturing industry. Therefore, the estimation of the proportion of the SME manufacturing 
industry to Taiwan’s GDP is times 90%. 
 
Table 7-2. The Estimation of the Percentage of Total Employment Provided by the 
SME Manufacturing Industry in Taiwan, 1951-1991 
 Year 
% of employment share by the manufacturing 
industry (A) 
Estimation on the % of employment 
provided by the SME 
manufacturing industry (B=A x 
90%) 
1951 11.99 10.79 
1952 12.35 11.11 
1953 12.85 11.56 
1954 12.95 11.65 
1955 13.22 11.89 
1956 13.1 11.79 
1957 13.4 12.06 
1958 13.76 12.38 
1959 14.39 12.95 
1960 14.66 13.19 
1961 14.82 13.33 
1962 14.86 13.37 
1963 15.6 14.04 
1964 15.41 13.86 
1965 16.26 14.63 
1966 15.62 14.05 
1967 17.42 15.67 
1968 17.88 16.09 
1969 18.37 16.53 
1970 20.21 18.18 
1971 21.28 19.15 
1972 22.86 20.57 
1973 26.67 24 
1974 26.97 24.27 
1975 27.53 24.77 
1976 28.82 25.93 
1977 28.45 25.6 
1978 30.52 27.46 
1979 32.42 29.17 
1980 32.92 29.62 
1981 32.4 29.16 
1982 31.83 28.64 
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1983 37.59 33.83 
1984 33.83 30.44 
1985 32.02 28.81 
1986 30.78 27.7 
1987 29.94 26.94 
1988 28.39 25.55 
1989 27.79 25.01 
1990 27.05 24.34 
1991 27.44 24.69 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan),  
Quarterly National Economic Trends, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 
(Taipei,1980, 1997), p.21, pp.24-25. 
Note: According to the Taiwanese government statistics, the SMEs dominated around 90% of 
manufacturing industry. Therefore, the estimation on the percentage of the SME employment to the 
Taiwan’s total employment forces was calculated on the percentage of the employment force in 
manufacturing industry to Taiwan’s total employment force times 90%. 
 
In the 1980s various problems emerged from the Taiwanese economy to 
challenge the SMEs. First, the rapid development of manufacturing industry damaged 
the environment. The Taiwanese government passed a series of new laws to protect 
the environment in the 1980s. These regulations had both a positive and negative 
impact on the Taiwanese economy. They brought new business for firms dealing with 
the environment and pollution. But for many SME factories, the regulations increased 
the cost of production and reduced profits.230  
Second, the large amount of exports not only brought profits, but also led to 
international trade problems. The U.S. market has always been the largest market for 
Taiwanese exports. In the 1980s, the U.S. trade deficit with Taiwan was large (as 
shown in Figure 7-1 below). The U.S. government in the 1980s urged the KMT 
government to revalue the NTD in order to balance the U.S.-Taiwan trade.231 Table 7-
3 below shows the foreign exchange rate of the NTD and USD., fixed at 1 USD to 40 
NTD. In 1987 the value of the NTD appreciated rapidly from 1:37 to 1:31 within a 
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 Various debates concerning the appreciation of the NTD against the USD arose in the late 1980s. 
One group of scholars argues that the huge increase of foreign reserve in the mid-1980s should have 
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appreciation of the NTD in the late 1980s and this then led to a market bubble in the early 1990s. 
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NTD in the late 1980s. Under the special 301 Report of the Trade Act 1974, the KMT government was 
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of the appreciation of the NTD on the SMEs. For further debates, see Yu, Zhongxian and Wang, Kinli, 
Taiwan paomo jingji (Taipei, 1999); Liu, Shouxian, ‘Taiwan paomo jingji de fazhan yu jiantao’, Jingji 
qanzhan, 5 January 1996, pp.114-119. 
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year. From 1987 to 1997 the foreign exchange rate remained at 1:26. The appreciation 
of the NTD had a serious impact on Taiwanese manufacturing industry, since (1) most 
of the factories were export-oriented and (2) the U.S. had always been the major 
market. The appreciation of the foreign exchange rate largely reduced export profits 
and business was sacrificed. 
 
Figure 7-1. Value of Exports and Imports with the U.S. (USD$1000), 1957-1989 
 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan) 
Statistical Yearbook (Taipei, 1997), pp. 302-309. 
 
Table 7-3 Foreign Exchange Rate of U.S.D. against NTD, 1980-1997 
1980 01:36.0 
1981 01:36.8 
1982 01:39.1 
1983 01:40.1 
1984 01:39.6 
1985 01:39.9 
1986 01:37.8 
1987 01:31.8 
1988 01:28.6 
1989 01:26.4 
1990 01:26.9 
1991 01:26.8 
1992 01:25.2 
1993 01:26.4 
1994 01:26.5 
1995 01:26.5 
1996 01:27.5 
1997 01:28.7 
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Source: Department of Economic Research, Central Bank of the R.O.C. (Taiwan), Foreign Exchange 
Rate, http://www.cbc.gov.tw/mp1.html. (25 January 2011). 
 
Third, Figure 7-2 below shows the increases in labour wages in manufacturing 
industry from 1980 to 1990. The calculation of these wages is converted to US dollars 
based upon the changing exchange rate every year. They are converted to show the 
sudden increase of labour costs for the SMEs during this period. Most of the SMEs 
are export-oriented and their largest market is in the U.S. The conversion of labour 
wages clearly shows the burden on the Taiwanese SMEs during this period. From 
1986 to 1989, the rate of labour wages increased from 20% to 30%. In other words, 
the production cost for the SMEs increased from 20% to 30%. 
  
Figure 7-2. Average Monthly Earnings of Manufacturing Industry in Taiwan (US$), 
1980-1990 
  
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), 
Statistical Yearbook of the R.O.C. (Taipei, 1991), p.9. 
 
In addition to the appreciation of the foreign exchange rate, labour shortages 
and the development of the labour movement in Taiwan also worsened the economic 
environment for the SMEs.232 According to the official account in 1987, there were at 
least 200,000 unfilled vacancies in manufacturing industry, since manufacturing 
industry found it hard to recruit workers in view of its low wages compared with other 
sorts of industry, such as commerce and services.233 The link between the lower wage 
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 For further details, see Galenson, Walter, “The Labour Force, Wages and Living Standards,” in 
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and the percentage of unfilled vacancies is shown in Figure 7-3 below. It 
demonstrates that the lower the rate of comparative wages, the higher the rate of 
unfilled vacancies. 
Figure 7-3 clarifies the loss of competitiveness of manufacturing industry in 
the labour market: it is always the case that industries, such as transport or financial 
services, which had fewer unfilled vacancies, had comparatively higher wages. 
Industries such as clothing and accessories, construction and furniture which had a 
comparatively large number of unfilled vacancies also had comparatively lower 
wages. Weak competitiveness in wages caused the problem of a labour shortage in 
manufacturing industry (for labour-intensive industries, such as clothing and textiles 
in particular) in the late 1980s. 
 
Figure 7-3 Percentage of Unfilled Vacancies and Comparative Wage Rate in Taiwan 
in 1988 (%) 
 
  
Source: Directorate of the General Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. 
(Taiwan), Reports of the Labour Movement (Taipei, 1988), pp.18-20. 
 
The appreciation of NTD also contributed to the comparatively low wages in 
the manufacturing industry. The export-oriented manufacturing SMEs were in a 
dilemma: in order to lower the production costs and maintain competitiveness in the 
global market, the wage for workers had to remain low; however, since they did not 
rise, labour shortages resulted, from the growth of other industries in the Taiwanese 
market. Moreover, it is difficult for the export-oriented manufacturing SMEs to alter 
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labour production quickly (since this involves developing new technologies and thus 
abundant capital).  
Demographic changes also influenced the changes of the labour market. In the 
early 1950s Taiwan had a high birth rate and a high death rate (as shown in Figure 7-4 
below). After thirty years, the structure changed and became characterised by a low 
birth rate and low death rate. This change in population structure also caused the 
problem of a labour shortage. People who were born in the 1950s to 1960s are called 
the baby-boom cohort. In the 1970s, this became the main labour force for the 
growing manufacturing industry. During this period, the participation rate was 
perceptibly high.  
 
Figure 7-4. The Changing Rate of Births and Deaths in Taiwan, (%) 1950-1999 
  
Source: Directorate of the General Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. 
(Taiwan), Statistical Yearbook of the R.O.C. (Taipei, 2000), p.68. 
 
The next generation after the baby-boom was born in the late 1960s to 1980s. 
The birth rate during this period is much lower than in the baby-boom generation. The 
low rate of population growth is also affected by the government policy of the 1960s. 
In the 1950s, in a situation of combat readiness, the government encouraged large 
families. However, the high growth of population caused problems in turn, such as a 
shortage of food. Therefore, in 1964 the government pursued a birth control policy 
and encouraged ‘two children in one family’. However, the low birth rate posed a 
challenge for manufacturing industry.234 
Moreover, in the late 1980s the labour unions organised a labour movement.  
Labour unions were set up very soon after the KMT government came to power in 
China. After the move to Taiwan, they maintained their organisations. Before 1987, 
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 For further details, see Lee, Joseph S., ‘Asia in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Work and Labor’, Japan Labor Bulletin , vol. 40 (2)(2001), pp.13-19. 
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the unions rarely went on strike for workers benefits even before martial law 
prohibited freedom of association and the right to protest. In 1987 martial law came to 
an end and the protests led by the labour unions followed within in the year. Since 
then, the Taiwanese labour unions have become active in striking for better working 
conditions, salaries and benefits for their members. In times of prosperity, the workers 
and the unions took advantage of it. This, again, increased the burden on the SME 
owners and weakened Taiwan’s global competitiveness. 
Overall, the Taiwanese labour market in the 1980s and the 1990s was 
challenged by the shortage of labour and the rise of labour movements. The shortage 
of workers forces was increased by the changing population structure, while the rise 
of the labour unions and labour movement challenged the entrepreneurs’ initiatives. 
These factors are the key to the rise in labour wages in 1980s and 1990s, a rise which 
became the main driver of the migration to China by the Taiwanese SMEs. The 
shortage of labour and the changing environment speeded up the migration of labour-
intensive manufacturing. To put it another way, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, 
the conditions of the labour market were not attractive enough to supply the labour 
needs of Taiwan’s labour-intensive industries. 
 
7-2. The Determinants of Taiwanese Outward Investment 
In this situation, the Taiwanese government implemented different policies. 
To cope with the labour shortage, in particular for manufacturing industry, the 
Taiwanese government first allowed in 1985 the entry of foreign workers (from South 
East Asia). Importing foreign forces had both a good and a bad effect on the 
development of Taiwanese economy. On the one hand, by reducing labour costs, the 
government helped the labour-intensive industry to solve the problems of the labour 
shortage and of remaining competitive in the global market. On the other hand, 
importing foreign workers may also reduce job opportunities for certain local 
workers. Therefore, the government strictly controlled the number of foreign workers 
until 1990.235  
Since the policy of importing workers could not solve the problems of 
understaffing, in the mid-1980s the Taiwanese government permitted the Taiwanese 
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SMEs to invest in other countries where sufficient low-paid workers could be found. 
In the late 1980s China and some countries in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand) were not too far from Taiwan and could meet the needs 
of the Taiwanese SMEs.236 Figure 7-5 below shows a comparison of GNP per capita 
in China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Taiwan from 1986 to 
1993.237 It is clear that China had the lowest GNP per capita in the group; the Chinese 
GNP per capita was only half of that in Taiwan. In other words, China was able to 
provide the cheapest labour force of all the Southeast Asian countries listed. Figure 7-
6 shows the percentage of the factors drawing Taiwanese enterprises to invest abroad. 
It shows that more than 80% agree that lower labour costs were the determinant for 
their choice of China. Other factors, including the Chinese market and the lower cost 
of land, were related to the market mechanism and the reduced cost of production.  
Figure 7-7 shows the average monthly earnings of the Taiwanese workers in 
manufacturing industry, the basic salary regulated by the Taiwanese government and 
the average wage of Chinese workers from 1984 to 1995. In 1984 the average 
monthly earnings of a Taiwanese worker were around six times higher than the 
average monthly earnings of a Chinese worker. The Taiwanese basic salary (generally 
the salary paid to foreign workers in Taiwan) was around three times higher than the 
average wage of the Chinese workers. The comparison implies that the SMEs were 
able to reduce production costs by means of the lower labour costs in China.238 In 
general, most research on the determinants of Taiwanese FDI in China identified that 
cheap labour costs, cheap raw materials and land, an export-oriented FDI strategy and 
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Chinese connections (including language, culture and geographical proximity) are the 
significant determinants for Taiwanese investment in China.239  
 
Figure 7-5. The Comparison of GNP per Capita in China, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (USD$), 1986-1993 
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Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific Countries (Manila, 
1999), pp.80-88, pp.126-136, pp.182-192, pp.262-272, pp.312-322, pp.332-342, pp.376-384. 
 
Figure 7-6. The Pull Factors in the Taiwanese Enterprises’ Investment in China 
  
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, Report of Investment Commission (Taipei, 2005), pp.11-12. 
Note: LC= Lower Labour Cost; CM=Chinese Market; LLC= Lower Land Cost; CO= Cooperation with 
Contractors; NR= Natural Resources; CL= Clients Requirements; PT= Preferential Tax and Levies; 
IE=Investment environment; EU=Effective use of capital; EQ= Export Quota; OT= Others.   
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Figure 7-7. The Comparison of the Monthly Earnings of Taiwanese Workers in 
Manufacturing Industry, Taiwanese Monthly Basic Salary and the Monthly Earnings of 
Chinese Workers 
  
 
Source: Directorate of the General Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan R.O.C. 
(Taiwan), Statistical Yearbook of the R.O.C. (Taipei, 1991), p.9; National Bureau of Statistics of the 
P.R.C., China Statistical Yearbook (2001), p.135; Statistical database of the Council of Labour Affairs, 
Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), Basic Salary of Workers, 
http://statdb.cla.gov.tw/statis/stmain.jsp?sys=220&ym=6700&ymt=9900&kind=21&type=1&funid=q0
4011&cycle=4&outmode=0&compmode=0&outkind=11&fld0=1&rdm=weSAkBP2. (accessed 25 
April, 2011). 
 
7-3. Conclusion 
The SMEs played a significant role in Taiwan’s export market and GDP in the 
1970s and the 1980s. The significant contribution of the SMEs to Taiwan’s economy 
indicates that the SMEs relied heavily on the export market and the labour force. The 
rapid economic growth brought economic challenges for SMEs, mainly related to the 
supply and the cost of wages. The significant factor in the rise of labour costs was the 
sudden appreciation of the NTD against the U.S.D. in the mid- and late 1980s. Since 
the U.S. is the largest export market for Taiwanese manufacturing products, 
production costs increased as the NTD appreciated. Furthermore, the factor of 
demographic change and the change in the industrial structure also increased labour 
costs and reduced the supply of labour in manufacturing industry. In this situation, the 
government first allowed the entry of foreign workers.  
The analysis of economic challenges indicates that the state had a significant 
impact on the market by controlling the price of foreign exchange. The fluctuating 
exchange rate significantly influenced the market environment for SME business 
operations. The analysis of policy adjustments shows that the state did not provide 
further support or subsidies to the SMEs. Although the tax exemption and the export 
subsidies remained, most of the SMEs did not rely heavily on such support (as shown 
136 
 
in Chapters 5 and 6). Although the government’s policy changed the market 
environment and this in turn influenced the SMEs’ economic activity, other factors, 
such as demographic changes and the development of other industries in Taiwan 
made the market environment more difficult for the SMEs.  
Instead of providing support, the policy became more open. The imported 
foreign workers opened the labour market but the admissions quota was still in 
control as regards job opportunities and benefits for Taiwanese workers; however, the 
control restricted the ability of the policy to solve the staffing problems. In 1986 the 
government permitted Taiwanese outward investment in other countries where 
manufacturing SMEs could employ adequate numbers of worker at a cheaper rate.  
Two popular places for Taiwanese investment to turn to in the late 1980s were 
China and South East Asia. Evidence shows that China had the lowest GNP per capita 
of any country in the two groups; this implies that China could provide cheaper labour 
than they could. The investigation by the Taiwanese government also shows that the 
reducing production costs, in particular that of labour, was the key determinant for 
Taiwanese FDI in China. The comparison of the average monthly earnings of the 
Chinese workers and the Taiwanese workers from 1984 to 1995 demonstrates that the 
cost of labour forces was much lower in China than in Taiwan. In conclusion, this 
chapter clarifies that the economic interest of the Taiwanese SMEs lay in these lower 
labour costs which China could provide in the late 1980s. 
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Chapter 8. The Interests of the State and its Limits on SME Investment 
Behaviour 
The economic interests of the SME clearly lay, then, in investing in China 
because of the cost of labour. What were the state’s concerns in terms of SME 
investment in China? The economists who analysed cross-strait trade and investment 
tended to believe that free trade and investment would bring huge profits for the two 
economies based upon comparative advantage, business interests, the division of the 
international labour market and changes in the industrial structure. Most analysts, for 
example, Robert Ash and Y.Y. Kueh, Douglas Fuller and Hsu and Liu confirm that in 
a framework of free trade and investment economic earnings exceed costs. Fuller’s 
analysis further shows that Taiwanese investment in China did not result in the rise of 
unemployment and hollowing-out of Taiwanese industries.240 According to Hsu and 
Liu, the hollowing-out effect may occur when analysing their data on individual 
firms. They suggest that the hollowing-out effect could have been mitigated by 
upgrading and developing new industries instead of controlling outward investment in 
China, because, as Ash and Kueh indicate, even if the Taiwanese manufacturers had 
not invested in China, they would have directed their capital elsewhere. 241  The 
academic research was sympathetic to the economic needs of the SMEs in the 
changing economic situation after the late 1980s.  
However, Sun Yunsuan, who was Premier from 1978 to 1984, claims that 
China was in the process of transition and neither well-established institutions nor 
clear regulations would protect the rights and property of Taiwanese investors 
there.242 In addition to the economic concerns, the biggest problem lies in political 
conflicts and military resistance across the strait. Hence, before 1991 there was 
limited transit trade between Taiwan and China via Hong Kong; and Taiwanese 
investment in China was prohibited. Even after 1991, trade and investment across the 
strait were managed and restricted.  Yet in 1994 the government promoted the ‘Go-
South’ policy. The aim of this policy was to encourage Taiwanese investment in 
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Southeast Asia instead of China. Most of the policies consisted of encouragement and 
supplies for the Taiwanese enterprises which invested in Southeast Asia. 243  
The academic research and the government’s policies lead to the main 
questions of this chapter. If the benefits from free trade and a more open investment 
policy with China are larger than the cost, why was a beneficial policy opposed? Was 
this only a political issue? Were the SMEs able to influence the formation of 
economic policy? Did the state’s interests and the policy restrictions influence the 
SMEs’ investment behaviour in China? This chapter examines whether the state 
policy, based upon its interests, was able to influence SME investment behaviour after 
the late 1980s.  
To this end, the chapter begins with a general explanation of the government’s 
political purpose in implementing bans and restrictions on cross-strait trade. A 
significant political transformation occurred in the 1980s; the chapter analyse the 
impact of the changing political system on the formation of the cross-strait economic 
policy in that and the following decade, in order to examine how far political 
conflicts, the state’s interests and policy restrictions influenced the SMEs’ investment 
behaviour in China. 
The analysis has four sections. The first section briefly shows the 
transformation of political conflicts across the strait from 1970 to 2000. The second 
section clarifies the impact of the political reform on the distribution of political 
power in Taiwanese society. The third section focuses on the impact of the changing 
political power structure on cross-strait investment relations. The fourth section then 
compares the new economic policies towards investment and trade in China and in 
Southeast Asia based upon the government’s interests. Finally, the analysis explores 
how far the political conflicts, state’s interest and policy restrictions were able to 
influence the SMEs’ investment behaviour.  
 
8-1. The Political Conflicts across the Strait  
The conventional view of the political conflicts between the KMT and the 
CCP resulted from the historical hatred, ideological differences and the impact of the 
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Cold War.244 These historical factors lead to the main dispute in the 1980s and the 
1990s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the dispute usually centred on the issue of 
‘one China’—was it the People’s Republic of China or the Republic of China?245  The 
political resistance in the mid-1990s transformed it into the national consciousness of 
Taiwan vs. Chinese nationalism. The main political issue after 1990 lay in the 
controversy over sovereignty in Taiwan.  
The political quarrel can be traced back to the Shimonoseki Treaty in the late 
19th century. For the Chinese, the Shimonoseki Treaty causes historical shame, since 
the last Chinese empire could not defend its territory. Therefore, they believe that 
reunification is a historical mission and Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. 
However, for the Taiwanese, the Chinese, or more specifically, the Chinese 
Communist Party and the government of the People’s Republic of China have never 
had legitimate sovereignty over Taiwan.246  
Therefore, the political issue concerning Taiwanese sovereignty has never 
subsided. The historical hatred regarding ‘one-China’ and the new conflicts 
concerning ‘one China, one Taiwan’ led to obstacles being raised against open cross-
strait trade and investment.247 The political conflicts between Taiwan and China has 
continued since 1947; however, how far would these historical and political factors 
affect the government’s interests when it made cross-strait economic policy and 
sought to  influence SME investment behaviour in the late 1980s and the 1990s?  
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8-2. Chiang Ching-kuo and the KMT’s Political Reform, 1970-1987 
The relationship of the state and the SMEs had been distant. Although the 
administrative organisation consulted the SMEs through different business 
organisations in order to adjust policies, the SMEs could not influence the formation 
of policy. The remoteness and the inability of the SMEs to influence the state’s policy 
lay in the political power structure. In the 1970s, a series of political reforms was 
gradually carried out. This changed the political power structure and influenced 
further political transformation in the 1990s.  
In the 1970s several factors had led to political reform in Taiwan. These 
factors included external and internal political and economic factors. The first and 
most significant external shock came in 1971, when the government of the Republic 
of China in Taiwan resigned its seat in the United Nations and was replaced by the 
People’s Republic of China. This marked a significant defeat in international relations 
for the KMT government. Later in 1979 the U.S. government officially broke off 
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (namely, the KMT government in 
Taiwan). The diplomatic crisis threatened Taiwan’s safety, since it meant the loss of a 
powerful ally. Equally, the 1973 and 1979 oil crises affected the economic 
development of Taiwan. Aside from the shocks to international politics and the 
economy, they brought instability to internal politics.248 
From 1949 the KMT government was challenged by several local 
organisations which questioned the legitimacy of the KMT’s sovereignty in Taiwan 
after World War II.249 In the 1970s the KMT government was severely challenged by 
the growing power of the Tangwai. Several local elections, such as the elections for 
municipal and district councilmen, were held in Taiwan in the 1970s. More and more 
candidates from the Tangwai won local elections. In 1979 the Kaohsiung Incident 
occurred when the Formosa Magazine and other opposition politicians held a 
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demonstration in order to encourage and demand democracy in Taiwan.250 The KMT 
government then arrested the opposition politicians and convicted them of 
insurrection.251 This was the first serious political challenge to the KMT government 
in the course of their thirty-year domination in Taiwan. 
In addition to the external and internal disturbances, a further problem within 
the KMT gradually intensified in the 1970s. Before 1970 Chiang Kai-shek’s son, 
Chiang Ching-kuo, was not included among the core members of the KMT. Chiang 
Ching-kuo’s political power was gradually enhanced in the 1970s and in 1972 he 
became the premier of the Executive Yuan. In order to deal with external oil shocks 
and to stabilise the domestic challenges from the Tangwai, Chiang Ching-kuo took 
the initiative to put political reforms into action in accordance with the economic 
development policy.  
His aim in the reform was to alleviate the ethnic problems in Taiwan by 
promoting Bensheng ren candidates to the rank of higher government officials. These 
new elites were technocrats who specialised in engineering, agriculture or other 
economic and technological fields. Chiang’s economic policy was based upon 
Keynesian economics: expanding government spending so as to increase needs and 
economic growth. The promotion of these Bensheng ren elites, on the one hand, put 
an end to the Waisheng ren monopolisation; but, on the other hand, these technocrats 
took over economic power and took more and more important positions within the 
KMT. Meanwhile, Chiang Ching-Kuo also encouraged young people to join the KMT 
and promoted young politicians to play a greater role in party affairs. The inclusion of 
Bensheng ren technocrats and the younger generation of KMT members was another 
means of strengthening his political and administrative power against the 
conservatives within the KMT. 
Although Chiang Ching-kuo had created his own power base within the KMT 
by the early 1970s, when Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, some conservatives did not 
fully support his son’s as leader of the party and the country. Several memoirs record 
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the power transformation and struggles within the KMT.252 From the early 1970s, 
Chiang Ching-kuo controlled the military and the national security bureau, trained his 
own people in the KMT and used new and Bensheng ren technocrats in the 
administrative system. Although there was opposition to him, his domination of these 
departments helped him to defeat his opponents and become the chairman of the party 
within the year. 
After the political struggle within the KMT, Chiang Ching-kuo included his 
own people in the core power groups. According to the membership list of the Central 
Committee, many technocrats were members by 1976, including his successor, 
President Lee Teng-Hui. Comparing this membership list with the one in 1952, it is 
clear that more Bensheng ren technocrats and the younger generation of technocrats 
were included in the decision-making system. 253  Moreover, some Bensheng ren 
entrepreneurs were also included. Such changes of membership show the changes in 
the political power structure within the KMT. The new power structure within the 
KMT had a significant impact on the further political transformation in the 1990s.254 
Table 8-1 shows the political weights of different social-economic groups 
from the 1970s to 1987. The ruling elites are the KMT and the core members who, led 
by Chiang Ching-kuo, decided which policy to adopt. The ruling elites monopolised 
both government organisations and capital. What is different about the KMT ruling 
elites during this period was that the groups contained both Waisheng ren and 
Bensheng ren ruling elites. The KMT elites have a political weight of 10. 
The group of government bureaucrats were technocrat members of the KMT 
party and therefore were responsible for implementing the party’s policy. During this 
period more Bensheng ren technocrats and the young generation of Waisheng ren 
technocrats took higher-level positions in the government administrative system. 
Although their influence on the policy-making process was less than that of the KMT 
core elites, their influence lay in the implementation of the policy and the moderate 
ethnic conflicts in Taiwanese society. This group has a political weight of 7. 
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The group of urban politicians was not influential in the policy-making 
process. Compared with the previous period, few Tangwai politicians participated in 
local politics. The Tangwai movement from time to time demonstrated or published 
newspapers or magazines criticising the KMT government. Nevertheless, their 
influence was limited since most elections were restricted to the local level and the 
military and police systems were strictly controlled by the KMT. Despite this, the 
Tangwai undermined the stability of the KMT’s regime and therefore have a political 
weight of 4. During the period of the 1970s and 1980s, when Chiang Ching-kuo was 
in power, he severely limited the influence of those capitalists who had good 
connections with the government’s development policy. Although the influence was 
restricted, with the onset of parliamentary elections, the urban capitalists, including 
the SMEs, had limited influence on certain policies through the business organisations 
in particular during the years when legislators were standing for election. Therefore, 
during this period, they have a political weight of 3.  
The unionisation of workers was also not allowed before the end of martial 
law. During this period, the urban workers had no right to establish labour unions 
without government permission for this political activity. 255 Students, poor people 
and farmers had very limited influence on government policy. The urban students 
were not influential, since under martial law they could not participate in politics and 
demonstrations. The urban poor and rural farmers were not allowed to take part in 
politics or to form into groups. Like the workers, these groups had limited influence 
on government policy; they only participated in the local and parliamentary elections. 
Therefore, these groups have a political weight of 1.  
Overall, compared with the political power structure in the previous period 
under Chiang Kai-shek (see Chapter 5), the changing political power structure during 
Chiang Ching-Kuo period lay in the increasing strength of the Tangwai movement 
                                                      
255
 The KMT government established some labour unions in China which continued in Taiwan. 
However, they were controlled by the KMT and did not function as modern labour unions do (for 
example, to organise protests for better welfare for their members). Li, Yunjie, Taiwan gonghui de 
zhengzhi jingji fenxi (Taipei, 1992); Wang, Zhenghuan and Fang, Xiaoding, ‘Guojia jiqi, laogong 
zhengce yu laogong yundong’, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Sudies, vol.13 (1992); He, 
Xueying, Taiwan zizhu gonghui yundongshi (Taipei, 1992). 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
and the rise of Bensheng ren power within the KMT. Some local and parliamentary 
elections opened opportunities, but, due to the limited scope of the elections, other 
social groups were not able to influence government policy significantly. Apart from 
these, the KMT elites mainly held the political power. The political power structure 
explains why the relation of the state and the SMEs was distant: under the political 
system, the SMEs could have only limited influence on the government’s policy-
making. 
 
Table 8-1. Political Weight of Different Social Groups in Taiwan 1970-1987 
Social groups Political weights  
KMT ruling elites 
(Waisheng ren and Bensheng 
ren) 
 
10 
Government bureaucrats  
(Bensheng ren and young 
generation of Waisheng ren) 
 
7 
Urban politicians  4 
Entrepreneurs 3 
Urban workers  2 
Urban students 1 
The poor 1 
Farmers 1 
 
8-3. Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Democratisation, 1988-2000 
Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988 and was succeeded as president by Lee Teng-
hui. As discussed above, Taiwan’s politics had been dominated by the Waisheng ren; 
Lee was one of the Bensheng ren elites who had been promoted by Chiang in the 
1970s. At first, Lee did not gain the full support of the KMT party. There were many 
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senior members and conservatives who opposed his political reforms in the 1970s and 
1980s. The conservatives tried to delay the election of him as KMT chairman.256 
Standing for a minority in the KMT party, Lee tried to cooperate with the younger 
generation of the KMT, local party members and the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP). This attempt succeeded and Lee was finally elected. In order to strengthen his 
power, Lee carried democratic policies yet further.257   
  Further democratic development proceeded in Taiwan in the 1990s. A series 
of disagreements on democracy erupted within the KMT. The conservatives were 
opposed to having direct elections at every level. By contrast, the reformers proposed 
making elections direct, presidential elections in particular.258 Direct elections could 
easily constrain the power of the KMT conservatives over Lee. In 1990, he was the 
last president to be elected by the National Assembly of the Republic of China in 
Taiwan, as the 8th president. On 1 May 1991 the National Assembly decided to repeal 
the Temporary Provision Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion. This 
move had a significant impact on the development of democracy in Taiwan. The 
Temporary Provision suspended general elections in Taiwan, which stabilised the 
KMT’s authoritarianism over Taiwanese society. The restoration of elections changed 
the political power structure in Taiwan.  
Table 8-2 shows the changes in the political weights of different social groups 
after the changes in the election system. The new ruling elites were now the ruling 
elites of the KMT. Although this was a new group, the KMT was still the political 
force dominating Taiwan. They thus still have 10 points of political weight in the 
model. The urban political bureaucrats were still responsible for implementing 
policies. There is no increase or decrease in their political weight, which remains at 7 
points. The urban politicians in this period were the newly-established political 
party― the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) – and the New Party which split off 
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from the KMT. The DPP was founded by the Tangwai politicians in 1986.259 The 
members of the New Party are the younger generation of the KMT who disagreed 
with President Lee’s reforms within the KMT in the early 1990s.260 The DPP has been 
increasing its power through local elections since 1987. The New Party has some 
supporters, but its power is weaker than that of the DPP. Their influence was 
gradually increased by the open voting in the general and presidential elections and 
they began to oppose the KMT’s sovereignty. Their political weights in the model 
thus increase to 8 points.  
The entrepreneurs during this period also increased their political weight 
because of elections.261 The increasing influence of the entrepreneurs can be seen 
from the KMT central membership lists. The central members used to include only 
KMT officials, military leaders and bureaucrats. After 1987, several significant 
entrepreneurs became members of the KMT central decision-making system.262 The 
political weight of the urban capitalists therefore increased to 7 points. It was possible 
for them to influence government policy by voting.  
The political weights of the urban workers increased more during this period 
since labour unions had became active in fighting for labour benefits. Their political 
weights increased to 6. The political weights of students, the poor and the farmers 
increased to 5 points. The political transformation re-distributed political power in 
society. In these circumstances, the SMEs gained more power to influence the 
formation of government’s policy through elections. In other words, the relation of the 
state and the SMEs was not as distant as it had been in the previous decade. The 
question then is whether the state interest complied with the economic interests of the 
SMEs in terms of cross-strait trade and investment. 
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Table 8-2. Political Weight of Different Social Groups in Taiwan 1988-2000 
Social groups Political weights  
KMT ruling elites 
 
10 
Government bureaucrats  
 
7 
Urban politicians  8 
Entrepreneurs 7 
Urban workers  6 
Urban students 5 
The poor 5 
Farmers 5 
 
8-4. The Impact of the Changing Political Power Structure on the Formation of the 
New Investment Policies 
From 1949 to the 1960s, cross-strait relations were hostile; several small-scale 
battles continued between Taiwan and China. In the 1970s fighting was suspended but 
the bombing of the Taiwan Strait continued. The military resistance continued until 
1978, when the Chinese government launched its significant economic reform and 
open policy in order to solve various problems in the economy.263 In 1979 Deng 
announced ‘An official notice for Taiwanese fellow countrymen’ which tried to 
reconcile his administration with that of the KMT government. This declaration can 
be considered the turning point for modern cross-strait relations. It had several 
implications in both the political and economic spheres. Politically, it points out that 
the PRC government is opposed to any form of independence for Taiwan. The clear 
line for negotiation is no independence; but as long as the KMT government complies 
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with the ‘one China’ policy, anything and everything (whether it is PRC or ROC) can 
be negotiated. This line significantly influenced the next 30 years of cross-strait 
relations. Meanwhile, the declaration also announced that the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) would stop firing artillery shells at the islands of Jingmen and Mazu.264 
The political principle and the military policy had great influence on further 
communications across the strait. Economically, China required financial capital and 
new technology to solve its difficulties regarding labour and light industry. In addition 
to the economic requirements, investment from overseas Chinese was preferred by the 
Communist government. 265  With this in mind, the Chinese launched a series of 
encouragement and welcome policies for Hong Kong and Taiwanese investment and 
trade (more details of these policies are discussed in the next chapter).  
 
8-5. Chiang Ching-kuo and the Cross-strait Policy, 1978-1986  
Although China modified its cross-strait policy, Taiwan was in an unstable 
political situation in particular in the late 1970s; both external shocks and internal 
disturbances challenged KMT sovereignty. In these circumstances, Chiang Ching-
Kuo responded to Deng by the ‘Three-no policy’. The ‘Three-no’ stood for no 
contacts, no compromises and no negotiations.266  Although the KMT government 
practised the ‘three no policy’ politically in 1979, there was a small amount of transit 
trade then (via Hong Kong) between Taiwan and China. In 1985 the Taiwanese 
administration announced the ‘three no policy’ concerning transit trade across the 
Taiwan Strait. This declared that the policy of the Taiwanese government towards 
transit trade with China (via Hong Kong) was ‘no contacts, no encouragement and no 
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interference’.267 The political and economic ‘three-nos’ were the principle for the first 
period of cross-strait policy, until 1987. 
Table 8-3 shows the social groups’ reaction to the open policy towards China 
from 1978 to 1987. The ruling elites were opposed to the open policy towards China, 
because their political longevity under the external and internal shocks was threatened 
by the Chinese Communists. The KMT elites were then strongly opposed an open 
policy towards China. The government did not worry as much about economic profits 
as about political challenges since the economy had grown and prospered in this 
period. The political power of the KMT ruling elites weighed 10 points in opposing 
the open policy in order to secure their sovereignty. During this period, the urban 
political bureaucrats were a part of the KMT party. Hence, the KMT’s interests 
coincided with theirs. In the context of the urban political bureaucrats, 7 points were 
given to opposing the open policy towards China.  
In terms of the reaction of other social groups at the time, their influence on 
the government’s cross-strait policy was very low. On the one hand, establishing new 
political parties was still prohibited; on the other, the limited local elections could not 
influence the government in power. In these circumstances, the reaction of the group 
of urban politicians, the urban workers, the urban students, the poor and the farmers 
were not considered since they could not influence policy by voting at elections. 
The results in Table 8-3 clarify the factors affecting the restrictions on the 
open policy towards China and explain the tough policies towards China during this 
period. Since the local elections did not help the urban capitalists and other social-
economic groups to influence government cross-strait policy, the bans on cross-strait 
relations resulted instead from the political interests of the KMT elites and the 
political bureaucrats.  
 
Table 8-3. Political Weight of Different Social Groups and Their Reaction to the 
Open Policy towards China 1978-1987 
 
Social groups 
Political 
weights  
Group reaction to the open policy 
(Political power points) 
Favour Oppose Uncertain 
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KMT ruling elites 10 0 10   
Government 
bureaucrats 
 
7 0 7   
Urban politicians  4 n/a n/a   
Urban capitalists  3 n/a n/a   
Urban workers 2 n/a n/a  n/a 
Urban students 1 n/a n/a  n/a 
The poor 1 n/a n/a  n/a 
Farmers 1 n/a n/a  n/a 
Total 29 0 17  n/a 
 
8-6. The Changing Cross-strait Policy, 1987-1994 
In July 1987 Chiang Ching-kuo announced the ending of martial law. There 
were debates regarding his policy decision. 268 Apart from the factors of Chiang’s 
changing policy, the ending of martial law had a significant impact on cross-strait 
relations. In early 1987 some young legislators (the new elites who had been 
promoted by Chiang’s political reforms within the KMT party) interrogated the 
administration during a parliamentary session regarding the bans on cross-strait 
communication. They urged the government to lift the bans, in particular those on 
travelling to China.269 Newspapers and public opinion also supported these young 
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legislators.270 Even the political opposition, the DPP, supported the more open policy 
towards China.271 Without the lifting of martial law, these legislators or politicians 
who supported this could have been imprisoned or executed for treason. The ending 
of martial law brought increasing freedom of speech and democracy in Taiwan. These 
factors are significant for the policy.272  Under pressure from the public, guidelines on 
‘How Taiwanese People Could Visit Chinese Relatives’ were issued in November 
1987.273  
When Lee Teng-hui came to power in 1988, his government re-framed the 
cross-strait policy. It set up a government organisation and formal regulations for 
further cross-strait communication. On 23 February 1991 the KMT government 
established the Mainland Affairs Council to deal with cross-strait affairs. Later in the 
same year, the KMT government announced the Guidelines for National 
Unification.274 In the same year, the KMT government officially permitted Taiwanese 
investment in China. In addition to the passing of laws, in 1992 the negotiations 
between the Strait Exchange Foundation and Association for Relations across the 
Taiwan Straits began. The political issues could not be settled, but there was an urgent 
need for economic cooperation, in particular in the 1990s. These non-governmental 
                                                      
270
 Opinion polls investigated by the Zili Evening Paper show that 64% supported to relax the 
restrictions on visiting relatives in China and 24% agreed that it was time to relax the restrictions (Zhili 
Evening Paper, Taipei, 3 August 1987). “Shunying minqing zhiding dalu tanqin zhengce,” United 
Daily, Taipei, 17 September 1987. 
271
 The movement to return home was advocated by the DDP in the late 1980s. The movement seems 
to have been out of tune with the DPP’s orthodox principle―establishing the Republic of Taiwan. In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, the DPP was anti-China (while contrariwise, the KMT became more 
China-friendly). However, the DPP politicians who strongly opposed the CCP government joined the 
returning-home movement in the late 1980s and visited their ancestral home towns in China in the 
1990s. “Dui kaifan minzhong qianwan tanqin, minjintang cu zhongyuan fankuan xianzhi,” United 
Daily, Taipei, 26 August 1987. 
272
 According to some unofficial information in the mid 1980s, many Waisheng ren, especially old 
soldiers (who had come with the KMT in 1949) had gone back to China (via Hong Kong) to visit their 
Chinese relatives before 1987, when the KMT government gave its official permission. “Laobin laojia 
tanqin,” United Daily, Taipei, 15 October 1987. 
273
 The document ‘How Taiwanese people could Visit Chinese relatives’ was issued by the Ministry of 
Domestic Affairs since there was no special department for dealing with Mainland affairs. Some of the 
articles of the methods were then merged into the new cross-strait regulations issued in 1992. Before 
1992 many cross-strait rules were scattered and not well-organised. 
274
 Guidelines for National Unification was issued on 23 February 1991 and abolished on 1 March 
2006. Mainland Affairs Council, Guidelines for National Unification, 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=68276&CtNode=5836&mp=4. (11 June 2011). For further 
discussions on the guidelines, see Huang, Kunhui, ‘Guojia tonyi gangling yu dalu zhengce’, 
Zhonggong yanjiu, vol.26, no.10 (1992) pp.16-39. 
152 
 
organisations achieved several significant economic agreements which facilitated 
trade relations between Taiwan and China.275   
Although the formal organisations and the negotiation mechanisms were 
established, the objective of the cross-strait economic policy was to control and 
manage trade and investment. Based upon principles of control and management, the 
regulations which largely concern cross-strait economic activity lie in the setting-up 
of an indirect model of trade, investment and transportation. Therefore, in the early 
period of the ‘open’ policy, it was actually open no more than indirectly.276  
Table 8-4 shows the social groups’ reaction to the open policy towards China 
from 1987 to 1994. The ruling elites during this period both favoured and opposed to 
the open policy. On the one hand, military threats and political conflicts still 
threatened their political longevity. On the other, economic needs and public opinion 
forced them to adjust the cross-strait policies. In these circumstances, 6 points were 
given to favouring an open policy and 4 points were given to opposing the open 
policy of the KMT ruling elites. In terms of the political bureaucrats, they were still 
under the control of KMT. Therefore, 4.5 points were given to them if they favoured 
the open policy and 2.5 points were if they opposed it. The interests of the KMT 
ruling elites and the political bureaucrats in this case coincided.  
The urban politicians, as the evidence above shows, were the group which 
advocated the relaxed restriction of Taiwan’s bans. Therefore, 4 points were given to 
favouring the open policy of the urban politicians. The urban capitalists still favoured 
the open policy because of the appreciation of the NTD in the late 1980s. With more 
elections at the local level, the urban capitalists gradually increased their influence in 
this period by supporting politicians in elections. However, most politicians who 
participated in elections also had limited influence on the government’s policy. It was 
possible to issue and pass bills in parliament; however, the parliament did not have a 
mechanism to enforce them on the government. The influence of the capitalists was 
indirect and not strong enough to enforce changes in government policy. Similar 
comments apply to the reaction of other social groups. On the one hand, there were no 
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opinion polls concerning the issue; but, on the other, their influence through voting 
and elections were still limited. The evidence provided by the newspapers indicates 
only that public opinion and some of the legislators were urging the government to lift 
the prohibitions. Therefore, the influence of the urban politicians can be calculated. 
The influence of the political power weights from other groups on the issue, however, 
is not clear due to the lack of direct evidence and the political system.  
 
Table 8-4. Political Weight of Different Social Groups and Their Reaction to the 
Open Policy towards China 1987-1994 
Social groups Political weights  
Group reaction to the open policy 
(Political power points) 
Favour Oppose 
KMT ruling elites 10 6 4 
Government bureaucrats 
 
7 4.5 2.5 
Urban politicians  4 4 0 
Entrepreneurs 3  n/a  n/a 
Urban workers 2  n/a  n/a 
Urban students 1  n/a  n/a 
The poor 1  n/a  n/a 
Farmers 1  n/a  n/a 
Total 29  14.5  6.5 
 
Comparing Table 8-3 with Table 8-4, it is clear that although the KMT was 
still the dominating political power in Taiwanese society, with the abolition of the 
Temporary provisions and the restoration of elections, the political influence of the 
urban politicians had increased. The increase in the political power of the urban 
politicians affected KMT’s adjustments in cross-strait policy. Of course, other factors, 
such as the foreign forces and economic needs were also among the KMT’s concerns.  
Nevertheless, during these two periods, under China’s changing policy, the KMT 
government was uncertain about the impact of the open policy on its political 
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longevity. The concerns of the safety of their political interests limited the relaxation 
of the cross-strait policy in the early period. It is also worth noting that, although the 
SMEs were able to influence the legislators through elections and push them to relax 
the restrictions on cross-strait policy, the legislators were not strong enough to take on 
the government. Therefore, the cross-strait policy was made on the basis of the 
KMT’s political and economic interest. In other words, the political conditions made 
the Taiwanese government give up the prospect of economic efficiency in order to 
consolidate national defence and political power.  
 
8-7. Elections and the Changing Cross-strait Policy, 1994-2000 
It is clear that the changing interest of the Taiwanese government in 1987 
improved and facilitated investment and trade across the strait. The government 
institutionalised cross-strait relations and adjusted the development policy in Taiwan. 
However, the peaceful political situation from 1987 did not last long. Political 
relations went downhill in 1995. In 1995 the U.S. parliament approved Lee’s visit at 
Cornell University. This political movement resulted in the Third Missile Crisis 
across the strait. The missile crisis continued in 1996 before the first direct 
presidential election in Taiwan. Political conflicts and a military crisis interrupted the 
formal economic negotiations between Taiwan and China.277 With the rise of political 
conflicts in 1996, Lee in 1996 announced the ‘no hurry, be patient’ policy concerning 
cross-strait investment. The policy pointed out that under the military threats and the 
lack of formal institutions to protect Taiwanese private investment in China, it was 
not enough to open direct transportation and communication. This implied that the 
government did not favour closer economic cooperation with China and would be 
strict over investment in China.278  
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During Lee’s period, the economic policy across the strait fluctuated. He 
gradually opened up investment in China in 1991; however, his government enforced 
several restrictions on investment and prohibited some large Taiwanese investments 
in China. It is worth noting that, with the restoration of elections, in particular the 
direct presidential election in 1996, these restrictions on investment and trade policy 
across the strait required the support of most Taiwanese voters. The opinion polls 
from 1995 to 2000 show people’s opinions on cross-strait policy in different fields in 
different years. 
 
8-8. Analysis of Public Opinion Polls, 1995-2000 
This section separates the public opinion polls from 1996 to 2000 into three 
categories. The first category shows public opinion towards political issues across the 
strait. The political issue includes the issue of independence and unification, military 
threats and national security. The second category is of public opinions concerning 
Taiwanese investment in China. The third category concerns direct transportation 
across the strait.   
According to the government documents, from 1995 to 1999, the majority 
agreed that the Chinese government was hostile towards the Taiwanese 
government/people. The highest vote as 88% in September 1995 when the missile 
crisis occurred. The lowest percentage was 28.2% in June 1998. The average 
percentage concerning this issue remained 50%. Concerning the issue of 
independence or unification, the majority agreed on retaining the status quo and 
deciding later between unification and independence. This opinion exceeded the 
average by 30%-40% from 1994 to 1999, implying that most people had no 
conclusive answer on unification or independence. Concerning the issue of military 
threats, the opinion polls investigated in early 1995 (before August) showed that most 
respondents did not think China would attack Taiwan. Later in 1995 (after August) 
people agreed that China would mount a military attack on Taiwan if Taiwan 
officially announced independence. However, by 1996 the majority had ceased to 
think so. Furthermore, concerning the issue of ‘one country, two systems’, from 1991 
to 1998 a very high percentage (generally over 60%) did not agree with the policy. In 
1999 when Lee defended the ‘Special Relations between Two Countries’ policy, the 
opinion polls showed that on  average 50% agreed with his view of cross-strait 
relations. On political issues, the majority did not favour the Chinese government. 
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However, in terms of unification or independence, most people were hesitant. Some 
opinion polls showed strong support for independence. But some opinion polls 
showed that most people still considered themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese.279  
The second category concerns Taiwanese investment in China, from several 
points of view. The first section presents public opinion on the restrictions on 
Taiwanese investment in China. From 1996 to 1999, most people agreed that the 
Taiwanese government should control and manage investment and capital flows to 
China. Some opinion polls even showed that over 50% agreed that the government 
should restrict Taiwanese investment in China even further. Interestingly, when 
considering the policy of ‘no hurry, be patient’, most believed that the policy needed 
to be adjusted. More specifically, opinion polls among Taiwanese industrialists and 
entrepreneurs, highly opposed the ‘no hurry, be patient’ policy and were in favour of a 
more open investment policy. It is worth noting that there were different opinions 
from the capitalist group and from ordinary people. However, there was still a 
majority agreeing that the government should control and restrict investment in 
China.280 
The third category is regarding direct transport links across the strait. It shows 
that the majority were in favour of opening direct transport links in particular 
circumstances. Moreover, some opinion polls showed that if the issue of direct trade 
affected national security, opinion was equally divided. It is also worth noting that the 
opinion polls from the entrepreneurs showed that direct transport links would increase 
their willingness to remain in Taiwan. Overall, concerning the general pace of cross-
strait communication (including political, economic and transportation), from 1993 to 
1999 the majority considered the pace of opening up was adequate. 281 
Comparing the public opinion polls in these three categories, it can be seen 
that the political issue was confusing. Some opinion polls tried to demonstrate that, 
without military threats, most would agree to independence immediately. However, 
the military threats existed and should be considered among the political factors. In 
terms of investment issue, it is clear that from ordinary people had a different opinion 
from the entrepreneurs. Regarding the issue of direct transport links, people generally 
approved of them in certain circumstances. However, the opinion polls did not specify 
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what these circumstances might be. This raised the question how far political conflicts 
and military resistance affected economic activity and voting behaviour.  
Some opinion polls combined several issues at once. In 1996 the Ministry of 
Chinese Affairs in Taiwan investigated whether China’s military threats would affect 
election behaviour. Over 80% of the people questioned said that their voting decisions 
were not affected by the military threats. Another investigation integrated military 
threats with the investment plans of private enterprises and found that more than 70% 
of the Taiwanese entrepreneur respondents considered that their business was not 
affected by the military threats. These opinions showed that there were no strong or 
definite connections between politics and investment.282  
Based upon the opinion polls, the analysis in Table 8-5 looks at different 
social groups’ reactions to the open policy towards China from 1994 to 2000. The 
ruling elites were still the KMT elites. Economic issues became more challenging for 
the KMT government after the appreciation of the NTD affected foreign orders and 
Taiwanese exports. Politically, more and more opposition parties competed with the 
KMT elites in elections. Under the pressure of the economic and political changes, the 
KMT government had little choice but to adjust its policy towards China. Its political 
life might or might not be threatened since different social groups supported or 
opposed the policy. Their preference would affect the KMT’s tenure through 
elections. It was also uncertain for the ruling elites whether China’s policy of 
‘economic integration leading to political integration’ would threaten their political 
control. A more open policy would increase the support from the capitalists and raise 
political funds for elections. However, the same policy might also lose the support of 
other social groups and thus lose elections. Therefore, while the rents from capitalists 
would increase, other rents from other groups might decline. In these circumstances, 
the KMT government weighed 5 points on each side. 
For the group of political bureaucrats, the new economic development policy, 
including the establishment of Asia-Pacific Regional Operation Centre, needed a 
further open investment policy with China; however, national security was another 
concern for these bureaucrats. Certainly, an open policy would increase the benefits 
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for the new economic development project.283 Having similar concerns to the ruling 
elites, the political bureaucrats weighed 3.5 points on each side. 
The group of urban politicians, including the DPP and the New Party, 
competed with the KMT party in elections. Support for and resistance to the open 
policy varied with the nature of the political parties. The major supporters of the DPP 
during this period were workers, farmers and young students. For the benefit of their 
major supporters, the DPP opposed complete openness to China because it reduced 
their political longevity and thus the rents from their supporters to support it.284 The 
New Party fully supported an open policy towards China and suggested that the KMT 
government should negotiate with the Communist government immediately. Since 
this group shows differing political attitudes, 4 political power points should go to 
opposing the open policy and 4 points to favouring it.285  
It is clear from the opinion polls that the urban capitalists favoured the open 
policy towards China because of the profits and orders they had lost by the 
appreciation of NTD. They would increase their profits and value added in 
manufacturing if the KMT government permitted investing in China. Therefore, the 
political power points of the urban capitalists gave 8 points to favouring the open 
policy.  
The other four groups, workers, students, the poor and the farmers, represent 
the ordinary people in the opinion polls. It is clear that most of them agreed that the 
government should control and restrict large investments in China, a view to be 
explained by the uncertainty of these groups. Students were uncertain whether an 
open policy would increase their job opportunities in the future. On the one hand, 
when numerous factories migrated and only head offices remained in Taiwan, job 
opportunities would be diminished. On the other, an open policy might attract 
investment from China and other foreign countries; however, they were uncertain 
whether the job opportunities thus created would be open to them. In these uncertain 
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circumstances, keeping the status quo was probably their choices.  The workers would 
lose their jobs if the urban capitalists invested in China and closed their businesses in 
Taiwan in order to spend less on wages. The concerns of workers were different from 
the concerns of students. The students were more uncertain about future jobs; the 
workers, however, would lose jobs immediately if more enterprises invested in China. 
Again, it was possible that the Chinese or foreign enterprises might create other 
opportunities. However, they were not sure about the transaction cost for a transition 
from one industry to another. Given this uncertainty and not knowing whether an 
open policy would be better or worse for them, they probably chose to keep the status 
quo for the sake of their jobs. 
The poor, for their part, had even less capacity to find a job than the students 
and the workers. Therefore, their concerns may have been similar to the other groups. 
They were not sure whether the new open policy would increase their benefits. But 
they did know that it would reduce their job opportunities. The farmers, however, may 
have been concerned whether the open investment policy would be accompanied by 
an open trade policy. The open investment policy might have only a limited impact on 
their career. But, with more entrepreneurs investing in China and more Taiwanese 
white-collar workers transferring to China with them, consumer consumption would 
be affected, with possibly a bad effect on their profits. Moreover, if the open 
investment policy were in accordance with a more open trade policy, Chinese 
agricultural products would in the Taiwanese market compete with their products. 
And it was highly likely that the Chinese produce would be cheaper, since production 
costs in China were lower. The groups of students, workers, the poor and farmers thus 
had different concerns over the open investment policy and could not decide whether 
it would leave them better or worse off. This, based upon the Rodrik model, made 
them highly likely to oppose it. 
The results of Table 8-5 help to explain that the political conflicts across the 
strait after 1995 were no longer politically -oriented because the government power 
needed public support. Of course, different factors, including political ideology, 
ethnic recognitions and economic factors would affect voters’ behaviour. The 
argument that politics was the basis for the policy restrictions on cross-strait 
investment policy was too general. The political transformation and the redistribution 
of political power in society complicated cross-strait relations. In order to remain in 
power, the government needed an electoral majority. The analysis here demonstrates 
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that the government interest did not comply with the economic interests of the SMEs. 
Did the conflicting interests between the state and the SMEs affect SME investment 
behaviour?  
 
Table 8-5. Political Weight of Different Social Groups and Their Reaction to the 
Open Policy towards China 1994-2000 
Social groups Political weights  
Group reaction to the open policy 
(Political power points) 
Favour Oppose Uncertain 
KMT ruling elites 10 5 5   
Government bureaucrats 
 
7 3.5 3.5   
Urban politicians  8 4 4   
Urban capitalists  7 7 0   
Urban workers 6 0 0  6 
Urban students 5 0 0  5 
The poor 5 0 0  5 
Farmers 5 0 0  5 
Total 65 22.5 11.5  21 
 
8-9. The Limits of the State: the Pattern of Taiwanese Outward Investment, 1986-
2000 
Since the government had its own interests and concerns for its economic 
needs, many bans and restrictions on investment in China were enacted but also more 
encouragement to invest in Southeast Asian countries. For example, the Taiwanese 
government negotiated with some Southeast Asian governments (mainly Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and Brunei) in order to set 
up and sign investment, trade and transportation agreements. These agreements would 
facilitate and protect Taiwanese investment in these countries. Furthermore, the 
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government also issued special loans and insurance for enterprises which invested in 
these Southeast Asian countries.286  
In contrast, not until 1996 did Taiwan and China make preliminary economic 
agreements on investment protection and a dispute mechanism, which were signed by 
the two civil organisations (on behalf of the two governments). In other words, under 
the formal institutional framework, Taiwanese investment in some Southeast Asia 
countries was freer and better protected. However, the statistics of Taiwanese outward 
investment question the influence of government’s policy on SME investment 
behaviour. 
A closer examination of the average number of investments in China and in 
Southeast Asia clarifies the types of enterprise which did not follow the government’s 
guidance. Figure 8-1 shows a comparison of the average amount of money of 
investment cases in China and in Southeast Asia. The average amount of FDI per 
investment in Southeast Asia exceeds the average amount of FDI per investment case 
in China. The comparison implies that the type of enterprise that invested in China 
was mainly small or medium-sized.  
Figure 8-2 below shows Taiwanese investment in China and in these 
Southeast Asia countries from 1987 to 2000. Before 1991 there was no official record 
(from the KMT government) of Taiwanese investment in China because the KMT 
government had prohibited such investment. It is clear that the Taiwanese investment 
in Southeast Asia countries rose quickly from 1988 to 1990 when there was a huge 
appreciation of NTD against USD. However, after 1991, when the Taiwanese 
government opened up investment in China, Taiwanese investment in the SEA 
countries declined sharply. After 1992, the Taiwanese investment in China was much 
higher than in the SEA countries. The pattern of Taiwanese investment shows that, 
regardless of government restrictions or encouragement, most Taiwanese investment 
still went to China and not elsewhere.  
The investment pattern also shows an increase of investment from 1995 to 
1998. The increase of Taiwanese investment in China during this period was 
indifferent to the severe political and military tensions across the strait. In 1995 
President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University in the United States resulted in 
the Third Taiwan Strait crisis. The People’s Liberalisation Army conducted missile 
                                                      
286
 Bureau of Economic Research, the Central Bank of the R.O.C., Taishang dui dongnanya guojia 
touzhi zhi yannxi  (Taipei, 1997). 
162 
 
tests in an area only sixty kilometres north of Pengjia Islet in August 1995 and March 
1996. Clearly, however, the missile crisis did not disturb Taiwanese investment in 
China. The reduction of Taiwanese investment in China in 1998 and 1999 was 
affected by the Asian Financial Crisis. But, while the political conflicts and military 
tests did not suspend investment and trade, further improvements concerning 
economic cooperation were postponed.287  
Based upon the evidence of Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2, it can be assumed that 
the government had limited influence on the investment behaviour of SMEs. Despite 
the government restrictions and political conflicts and crisis, the SMEs followed the 
market wherever the lowest labour costs could be found. Relatively speaking, the 
large enterprises were influenced by the government policy and invested in Southeast 
Asia.   
 
Figure 8-1. The Average Amount of Taiwan’s Investment Cases in China and in 
Southeast Asia (USD$ million), 1987-2000 
  
Source: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), 
Statistical Yearbook of Investment Commission (Taipei, 2001), pp.77-79. National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing, 2001), p.602. 
Note: (1) ‘Southeast Asia’ stands for four countries: Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia.  
(2) The FDI statistics of Taiwanese investment in China from 1987 to 1990 are based upon the China 
Statistical Year Book. 
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Figure 8-2. Taiwanese FDI in China and in Southeast Asia (USD$ million), 1987-
2000 
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Sources: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan R.O.C (Taiwan), 
Statistical Yearbook of Investment Commission, (Taipei, 2001), pp.77-79. 
 
8-10. Conclusion 
This chapter explains the government’s interest in making cross-strait 
economic policy and how far the state’s interest and the policy influenced the SME 
investment behaviour. Although the economists generally agree that free trade and 
investment with China would bring larger earnings than cost to the Taiwanese 
economy, in the late 1980s the government banned and afterwards restricted 
investment in China. At the same time, the government encouraged Taiwanese 
investment in Southeast Asia with the incentive of preferential terms. The 
contradiction between economic profits and government policies is usually explained 
by the single factor of political conflict across the strait. Such political conflict did 
influence free trade and cross-border investment; however, the political 
transformation complicated the government’s interest and the formation of the new 
trade and investment policy. What is more important is whether it was the political 
conflicts, the state’s interests or the policy restrictions that influenced SME 
investment behaviour.  
The analysis of the political transformation from 1970 to 2000 shows that 
when a new dictator came to power, he needed to create different power groups in his 
support because he had no power of his own. This can be found from Chiang Ching-
Kuo’s political reform and Lee Teng-Hui’s democratisation. The impact of political 
transformation led to the re-distribution of political power in the power structure. The 
re-distribution of political power structure also affected the most recent cross-strait 
economic policy. In 1979 China’s economic reform and the announcement of Deng 
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Xiaoping significantly changed the cross-strait relations after the Cold War. The offer 
of political compromises and an open market policy forced the KMT government to 
adjust its cross-strait policy.  
In the first period, from 1979 to 1986, Chiang-Ching-Kuo did not compromise 
with Deng but announced the ‘three nos’ policy. During this period, it is possible to 
argue that political conflicts and the political interest of the KMT were the cause of 
policy restrictions across the strait. This argument needs more explanation. Politics 
hindered open cross-strait policy because the political power structure was still 
dominated by the KMT’s ruling elites and its political bureaucrats. Facing both 
internal and external challenges, the KMT chose to retain the status quo without huge 
adjustments of cross-strait policy. Since the decision-making system was still 
dominated by the party and the SMEs and other socio-economic groups were unable 
to influence the decision-making system, the making of policies was based upon the 
interests of the party and the ruling groups.  
In the second period from 1987 to 1994, Chiang Ching-Kuo finally permitted 
travelling to China and lifted martial law. Chiang Ching-Kuo’s political reform in the 
1970s and the gradual opening of parliamentary elections in the 1980s produced a 
developed younger generation of KMT members. The re-distribution of political 
power gave the opposition political party and the young KMT members more 
influence on the decision-making system. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
although the urban politicians and the younger generation KMT members had 
increased political power weights, it was still difficult for them to dominate the 
government because the electoral system for the president was still indirect and 
dominated by the National Assembly. In other words, the influence of other social 
groups on the issue was limited through voting and elections.  
In the third period from 1994 to 2000, the impact of political conflicts on 
economic activity became obvious. The government policy disrupted trade and 
investment; nevertheless, with the changing political power structure, the government 
needed public support to remain in power and to enforce these restrictions on cross-
strait investment and trade. The analysis of public opinion polls showed that in the 
1990s there was no clear-cut split on an ethnic or national basis. Yet public opinion 
polls concerning investment and trade issue show clear differences before 1996 and 
after 1996 and different opinions from the people and from entrepreneurs about 
investment and trade policies.  
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Before 1996 and the policy of ‘no hurry, be patient’, the separation between 
those who favoured and opposed open trade and investment policy and why they did 
so was not very clear. The policy in the early 1990s, on the one hand, slowly 
improved investment and trade institutions across the strait. For the entrepreneurs, a 
policy which gradually opened up opportunities was what they were looking for. They 
also preferred well-established institutions for their business between Taiwan and 
China which would reduce transaction cost. On the other hand, the early policy was 
indeed gradual and under the control of the government. For other socio-economic 
groups, these policies were accepted, since the restrictions and control remained. In 
other words, Lee Teng-Hui’s cross-strait policy before 1996 was moderate and was 
accepted by most Taiwanese voters.  
With the changing policy on trade and investment after 1996, public opinions 
polls showed a clear split between the entrepreneurs and the people. Different socio-
economic groups had different interests; and these interests made them favour, oppose 
or question more open trade and investment policy in the future. The diversified 
interests of different social groups resulted in a relaxation of investment and trade 
under the government restrictions across the strait. The relaxation and restrictions 
were in response to the government’s interest in retaining power by complying with 
the diverse interests of the social groups. In this period, with the changing political 
power structure and the start of presidential elections, the interests of different social 
groups were able to influence the government’s cross-strait policy. 
By analysing the political transformations and changes in power structure, it 
becomes clear that the politically-oriented policy allowing cross-strait economic 
activity was produced by several factors. The aim in setting up the restrictions was 
related to the desire to stabilise political power and to remain in power. When the 
main interest was the survival of the political party, the government did not support 
the investment of SMEs in China, even though China was the best environment for it. 
This implies that the government did not support the best interests of the SMEs.  
Although the government set up the restrictions on cross-strait investment to 
serve its own political and economic interests, a comparison of Taiwanese FDI in 
China and in Southeast Asia shows that the government had limited influence on the 
SMEs’ investment behaviour. Neither the government restrictions nor the military 
crisis disturbed the continuing inflow of Taiwanese investment in China. Further 
comparison of the size per Taiwanese investment case in China and in Southeast Asia 
166 
 
confirms that the government had only limited influence on SME behaviour. The 
evidence shows the limits of the government in influencing this investment behaviour. 
To conclude, the consequences of political transformation significantly 
affected people’s power to influence the decision-making system. Although political 
conflicts across the strait did influence economic policy, with the changing political 
system, government policy required voters’ support. A beneficial economic policy 
could not be implemented because the changing of the political power structure in 
Taiwanese society created different socio-economic groups with divergent economic 
interests regarding investment and trade across the strait and these changed the 
government’s concern to form a cross-strait policy with both relaxation and 
restrictions. The analysis also shows that even though the SME group gained more 
political power to influence the government’s policy through elections, the state’s 
interest did not comply with their needs. Nevertheless, SME investment behaviour 
was not affected by the government’s restrictions nor the political conflicts. Evidence 
shows that the Taiwanese government had limited influence on SME investment 
behaviour; SME investment continued to flow into China without government support 
and the SMEs followed the market mechanism.  
Based upon the findings of this chapter, it may be argued that the SME 
investment behaviour in China was not influenced by the political conflicts, the state’s 
interest nor the policy restrictions. This significantly questions the support of the state 
to the SMEs from the 1960s to the 1980s. If the state had provided substantial support 
(both direct and indirect) to the SMEs in the post-war period, presumably the SMEs 
would have relied on it and the state could have influenced the SMEs’ investment 
behaviour in the form of the state-influenced investment by the Taiwanese large 
enterprises in Southeast Asia. The evidence presented in this chapter shows the 
opposite. 
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Part V. The State’s Constraints? Why the State Had Only Limited Influence on 
SME Investment Behaviour, Trade and Business Transactions across the Strait   
In view of the conflicting interests between the state and the SMEs, the state 
set up restrictions in order to maintain national and economic security. The 
restrictions involved several different areas: transportation, trade and the scrutiny of 
the type and amount of investment from Taiwan to China. Nevertheless, the 
continuing and increasing flow of Taiwanese FDI in China demonstrates that these 
restrictions and control were ineffective. The prosperity of cross-strait trade and the 
high level of Taiwanese FDI in China raised two questions: first, why did the state 
have such a limited influence on the SMEs’ investment behaviour and their business 
transactions across the strait? Were the restrictions ineffective? Why did these 
restrictions fail to control and manage trade and investment in China? And second, 
What supported SME investment and business operation across the strait 
notwithstanding the government’s restrictions? 
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Chapter 9. The Constraints on SME Trade and Business across the Strait, 1980-
2000 
The conflicting interests between the Taiwanese government and the SMEs 
resulted in controls and restrictions on cross-strait trade and investment. Despite these 
constraints, large amounts of Taiwanese FDI continued to flow to China, instead of 
Southeast Asia. On the one hand, the increasing FDI in China indicates that the 
government had limited influence on the SMEs’ investment behaviour. On the other, 
this raises the question of how much impact the restrictions and controls had on cross-
strait trade and investment. The intention of the Taiwanese government was to 
manage and control trade and investment across the strait by establishing an indirect 
model. The indirect model banned direct contacts between Taiwan and China 
including trade, investment and communication. All activity from Taiwan to China 
was to reach it via a third place. This chapter seeks to explain the limited control of 
the indirect model on SME trade, investment and business operation across the strait 
by analysing the grey areas which this model created and the dynamics of the social 
institutions which supported the SMEs across the strait from the late 1980s to 2000. 
The chapter begins by analysing the policy framework in which the indirect 
model was created. The second section, by showing the distribution of Taiwanese FDI 
in China, indicates the over-generalised nature and ignorance in the common 
explanations of the part played by the culture and social networks in facilitating this 
investment, despite the constraints of the indirect model. The third section then tries 
to explore explanations by analysing the economic cost incurred with by the indirect 
model, the management and control on trade, capital flows and financial sources. 
Finally, the chapter compares four instances of investment in China by Taiwanese 
LEs and SMEs, in order to demonstrate the significance of the social institutions 
which facilitated SME business operations across the strait.  
This chapter demonstrates that the formal institutional framework, including 
the restrictions of the Taiwanese government and the regulations of the Chinese 
government, created certain grey area which eased the progress of trade, investment 
and SME business operations across the strait. The dynamics of the Taiwanese social 
institution continued to provide support for this purpose within the grey areas all 
through the 1990s.  
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9-1. The Cross-strait Indirect Model under the Formal Policy Framework 
Since the mid-1980s the Taiwanese government had adjusted several trade and 
investment policies in order to deal with the increasing indirect trade with China. In 
1984 the Taiwanese government relaxed its restrictions on the categories of imported 
Chinese products. A year later, the Taiwanese administration announced the ‘three no 
policy’ concerning transit trade across the Taiwan Strait. This ‘three no policy’ 
declared that the Taiwanese government wanted ‘no contacts, no encouragement and 
no interference’ in the transit trade with China (via Hong Kong). From 1987 to 1989, 
however, the Taiwanese government permitted more agricultural and industrial 
materials to be imported from China to Taiwan. 288 Although the regulations indicate 
that the Taiwanese government would not interfere in this transit trade, they 
reaffirmed the ‘no contacts’ policy to strictly prohibit direct contacts between 
Taiwanese businessmen and Chinese businessmen or any official departments. 
In 1990 the Taiwanese government issued ‘Regulations Governing Indirect 
Investment and Technology Cooperation in Mainland China’. These regulations 
derived from three principles: first, investment is only permitted when the types of 
industry do not threaten national security or affect Taiwan’s economic development; 
second, the operations of all investment in China shall take place through a third 
country; and third, the total investment amount per case does not exceed 1 million 
USD.289  In accordance with the relaxation on investment in China, in 1991, the 
Taiwanese government regulated how capital could flow between Taiwan and China. 
The pattern of the mode focuses specifically on managing the remittance routes 
between the two. 
These early adjustments of trade and investment policies were legislated under 
the ‘Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the 
Mainland Area’ in 1992. The regulations cover all aspects of cross-strait 
communications, particularly investment, transport, trade and economic cooperation. 
                                                      
288
 In 1987 the Ministry of Economics permitted twenty-seven categories of Chinese agricultural and 
industrial raw materials to be sent to Taiwan; at the end of 1987 the number increased to thirty 
categories. Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China, Regulations Governing Products 
of Mainland China, http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=Q0040008. (accessed 
07 May 2011); Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China, Regulations Governing 
Indirect Export Products to Mainland China, 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=Q0040009. (accessed 07 May 2011).  
289
 Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China, Regulations Governing Indirect 
Investment or Technological Cooperation in Mainland China, 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=Q0040010. (accessed 07 May 2011). 
170 
 
Article 35 in Chapter 5 specifies indirect trade across the strait. According to the 
regulations, transportation, including flights (both cargo and civil) and cargo ships are 
required to transfer or transit through a third place if their final destination is either 
China or Taiwan.290  Under the indirect transportation principle of Article 35, the 
Bureau of Foreign Trade of the R.O.C. launched the ‘Regulations Governing 
Permission of Trade between Taiwan Area and Mainland Area’ in 1993, concerning 
the types of export and import commodity permitted across the strait.291  
Based upon Article 35 and the regulations on trade, investment and finance 
across the strait, the triangle trade system was formalised and Hong Kong became the 
significant buffer zone for Taiwan-China trade. Although the regulations do not 
specify that the third place should be Hong Kong, trade via Hong Kong was related to 
its geographical location, since Hong Kong lies mid-way between Taiwan and China. 
In addition to its geographical location, Hong Kong is a free port without customs 
duties and controls for transhipment. The bans on direct trade and transportation 
across the strait made Hong Kong the best buffer zone for transhipping trade 
commodities between Taiwan and China. 
Another part of Article 35 also specifies the methods for investing in China 
and the process of applying for these investments. The Investment Commission of 
Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1993 enforced the 'Regulations for Verification of 
Investment or Technological Cooperation in Mainland China’, based upon the 
principle of Article 35. The KMT government specified three types of investment: 
permitted (labour-intensive traditional manufacturing industry); prohibited (high-tech 
manufacturing industry, government investment, finance, insurance and service 
industries) and special-case-examination. The penalties for breaking these rules and 
regulations were fines of 30 million NTD to 120 million NTD and the suspension of 
the right to invest in China. 292 
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Categories of investment amounts and percentages are included in the 
regulations and were adjusted in 1997. In 1993 the regulation had stipulated that 
different types of firm could invest only up to a specified total. In 1997, under the 
impact of the ‘no hurry, be patient’ policy, the regulation was adjusted to a percentage 
based upon the enterprise scale. The penalties were also changed. In addition to 
raising the fines, the government would also suspend the imports and exports of an 
offending company for two months or up to two years or would revoke its import-
export registration. 293 Although the ' Regulations for Verification of Investment or 
Technological Cooperation in Mainland China’ show that the government allowed 
labour-intensive SMEs to go to China, other related regulations and restrictions 
caused inconvenience to these investors. 
With these investment and trade regulations, the Ministry of Finance in 
Taiwan also legitimated the remittance rules for cross-strait trade and investment. 
According to the ‘Regulations for Permission on Financial Transaction between 
Taiwan Area and Mainland China’ issued by the Ministry of Finance in 1993, 
remittance transactions (both inward and outward) between Taiwan and China had to 
be made through a financial institution in a third place.294 The transit-through-a-third-
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place regulation also applied to travellers between Taiwan and China. The indirect 
model was established on the principle of the Act and different regulations on trade, 
investment, remittance and immigration. This indirect model had its own rules. First, 
all the economic activities had to proceed via a third place. Second, most cross-strait 
communication and activity were one-way only. The KMT government strictly 
controlled Chinese investment in Taiwan and Chinese people travelling to Taiwan.  
Third, the setting-up of the formal institution was aimed at managing and controlling 
cross-strait economic activity rather than facilitating it.295 
 
9-2. What Facilitated Taiwanese FDI in China?  
  Since the indirect model constrained trade and investment across the strait, 
what facilitated trade and investment in its place? Kotkin defines the meaning of 
‘global tribes’ as “cultural groups whose members are geographically dispersed, 
maintain worldwide business and cultural networks and share a strong sense of a 
common origin as well as important values on the primacy of science and knowledge 
in general”296. The idea of global tribes highlights a notion of fading political ideology 
and the emergence of economic cooperation via ethnic origins.297  Much has been 
written on the culture and the kinship relations shared between Taiwan and China (via 
Hong Kong) which mediated the political conflicts and facilitated the investment 
which eluded the formal institutional arrangements.298 
For example, Chang implemented the increasing volume of trade and 
investment statistics showing a gradually integrating market and argued that, despite 
government barriers, a Greater China Zone was gradually emerging between the three 
main entities.299 Chang’s research highlights the role of economic interests and social 
networks in the linked route of Taiwan-Hong Kong-Guangdong-Fujian even without 
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the support of formal institutions. The key point is that these overseas investors could 
‘understand, utilise and exploit connections or networks’300 and this has always been 
‘the predominant mode of getting anything done in mainland China’301. A similar 
argument can be found in Harding. Harding contends that economic integration 
between Taiwan, Hong Kong and China can be regarded as “the realization of 
economic complementarities, in turn, is facilitated by the cultural ties among Chinese 
societies”302. Harding and Chang believe that this triangular economic cooperation 
cannot be separated from Chinese culture. The role of the social institution is indeed 
to lubricate business transactions and reduce transaction costs.303  
Approaching the distribution of FDI and the trade volume from the research 
discussed above, when we take a closer look at the FDI distribution in the four 
provinces in China (as shown in Figure 9-1 below), it is clear that the largest volume 
of Taiwanese FDI from 1991 to 2000 went to Guangdong and Jiangsu. This 
distribution indeed questions the influence of kinship relations on investment 
behaviour. According to Taiwanese population data, Hoklo people occupy 75% of the 
total population and Hakka people 15% of it. The people who came with the KMT 
government after 1949 form only 13% of the total population. Furthermore, several 
researchers on social class indicate that most Hoklo and Hakka people were engaged 
in agriculture, commerce and small-scale manufacturing industries.304 In contrast, the 
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Waisheng ren served mainly in the military or in government organisations. In terms 
of kinship relations, Waisheng ren have closer relations with their Chinese family 
members, whereas Bensheng ren have produced several generations in Taiwan had 
distant relations with their original families in China. Yet this latter group of 
Bensheng ren were the ones mainly engaged in the SMEs. A few existing writers have 
noted the ethnic differences in their careers and over-generalised the function of 
kinship relations. If the kinship relations had still been functioning, the largest amount 
of Taiwanese FDI should have gone into Fujian province, because most of the people 
who were engaged in SMEs were Hoklo (or Hakka) people. A closer examination of 
FDI distribution questions how far kinship relations and culture across the strait 
facilitated Taiwanese investment in China in the 1990s.  
 
Figure 9-1. Statistics on Approved Indirect Mainland Investment by Year and Area 
(US$ 1,000), 1991-2000 
  
Source: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), 
Statistics on Approved Indirect Mainland Investment by Area and Industry, 1991-1995, (Taipei, 
1995)pp.88-92. Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan R.O.C. 
(Taiwan), Statistics on Approved Indirect Mainland Investment by Area and Industry, 1991-2001, 
(Taipei, 2001), pp.66-70. 
 
9-3. How the SMEs Overcame the Restrictions of the Indirect Model 
The explanations provided in this chapter are analysed from three standpoints. 
The first considers the cost incurred by the indirect model: would this cost have been 
reduced if the government had allowed direct transport links across the strait?  The 
second aspect is to ask whether trade was stifled or affected at all by the indirect 
model; did this model manage and control trade across the strait? The third aspect 
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focuses on the capital flows across the strait; did the indirect model manage and 
control capital across the strait? 
9-3.1.The Economic Cost of the Indirect Trade and Investment Model 
The restrictions of the indirect model on transportation, trade, investment, 
money remittance and civil flights suggest that certain costs may affect it. The 
possible cost for SME investment and business operation in China can be analysed 
from three perspectives. The first is related to the cost of travelling time and the price 
of flight tickets using civil aviation. This inconveniences caused by the indirect model 
caused the main complaint by the Taiwanese investors. The second is related to the 
shipping cost. According to the government statistics, 99% of the cross-strait trade 
relies on shipping and only 1% of cross-strait trade is treated as air cargo. The cost of 
shipping greatly affected the cost and profits to the Taiwanese manufacturing 
enterprises, in both China and Taiwan. The third is related to the remittance of money 
across the strait via a third place.  
The government report in 2003 evaluated the benefits of the direct model on 
cross-strait trade and investment. The government report calculated that direct 
shipping would reduce the shipping cost from 12 billion to 8 billion NTD per year and 
save shipping time from 16-27 hours per trip. In terms of air cargo, the cost would 
reduce by around 8.1 billion. In terms of civil aviation, travellers will reduce their 
travelling costs by around 132 billion NTD. The reduction of transportation costs with 
the move to direct trading would help the individual enterprises to pay 15% to 30% 
less in transportation costs. The benefits of the direct trade on transportation lie in this 
economic efficiency. By reducing transportation time and cost, delivery becomes 
more effective and increases the amount being transported from ports and airports.305 
However, government’s report in 2003 does not quite match what happened 
after the government adjusted the policy for direct trade and investment in 2010. The 
investigation of Industrial Bureau of the R.O.C. shows that the Taiwanese enterprises 
expected that the cost of staff travelling can reduce 26.45% compared with the 
indirect model.306 However, according to the annual report of the Civil Aeronautics 
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Administration, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the price of the 
direct flight ticket was higher than it was expected.307  The Fair Trade Commission 
and the newspapers also criticised the issue of higher price of the direct flight 
ticket.308 
The phenomenon can be explained by the restrictions on direct flights, 
affected by the national security concerns. The government report on the impact of 
direct trade and transportation on national defence indicates that some controls on 
direct transportation are necessary. The impact of direct trade and investment on 
national security can be separated into two parts. The first part is related to security 
defence, the second to military strategy. From the standpoint of national defence, it 
would be more difficult to prevent unexpected attacks on Taiwan if military action 
were impeded by civil flights, air cargoes or shipping. From the standpoint of military 
strategy, in order to open direct flights and shipping, the military strategy would need 
to be adjusted. The Department of National Defence highlighted the significance of 
‘the central line of the Taiwanese Strait’ which maintains Taiwan’s national security. 
An alternative way would be to implement ‘fixed locations, fixed lines and fixed 
time’ for direct flights and shipping. Under the ‘three fixes’, it would be the easier for 
the national defence to detect irregular flights or ships to Taiwan.  
However, under ‘the three fixes’, direct flights are limited to certain routes, 
airlines and times. This implies that the demands for direct flights are likely to exceed 
the supply. In addition, only certain Taiwanese and Chinese airlines are permitted in 
the direct flight market. In other words, the direct flight market lacks competition 
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from other airlines. The lack of market competition and the fixed locations, routes and 
times meant that both direct flights and indirect flights cost travellers the same.309  
The cost of shipping was another concern for the Taiwanese enterprises across 
the strait. According to the investigations of the Industrial Bureau of the R.O.C., most 
manufacturing industries expected that direct trade would reduce 14.56% of the 
shipping cost.310 However, the Taiwanese shipping companies did not expect a huge 
reduction of shipping cost from the direct trade model. The investigation from these 
shipping companies also shows that the shipping companies assumed that direct trade 
would reduce the shipping cost by only 3%-4%.311 These expectations are markedly 
different. The gap can be explained by the import-export structure and the types of 
industries across the strait. 
The cost of shipping is closely related here to the nature of the goods shipped 
across the strait, which are related to the types of industry in Taiwan and in China. 
The major export goods from Taiwan to China included electronic and electricity 
products, industrial materials and machine equipment; all goods which are suitable for 
shipping. In terms of the structure of imported Chinese goods to Taiwan, the major 
imported Chinese goods were raw materials from agriculture and mining, coal in 
particular, such as are suitable for bulk cargo vessels.312 Duo to the differences of 
ships and bulk cargo vessels, directly shipping exported goods or imported raw 
materials is usually one-way because Taiwan has no suitable products for exporting in 
bulk to China and China has few suitable products for importing to Taiwan. In other 
words, the returning ships are usually empty. This does not necessarily reduce 
shipping cost unless the ships can transit at Hong Kong to exploit other business 
opportunities. 
 When the shipping companies transported materials for processing factories in 
South China, the final products were directly exported from China (or Hong Kong) to 
the U.S. or the European market. Therefore, it was more beneficial for the Taiwanese 
shipping companies to transit at Hong Kong. While taking Taiwanese export goods to 
China, they were able to ship Taiwanese export goods due for export to the U.S. and 
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the European markets. On the return journey, they were able to ship goods imported 
from the U.S. and the European market to Taiwan. Therefore, the shipping companies 
found that the indirect trade model did not necessarily increase their costs and at the 
same time it increased their business opportunities.313 
According to the government’s evaluation and research, most respondents felt 
positively about the direct trade and investment model and blamed the indirect trade 
and investment model for increasing production costs for Taiwanese enterprises. The 
analysis in this section shows that while the indirect trade and investment model did 
increase the costs of time and transportation, the direct model did not necessarily 
reduce this considerable extra cost. The key lies in the demand and supply of the 
market and the industrial structure for cross-strait trade.  
9-3.2. Management and Control on Trade  
Although the Taiwanese government launched several regulations in order to 
manage the transit trade between the three, it could not completely control the flow of 
goods. The reason was the grey areas in the indirect trade mode. In terms of imported 
Chinese products, although the government prohibited the import of Chinese products 
to Taiwan, with a little extra work in Hong Kong, they were no longer ‘Chinese’. For 
example, when these Chinese products were first exported from China to Hong Kong, 
their packaging was changed (in particular, the simplified Chinese printed on the 
packaging was replaced by traditional Chinese) and the goods were then re-exported 
from Hong Kong to Taiwan. 314  In these circumstances, it was difficult for the 
government to prohibit all Chinese products from Hong Kong unless it prohibited 
Hong Kong products as well.  
In terms of export products to China, the indirect trade was sometimes in fact 
a semi-direct trade in reality. For example, the Taiwanese exporters claimed that the 
final destination for the export goods as they left Taiwan was Hong Kong. In the 
middle of the trip, they might substitute fresh export documents where the destination 
appears as China. There is no technical or legal problem in switching documents, 
since re-routing a voyage is allowed. When the goods arrived in Hong Kong, the 
Hong Kong customs would have no right to levy tax on them since they were 
                                                      
313
 Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research, op.cit., 2002, pp.206-209. 
314
 During the 1980s the Chinese simplified characters were not allowed in Taiwan. The change of 
packaging, on the one hand, made the products more ‘Hong Kong’ than ‘Chinese’. But on the other 
hand, under martial law and its provisions, the simplified Chinese characters were illegal. 
179 
 
consigned to Chinese buyers. By doing this, the Taiwanese exporters could save the 
tax imposed by the Hong Kong customs. These forms of trade occurred in the triangle 
model very often.315 
The grey areas which formed the semi-direct triangle trade occurred only in 
sea transport. For airfreight and civil flights, it was obligatory to transfer at a third 
place. The trading behaviour among the three entities shows that the government 
policy could not prohibit economic activity. Either before or after the enactment of 
legislation, the flow of goods continued according to its own patterns.  
 
9-3.3. Management and Control of Financial Capital 
The management and control of financial capital across the strait can be 
separated into two aspects: the policy framework which regulated capital flows and 
the sources of the capital formed by the SMEs. The regulations on capital flows 
included regulations by both the Taiwanese and the Chinese government because 
capital transfer for or by the SMEs in business in China could be influenced by both 
governments. In addition to the capital transfer, the source of the capital played an 
important part. The second aspect examines whether the Taiwanese government was 
able to control and manage the sources of financial capital of the SMEs. 
The capital flows of SME investment in China included not only capital 
outward from Taiwan, but also capital circulating across the strait. When the SME 
entered the Chinese market, their capital transfer across the strait was regulated and 
affected by the policies of both governments. The Taiwanese government managed 
and controlled Taiwanese capital transfer by setting up the indirect remittance model. 
On the one hand, the indirect remittance model required capital to go through the 
banks in a third place. On the other, the regulation limited the direct remittance of 
NTD or Renminbe (RMB) outward and inward between Taiwan and China, even 
through a third place. The first round of the Taiwanese investment flowed to China 
usually following the regulations on the indirect model and under government 
management and verification.  
However, the remittance from China to Taiwan, based upon the regulations, 
seems to have been easier than the other way around. The order issued by the State 
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Council, ‘Regulations on encouraging Taiwanese investment’, indicates that the 
Taiwanese enterprises were permitted to remit legal profits and legal incomes or to 
liquidate money capital overseas through normal channels. The regulation was simple 
and clear; however, it was not as efficient as it looked when making a remittance. 316  
According to the regulations on foreign exchange by the Chinese government, 
there are several formal and legal ways to remit money: (1) Payment for goods: 
according to the regulations on ‘payment for trade and imported goods by outward 
remittance’, the enterprises need permission from the Bureau of Foreign Trade for the 
operation and have to register for export/import rights in the industrial and 
commercial bureau. After acquiring the permission and the rights, the enterprises are 
qualified to apply for outward remittance in the Bureau of Foreign Exchange. When 
remitting, the banks require the enterprises to supply them with many different 
documents; after remitting, the banks are asked to submit the verification reports to 
the Bureau of Foreign Exchange.317  
(2) Foreign reimbursement: the Bureau of Foreign Exchange of the P.R.C. is 
responsible for registering the foreign reimbursement of the foreign enterprises. 
Foreign investors are asked to register the foreign reimbursement and supply the 
Bureau with loan contracts, investment contracts, a report of capital examination, 
application for foreign reimbursement, registry certification and other documents. 
When the foreign reimbursement is remitted in China, it requires another process to 
inform the Bureau of Foreign Exchange. As soon as payment falls due, all the 
documents used in applying for the inward foreign reimbursement and for outward 
reimbursement must be submitted to the Bureau again.318  
(3) According to the regulation, it is possible after tax to remit business profits 
from China to Taiwan. Before this can be done, the enterprises need to pay tax and 
fines, make up deficits and pay the social warfare fund. After all this is done, the 
profits are finally eligible for remission overseas. Meanwhile, based upon the 
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regulation on ‘liquidation for foreign investment enterprises’, it is possible for foreign 
enterprises to withdraw their investment from China. Again, before the withdrawal 
can be made, the enterprise is required to liquidate capital for paying salaries and 
employees’ insurance, tax and other debts. After liquidation and payments, it can then 
apply for outward remittance from the Bureau of Foreign Exchange.319  
Although the formal channels allow the Taiwanese enterprises to remit 
business profits back to Taiwan, the process of remittance was time-consuming and 
the standards of verification strict. Hence, three illegal or semi-legal means of 
remittance were commonly used by the Taiwanese enterprises. First, the enterprises 
would purchase other foreign currency, such as U.S. dollars and HK dollars, through 
the black market. After changing RMB into foreign currency, it is easier to bring 
foreign currency in cash out of China and deposit it in another overseas bank 
account.320 
Second, some enterprises lend in China and repay in Taiwan. The enterprises, 
which had come to China earlier, lend to the enterprises which came to China later 
and require financial capital for investment and turnover funds. The second group of 
enterprises then repays the debts to the first group in Taiwan. The use of this loan-
repayment mode was not limited to the Taiwanese enterprises in China; sometimes 
they lend money to tourists and expeditions in China, which repay them when they go 
back to Taiwan. Through this loan-repayment mode, the enterprises are able to 
indirectly ‘remit’ their profits back to Taiwan.321  
The third method of semi-legal money remittance occurs when the enterprises 
manipulate the price of imported and exported goods. When the enterprises export 
goods from China, the price which they declare is lower than the real price of the 
exported goods. When they import goods, conversely, the price is declared to be 
higher than the real price. By manipulating the price of imported and exported goods, 
it is possible to reduce the profits they make in China and retain the profits in overseas 
paper companies for further investment.322 
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The first method of remittance is clearly illegal and risks are high for the 
enterprises which exchange foreign currency in the black market and bring the cash 
out of China. The second and third methods of remittance are considered semi-legal, 
since they are making a detour through the grey area. However, due to the 
complicated process of legal remittance, most Taiwanese enterprises used semi-legal 
ways to remit their profits from abroad. The maintenance of profits then facilitated re-
investment in their Chinese business or they used it as turn-over credit for business 
transactions. This behaviour was, on the one hand, influenced by the Chinese 
regulations on the control of foreign currency; it was also, on the other hand, affected 
by the way in which money could be sent out from Taiwan. The policy framework 
established by both governments created some grey areas which facilitated SME 
capital transfer across the strait.  
 
9-4. Dynamics of the Taiwanese Social Institution 
The grey area created by the formal institutional framework facilitated capital 
transfer across the strait and the avoidance of government supervision and regulations. 
Although the channels for capital transfer could avoid government restrictions, what 
about the source of the financial capital? Figure 9-2 below shows the estimation on 
the sources of capital formation of the manufacturing SMEs. It is clear that the major 
source of the SME capital formation came from the family category and remained at 
around 80% for the whole period. Other sources for the SME capital formation 
remained low. The estimation of the capital formation suggests that, since the SMEs 
still relied heavily on the private sector for capital formation, the Taiwanese 
government controlled only the channel for its transfer. 
Figure 9-3 and Figure 9-4 below show a comparison of the sources of turnover 
credit funds in China by different foreign corporations. Comparing the loans from 
Chinese banks to the foreign corporations, such as the U.S., Japanese or other 
Western corporative firms with loans from Chinese banks to the Taiwanese 
enterprises, it is plain that the Chinese banks preferred the former to the latter. This 
may be explained by the types of enterprise from Taiwan and the difficulties of the 
planned market economy. 
When banks extend credit to their clients, they do so at some risk. In order to 
minimize the likely default, banks usually carefully evaluate loan applications, and 
monitor and manage the loans. The banks usually first appraise the ability of the 
183 
 
clients to service their debt, gather credit information about their clients and rate them 
on different levels. Second, the banks evaluate the security of the borrowing 
enterprises. A security means an asset a creditor can liquidate in order to recoup a 
loan which a borrower cannot pay.323 Banks most often accept four kinds of security: 
hypothecated time deposits, a letter of guarantee from a government or other financial 
institution, a lien on real estate and secured movable property. The priority for the 
banks is those clients with unsecured financing, even the most creditworthy. Next in 
line are loans secured by hypothecated time deposits and guarantee from other banks. 
Banks are usually less interested in clients who provide real estate and movable 
property as security.  
Based upon the standards for approval loans, from the market’s perspective it 
was difficult for the Taiwanese enterprises to be granted loans by Chinese banks. The 
Taiwanese enterprises were mainly small/medium-sized ones. These SMEs are in 
themselves difficult to supply with valuable enough security for loans. In particular, 
the Taiwanese SMEs usually had problems over the use for security purposes of 
factory land or buildings as the lien on real estate. Since China is a Communist 
country, the Chinese Constitution indicates that ‘organisations or individuals are not 
allowed to invade or occupy, purchase or sell, or transfer the right of land use by any 
illegal means’324.  
The Constitution sees land as in public ownership. Hence, although the reform 
began in 1978, not until 1990 was the use of land revised. In 1990 China’s State 
Council issued an order concerning ‘the regulation of land use and land 
transformation’; it aimed to reform the system of land use for further economic 
development.325 The significant issue is that the regulation separates ownership from 
the right to use. Under this principle, land can be used for selling, transferring the 
right to use right, renting and mortgaging. These changes of land use are expected to 
pull in more foreign investment to China. However, the process of acquiring the 
certification of land use for free trade is complicated and time-consuming. Therefore, 
it is unusual for Taiwanese SMEs to offer factory land as security for loans. 
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Moreover, the factory building or machinery is hard to accept as security because 
their value is hard to realise.326  
In addition, the Chinese commercial banks were challenged by the problem of 
lacking information about these Taiwanese SMEs, since this was the first time that 
they had negotiated business loans with them. The financial system between Taiwan 
and China did not create a credit reference agency; this made it more difficult for the 
Chinese banks learn about the credit-worthiness of the Taiwanese SMEs. Moreover, 
as mentioned above, the Taiwanese SMEs sometimes manipulated flows of capital 
and credit, while the Chinese banks are very careful with their financial statements.  
Unless the Taiwanese enterprises were large corporations or the parent company in 
Taiwan guaranteed them (the parent company is usually large and famous), the 
Chinese banks lent money to the Taiwanese enterprises very reluctantly.  
 
Figure 9-2. Estimation of the Internal Capital Structure of the Taiwanese 
Manufacturing SMEs by Financial Source (%), 1990-2000 
  
Source: Bureau of Economic Research, Central Bank of the R.O.C., Report on the Source of Capital of 
Public and Private Enterprises in Taiwan Area (Taipei: Central Bank of the R.O.C., 1992, p.59-61; 
1993, pp.60-61;1994, pp.58; 1995, pp.52-53, pp.56-57; 1996, pp.54-55; 1997, p.47-51; 1998,pp.47-53; 
1999,pp.40-41, pp.46-47, p.38-39; 2000, pp.51-53; 2001, pp.61-64). 
Note: 1. From 1993 the categories in the statistics of the Reports combine ‘government’, ‘state 
enterprises’ and ‘public financial institution’ together into ‘government and public financial 
institutions). 2. The original government data list only the source of capital in manufacturing and other 
different industries. The estimation is calculated on the basis of the statistics for manufacturing industry 
times 90% for the SMEs in manufacturing industry. 
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Figure 9-3. A Comparison of Sources of Credit Funds Turnover of the Foreign 
Companies in China by Countries and Regions (%)                                                             
 
  
Source: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan) and 
Chun Hua Institute for Economic Research, Dalu jingying huanjing bianqian dui taishang touzi 
yingxian zhi yanjiu (Taipei, 1996), pp. 148-149. 
 
Figure 9-4. A Comparison of Overseas Sources of Credit Funds Turnover of the 
Foreign Companies in China by Countries and Regions (%) 
  
Source: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan) and 
Chun Hua Institute for Economic Research, Dalu jingying huanjing bianqian dui taishang touzi 
yingxian zhi yanjiu (Taipei, 1996), pp. 148-149. 
 
The evidence shown above suggests that the Taiwanese SMEs did not rely on 
the support of the Chinese government for their turn-over credit in China. The major 
support of the turn-over credit or the SMEs can be found from the statistics on its 
sources. Figure 9-5 below shows the credit turn-over fund of the Taiwanese 
manufacturing enterprises in the 1990s. It is clear that the major sources of credit 
turn-over funds relied heavily on business credit and private borrowing. The major 
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financial sources of the SMEs in China relied on Taiwanese parent companies for 
credit turn-over funds; and the financial sources of the Taiwanese parent companies 
came from the family category (as shown in Figure 9-2), business credit and private 
borrowings. The financial support structure clearly identifies that the Taiwanese 
social institutions continued provided significant financial support for the SMEs in 
China.  
 
Figure 9-5. Estimation of the External Capital Structure of the Taiwanese 
Manufacturing SMEs by Financial Source (%), 1990-2000 
  
  
Source: Bureau of Economic Research, Central Bank of the R.O.C. (Taiwan), Report on the Source of 
Capital of Public and Private Enterprises in Taiwan Area (Taipei: Central Bank of the R.O.C., 1992, 
p.59-61; 1993, pp.60-61;1994, pp.58; 1995, pp.52-53, pp.56-57; 1996, pp.54-55; 1997, p.47-51; 
1998,pp.47-53; 1999,pp.40-41, pp.46-47, p.38-39; 2000, pp.51-53; 2001, pp.61-64). 
Note: From 1980 the categories in the statistics of the reports adjusted. 
2. The original government data list only the source of capital in manufacturing and other different 
industries. The estimation is calculated on the basis of the statistics for manufacturing industry times 
90% for the SMEs in manufacturing industry. 
 
9-5. Comparison of Four Instances of Investment Cases: the Formosa Plastic Group, 
Pou Chen Group, Uni-president Enterprises Corporation and Tinghsing 
Formosa Plastic Group is one of the largest enterprises in Taiwan, mainly 
producing petro-chemistry-related products. The founder, Mr. Wang Yung-Ching, 
planned to invest in China in 1989. The Chinese government, in particular Deng, 
welcomed Formosa’s investment and strongly supported Formosa’s projects in China. 
The project is called the ‘Hai Cang Project’ (Hai Cang is a small town in Fujian 
Province) which aimed to build up another petro-chemistry kingdom in China. The 
project finally failed because the Taiwanese government interfered. According to the 
reports of the newspapers at the time, the prohibition of Formosa’s investment was 
highly political. The Taiwanese government used several methods to prohibit 
Formosa’s investment: (1) suspending the Formosa Group and its branch companies 
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on the stock exchange; (2) freezing Formosa’s capital and loans in the banks; (3) 
forbidding Formosa’s high-level managers to go abroad. Therefore, in 1992 it was 
announced that the project was suspended. The case of the Formosa Group implies 
that the Taiwanese government could supervise capital flows, and particular could 
influence the investment behaviour of the large corporations by controlling the 
sources of   finance.327   
The Formosa Group is an upstream industry and has been supported by the 
government in terms of technology, preferential terms and capital. Unlike the 
Formosa Group, Pou Chen was an SME in the downstream manufacturing industry. 
The Pou Chen Corporation is a footwear manufacturing company which was founded 
in 1969 in Taiwan. Initially it produced canvas and rubber footwear. In 1978 it 
gradually transferred as an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) for the 
international branded sport company ‘Adidas’. Since then it has focused on 
manufacturing athletic and casual footwear for other international branded companies, 
including Nike, asics, Reedbok, PUMA, NewBalance, Merrell, Timberland and 
Converse. In 1981, Pou Chen began investing in other countries where cheaper labour 
forces and materials for shoe-manufacturing could be found. In 1988 Pou Chen 
transferred investment to Yue Yuen Industrial (holdings) Ltd. in Hong Kong. Yue 
Yuen is the holding company which directs Pou Chen’s investment in Vietnam, China 
and Indonesia. In 2005 the press estimated that Pou Chen dominated around 17% of 
the global athletic and casual footwear market.  
Pou Chen is a typical Taiwanese labour-intensive manufacturing SME. The 
initial financial capital was 500,000 NTD in 1969; it was a downstream footwear 
manufacturer which relied on the export market and the raw materials (rubber and 
canvas) which were supplied by the SOEs and LEs. Since it was a traditional labour-
intensive manufacturing SME and was not constrained by the restrictions on the 
amount of total investment and technology in China, it was easier to transfer 
investment to Hong Kong and then to invest in new factories in China. However, it is 
worth noting that it invested in China in 1988, which was earlier than the Taiwanese 
government officially permitted this practice. Comparing the story of Pou Chen with 
the investment case of Formosa Plastic, it is clear that business of Pou Chen has 
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continued to prosper in China. This demonstrates that Pou Chen did not rely heavily 
on government support for its capital formation and the indirect support of cheaper 
raw materials or intermediate goods were not as significant as Wade and Amsdem 
describe. If Pou Chen had relied on government credit support and the supply of 
materials and intermediate goods for production, it is highly unlikely that it could 
have invested in China earlier than the government officially permitted. 328 
Like the Formosa Plastic Group, the UPEC food producing company is the 
largest of its kind in Taiwan. Tinghsing Co. Ltd. is now the largest instant noodle 
producer of all Taiwanese enterprises in China and its instant noodles (Master Kong) 
dominate40% of the instant noodle market in China. In comparison, the UPEC 
dominated less than 15% of this market. Many researchers have analysed its business 
strategy in China. Although market strategies play a significant role, few have noticed 
constraints for the UPEC on its investment and business operation in China.  
UPEC was founded in 1967 by the Tainan business group (‘Tainan Bang’). 
The initial business of the Tainan business group includes Tainan Spinning Co. Ltd. 
(1954) and Universal Cement Corporation (1960). Tainan Spinning Co Ltd. and 
Universal Cement Corporation are the large enterprises that the Taiwanese 
government supported in order to develop the domestic industries in the early post-
war period. The initial financial capital of the UPEC was 32 million NTD in 1967; it 
is the largest food company in Taiwan. In 1991 the UPEC began investing in 
China.329 In contrast, Tinghsing Co. Ltd. was founded in 1958 in Taiwan as a small-
medium sized factory which initially produced castor oil. In 1990 Tinghsing began a 
food business in China and gradually focused on producing instant noodles.330 
UPEC was founded by the Tainan business group, which is one of the 
influential business groups in local Taiwanese society. The Tainan business 
dominated the upstream industries and participated in politics. The president of UPEC 
is a board member of the KMT Central Committee. Political and business connections 
facilitated their business in Taiwan in the post-war era. In the 1970s and 1980s the 
average profits of Universal Cement and Tainan Spinning were 11 billion NTD and 
20 billion NTD respectively.  However, these political and business connections also 
hindered their investment in China. The president of the UPEC criticised the 
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government policy which restricted the amount of investment in China. He indicated 
that government restrictions and controls weakened firms’ competitiveness in the 
global and Chinese market. At the same time, after 2000 the average profits of the 
Universal Cermet and Tainan Spinning was less than 300 million.331 Comparing these 
with the rapid growth of Tinghsing in the Chinese market, an SME had beaten LEs in 
the Chinese market in a matter of less than twenty years.332  
The above comparison of the four cases of LEs and SMEs from manufacturing 
industries questions the argument of Wade and Amsden. The LEs, both the Formosa 
groups and the UPEC, were supported by the government in the post-war 
development era. They enjoyed tax exemptions, protection in the domestic market and 
found it easier to obtain loans from the banks. Nevertheless, after 1990 their 
investment plans in China were restricted by the government. The government 
influenced the investment project of the Formosa Plastic Group mainly by freezing its 
sources of capital. Moreover, the UPEC was constrained by the use of financial 
capital for its investment in China.  
On the contrary, Pou Chen and Tinghsing began their investment in China 
earlier than formal permission was obtainable. It is also worth noting that they both 
transferred investment to China via Hong Kong. The comparison demonstrates that 
the SMEs did not rely on government support; in particular, the SMEs had more 
freedom to use their financial capital. If the SMEs had relied on the government’s 
support, for example in credit and technology and the indirect support of the LEs to 
provide cheaper raw materials and intermediated goods, it would not have been easy 
for the SMEs to have gone to China under the government restrictions. What is more 
important is that in these two cases the SMEs prospered and grew larger in China. 
However, the LEs were not only hindered in their development by the government’s 
policy, but had their profits reduced when the Taiwanese SMEs went to China.   
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9-6. Conclusion 
In the mid-1980s the Taiwanese government began to adjust its cross-strait 
policy, but in a passive way. Not until the 1990s were the regulations for cross-strait 
relations institutionalised. Analysis of government regulations and verification 
standards on investment in China shows that the KMT government allowed labour-
intensive SMEs to invest in China. But although their enterprise was allowed, the 
institutions set up by the KMT government for cross-strait economic activity did not 
facilitate it. The principle of the cross-strait policy of the KMT government was 
‘indirect’: trade, investment and transport links had to go through a third place. The 
institutionalised indirect model aimed at both normalising economic activity and 
protecting economic and national security. With this model, the KMT government 
sought to manage and control trade and investment. 
Under the constraints of this model, some research indicates the role of culture 
and kinship relations in facilitating business among Taiwan, Hong Kong and China. 
However, a closer examination of FDI distribution shows that the largest amount of 
Taiwanese FDI went to Shenzhen (Guangdong province) rather than Xiamen (Fujian 
province). The existing literature over-generalised social factors which cannot be 
applied when analysing the ethnic structure of Taiwanese SMEs. Most SME owners 
are Haklo and Hakka people. On the one hand, most of their ancestors immigrated to 
Taiwan in the 19th century; it is then difficult to identify which part of the kinship 
relationships facilitated or attracted Taiwanese FDI to present-day China. On the other 
hand, they are not familiar with Guangdong and Jiangsu; however, the two largest 
amounts of Taiwanese FDI went to these two provinces, where the historical and 
kinship relations with Haklo and Hakka people were weaker. The evidence suggests 
that culture or kinship relations between Taiwan and China were relatively 
insignificant to SME investment behaviour. 
This chapter then provides an explanation of the functioning of the social 
institutions in support of SME business across the strait from 1990 to 2000. It first 
examines the cost generated by the indirect model. Although the economic cost of the 
indirect model was particularly criticised by the Taiwanese entrepreneurs, the analysis 
in this chapter shows that the indirect model increased the cost of travelling time but 
did not reduce the cost by much.  In terms of the price of flight tickets, it is clear that 
the prices for transferring via a third place and for direct flight were much the same. 
This was affected by the concerns of national security and the openness of the market 
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for direct flights. Moreover, the shipping costs would not be reduced to the degree 
expected by the Taiwanese entrepreneurs. The shipping routes are affected by the 
industrial structure across the strait. In other words, the demand and supply of both 
markets determined the shipping cost. Under the demand and supply and industrial 
structures, Hong Kong still plays a significant role and is more than a mere political 
buffer zone. 
In terms of the institutional framework for capital flows, the restrictions of the 
Taiwanese government and the regulations of the Chinese government created a grey 
area which facilitated SME capital transfers and business operations across the strait 
to avoid management and control. The ‘via-a-third-place’ principle was meant to 
supervise the capital flows and avoid deep economic integration with the Chinese 
market. The regulations of the Chinese government on remitting money were meant 
to control the inflow and outflow of foreign currency in China. The SMEs 
manipulated the remittance regulations and used the third place to avoid control and 
management from both governments. The policies of both governments created the 
grey areas in which the Taiwanese enterprises could avoid government restrictions 
and controls. The analysis of grey areas within the formal institution was significant. 
It shows that economic activity did not exactly follow the formal institutions; instead 
business operated in the grey area created by the formal institutions in order to reduce 
government intervention and transaction cost.  
Within the grey area, the social institutions provided significant financial 
support to SME investment in China and business operation across the strait. 
Evidence shows that the major source of capital formation came from the family 
category from 1990 to 2000. This indicates that the SMEs did not rely on the formal 
banking system for their business. The continuing support of social institutions for the 
Taiwanese SMEs business operation in China was also influenced by the Chinese 
formal institutional framework. Since the Chinese financial institutions and the 
foreign banks did not play a significant role in granting loans or in providing credit 
funds as turn-over for Taiwanese SMEs, the Taiwanese SMEs, having invested in 
China, still relied heavily on financial support from Taiwan. The reliance was on the 
Taiwanese parent companies and the Taiwanese parent companies relied on the 
financial sources supported by the social institutions.  
The significant role of the financial support from the social institutions to 
facilitated SME investment operation in China can be found from the comparison of 
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the four chosen cases. This comparison demonstrates that the government was able to 
control and affect the investment projects of the LEs in China. Both the Formosa 
Plastic Group and the UPEC were financially constrained by the government. In 
contrast, although the government allowed the labour-intensive manufacturing SMEs 
to go to China, both Pou Chen and Tinghsing began their investment before they had 
the government’s formal permission. The SMEs prospered in China; yet the profits of 
the traditional LEs withered. The government had limited influence on SME 
investment projects in China because the SMEs did not rely on government support 
for their finance credit and technology and they did not rely significantly on the 
business credit, cheaper materials and intermediate goods from the Les, either.  
To conclude, this chapter shows the indirect model did not necessarily cause 
inconvenience or generated cost for the SMEs. This implies that the government’s 
formal institutions had limited control on economic activity across the strait. 
Moreover, the evidence also demonstrates how the Taiwanese social institution 
provided support to the SMEs in China. It was not the culture and kinship relations 
that facilitated trade and business operation across the strait. It was the grey area that 
two governments themselves created by their formal institutions that facilitated trade 
and business transactions. The social institutions continued to provide significant 
financial support within the grey area to facilitate SME business operations across the 
strait.  
The comparison of the four cases also demonstrates the significance of the 
source of capital formation. On the one hand, the government was able to control the 
LE investment in China by restricting their sources of finance. On the other, since the 
SMEs relied more on the social institutions for credit, the government had little 
influence on their business operations. The SME investment and prosperity in China 
also questioned the role of the government in the rise and development of the SMEs 
in the post-war era. Significant support tends to lead to reliance on the support and the 
restrictions of the government were much more effective in the cases of the LE 
investment projects.  
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Part VI. Conclusion 
Chapter 10. Conclusions 
The neo-classical economists argue that the success of Taiwan’s post-war 
economic development was the result of establishing a free market economy. This 
was what induced the rise of the SMEs, created the market mechanism and facilitated 
business operations. Some of the neo-classical economists agree that the government 
created a suitable environment, such as a free market, for the functioning of the 
economy and business. They do not agree that the government intervened deeply in 
the process of the development.  
However, Wade and Amsden believe that the Taiwanese government played a 
significant role in Taiwan’s economic miracle. The government successfully 
implemented development policies to plan, direct and guide the economy; in other 
words, the government did more than the neo-classical economists had argued. In 
addition to creating a suitable environment, they claim, some of the policies induced 
industrial development. The success of the SMEs was part of the successful story of 
the state-led model. Moreover, the state-led model usually highlighted the 
significance of the authoritarian political power which helped to implement the 
development policies. Both strands of thinking focus on the suitable market 
environment and the policies facilitated the rise and development of the SMEs in 
post-war Taiwan. 
This chapter summarises the findings of the present research project. The first 
section clarifies how the social institutions work according to the historical pattern. 
The second section addresses the question how far the government supported the rise 
of the SMEs in the post-war development era. The third section provides evidence 
that the state had only a limited influence on SME investment behaviour in China 
after the late 1980s and explains why this was so. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
looking to historical similarities and continuity (notwithstanding the differences and 
discontinuity) to clarify the relations of the state, the market and the social 
institutions. 
 
10-1. The Historical Pattern 
Gold and Booth argue that one of the key factors in Taiwan’s post-war 
economic success lay in its authoritarian system of government. They assume that 
Taiwanese society found it easy to accept authoritarian power and that local 
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Taiwanese society lacked a well-established financial and industrial class in. Wade 
further indicates that the relations of the state and the SMEs (or the private business 
sector in general) were distant. The state was then able to avoid disturbing interest 
groups in the provision of its development policies. This concept of a distant 
relationship resembles that of Gold, implying that after the War Taiwanese society 
was a passive receiver and the private business sector in Taiwanese society had not 
yet developed. However, they ignore the impact of the historical legacy on the 
development of society in the time before the KMT came to Taiwan.  
Analysis of the historical pattern produces some significant findings. The open 
or close of the market was significant for business activity. During the early post-war 
period, the market was monopolised by the KMT government. That is, the market was 
not open to everyone. The limited access to the market may lead to the general 
argument that the Taiwanese society is a passive receiver.  
The historical pattern shows that a more open policy benefited Taiwan’s trade 
and economic prosperity. No matter whether the institutions were undeveloped or 
well-established, business and trade prospered as long as the governments did not 
block the market. The historical pattern also identifies that, in a different institutional 
framework, the social institutions had continuously provided business networks and 
sources of capital to facilitate trade and business operations in Taiwan.  
It is also worth noting the changes to the social institutions in the late Qing 
period and in the early Japanese colonial period. Before 1895, the major financial 
capital and business remained in China (particularly Fujian province); however, in the 
early 20th century, Taiwanese society had built up its own social institutions, which 
were able to provide sufficient financial capital to support their business demands. 
This significant transformation was not mainly affected by the policy of the Japanese 
colonial government to reduce the amount of Chinese capital in Taiwan; the result 
rests on the accumulation of financial capital by the Taiwanese business groups in the 
Qing period. The ability to providing a source of capital for investment and trade also 
implies that trade and business in Taiwan since the mid-Qing dynasty prospered as the 
businessmen accumulated capital in Taiwan.  
The historical pattern shows that trade in Taiwan had relied heavily on the 
private business groups rather than on the formal institutions which had been set up 
by different political powers. The dynamics of the private business groups was 
founded on the social institutions which provided support for private/illegal trade 
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under different political systems. As long as the market and trade in Taiwan remained 
open, the social institutions adapted to the changing environment in order to support 
private business. Therefore, Taiwanese society was not a passive receiver; but at the 
same time the historical legacy developed a dynamics in the social institutions which 
was adapted and transformed in line with the changing market environment, but did 
not challenge the political powers in their operations. The development of the social 
institutions gradually accumulated capital and established business networks in the 
society around them.  
 
10-2. Where Did the Support Came From? The Role of the State in the Rise and the 
Development of the SMEs, 1949-1980 
Wade agrees with Gold and Booth that the authoritarian system facilitated 
development policies in Taiwan because it was safe from the influence of local 
interest groups. The authoritarian system created the basis for successful economic 
development in the 1980s. In terms of development policies, Wade and Amsden 
suggest that the Taiwanese government intervened in the economy to guide, plan and 
direct the development of the SMEs by launching the policies of encouragement: tax 
exemptions, tax refunds for exporting SMEs, getting the relative price wrong, 
supporting technology and business credit for the SMEs in particular. Unlike Wade 
and Amsden, Rodric stresses that government increased its investment with the export 
growth after 1970. He then argues that the rise of export growth was supported by 
government investment in the subsidies for export.  
The argument around the authoritarian system ignores the state’s interest in 
forging the development policy. Party-state capitalism explains the government’s 
support for the SOEs and certain LEs. The ISI policy severely controlled the 
allocation of resources for industrial production. The KMT government controlled 
both political and economic power and this enhanced its domination of Taiwanese 
society. Encouraging the development of the private enterprises and FDI in Taiwan 
required several restrictions to be relaxed and this relaxation would have reduced the 
government control on the economy.  
This state’s interest influenced the effectiveness of further development 
policies. The FDI policy in the early 1950s failed and the evidence implies that the 
failure of the policy resulted mainly from the control of the foreign exchange system 
and the restrictions on imported materials. In 1959 the KMT government adjusted the 
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development policy to EOI; however, the adjusted foreign exchange system and 
relaxation of controls on the quotas of imported materials had little liberalising effect. 
The evidence demonstrates that in the 1960s the control on exports and the quota for 
imported materials were still tight. Meanwhile, the tax exemptions did not apply to 
the industries which contributed to export growth. This also raises a doubt whether the 
state chose the right exporting industries to support. The evidence challenges Rodric’s 
argument that most of the encouragement policies for export were implemented in the 
1950s.  
The state’s interest further affects the impact of the policies on the SMEs. 
Evidence shows that the major problem for the SMEs lay in the financial support for 
business operations. However, the market which the government established did not 
provide the SMEs with significant financial support. Under the development policy, 
the banks mainly granted loans to the SOEs and LEs so that they could develop 
Taiwan’s own industry. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the price of certain key 
materials or intermediate goods produced by the SOEs and the LEs was not 
necessarily lower than the price in Korea. This suggests that the state’s interest led it 
to support mainly the SOEs and LEs. It also questions whether the government did get 
the relative price wrong when it came to supporting SME production.  
The other factor in determining whether the SMEs benefited from the state’s 
support lies in the problem of their qualifications. Evidence indicates that most of the 
SMEs did not directly benefit from governmental encouragement. The qualifications 
required for tax exemptions, the time-consuming administrative process and the 
requirement of deposits for the export tax exemption policies effectively excluded the 
SMEs from direct state support. The other significant evidence can be found from the 
indirect financial support through business credit. The SMEs could enjoy the business 
credit system only if they had certain qualifications. The qualification problem 
questions how far most of the SMEs were able to benefit from the direct and indirect 
support from the government.  
The evidence of the debates and discussions on government’s encouragement 
policies suggests that the series of ‘encouragement’ policies, such as the 
encouragement to export, were indeed ‘open’ policies. The open policies merely 
allowed more participants into the governed market; the SMEs, due to the 
qualification problem, were not eligible to receive the government’s benefits. 
Examining the development policies and the government’s support raises the 
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question: since the government governed the market and the encouragement and 
relaxation of its controls allowed s only certain qualified participants in the market, 
how did the SMEs develop before they could qualify to enter the market and  access 
the government’s support?  
The evidence of this research shows how the SMEs were able to support 
themselves before obtaining state support (both direct and indirect). The KMT 
government focused on the development of and certain LEs and SOEs (which mainly 
dominated transactions upstream). It was the private enterprises that dominated 
downstream. However, during this period, it was difficult to estimate the size of the 
individual enterprises in this category. The statistical data in the 1950s do not split up 
private enterprises according to size. This was also related to the regulations of 
companies and factory registration. The registration regulations helped SMEs to start 
up in the suburban and rural areas because the enterprises were so small that they 
needed only to obtain a production permit from the local council and need not apply 
for permission from the central government. The industrial structure and the 
registration regulations created a space for the functioning of social institutions. 
When business opportunities arose in downstream industry, requiring small 
amounts of financial capital and lower labour skills, the social institutions were able 
to contribute the first round of money to start business. Evidence shows that a 
substantially high percentage of the SME’s financial capital came from the category 
of family and the percentage remained high from the 1970s to the 1990s. Financial 
sources from other categories, such as banks, contributed little to the SMEs’ financial 
capital.  
Moreover, the evidence also shows that the credit turn-over fund for the SMEs 
came mainly from the categories of private enterprises, family, business credit and 
private borrowings. This dependence was related to the SME subcontracting system. 
Since the SMEs are usually small-scale and specialised only in certain skills, they had 
to cooperate with other SMEs. The structure of the subcontracting system also 
questions the role of the state in supporting the SMEs. Apart from purchasing raw 
materials and intermediated goods from the SOEs and LEs, the SOEs and the LEs did 
not integrate with or lead the SME subcontracting system. The examples presented of 
the way in which the SMEs got the work done and won orders from foreign 
companies could not trace any leading or guiding role for the state in the SMEs’ 
business operations.  
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Evidence of the sources for capital formation and turn-over credit funding 
indicates the significance of the social institutions for the development of the SMEs. 
Although the social institutions were essential, their function was coordinated with 
that of the formal institution. It was found that the functions of the social institutions 
are slightly different from the model of social institutional theory. The social 
institutions are not independent of the formal institutions. Without the space left by 
the formal institutions, the social institutions cannot play any significant role in 
supporting the SMEs. Moreover, the reliance of the SMEs on the social institutions as 
a source of capital also demonstrates that even the government got the relative price 
wrong for the interest rate on bank loans, for the main source of capital was the 
private sector. This, again, goes back to the problem of being qualified to access the 
support and encouragement of the government. 
The analysis and the evidence in this section question the argument of Wade, 
Amsden and Rodric regarding the role of the state in the rise and development of the 
SMEs. The state’s interest mainly focused on developing the SOEs and certain LEs 
and this influenced the formation of its development policies. The sound development 
policies and the direct and indirect support looked effective; however, the main 
problem was how few SMEs were qualified to access the support and encouragement. 
The arguments about ‘getting the relative price wrong’ and ‘government investment 
to lead export growth’ also ignore how few SMEs actually benefited from these 
policies.  
However, the neoclassical economists are right about the market environment 
that was opened by the KMT government. A more open market policy allowed more 
SMEs to participate in the market. Yet this newly-opened market did not provide a 
source of capital for the SMEs hoping to start up and to operate. The source of 
significant capital was the social institutions. It was the policies which focused on the 
development of SOEs and LEs that created the space for the social institutions to 
function. It is possible to argue that, as long as the state opens the market, the social 
institutions adapt to the environment so as to provide support for the SMEs. 
 
10-3. Effective State Intervention? The Conflicting Interests of the State and the SMEs 
The research by Wade and Amsden on Taiwan’s economic development 
usually shifts the focus after 1980 to the rise of  high-tech manufacturing industry. 
Their analysis of the high-tech manufacturing industry fits the state-led model once 
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more. However, their research ignores the further development of the traditional 
manufacturing SMEs after 1980. The Taiwanese SMEs dominated a large part of the 
export market and the employment total. The contribution of the SMEs to the 
Taiwanese economy indicates that the SMEs relied on the export market and the local 
labour force. The main challenge in the mid- and late 1980s was the rising labour 
costs. Several different factors were at work among the workers in Taiwan. The key 
factor in the survival of the SMEs occurred in the mid-1980s when the exchange rate 
of the NTD against the USD suddenly appreciated. The conversion of the workers’ 
wages from the NTD to the USD brought a significant increase in production costs for 
the SMEs.  
The impact of the rising exchange rate on the labour cost shows that the 
government by controlling the price had a significant impact on the market. When the 
government adjusted the foreign exchange rate, it did not provide complementary 
subsidies for the export enterprises. Instead, the state launched a more open 
investment and trade policy. The comparison of China and the four selected countries 
in Southeast Asia indicates that China was able to provide the cheapest labour costs 
for the Taiwanese SMEs. There were several determinants for SME outward 
investment in China; but the lower labour cost was the key factor, which both pushed 
and pulled SME investment. The economic interest of the SMEs clearly lay in the 
need to cut labour costs. Although China was a relatively suitable place for the SMEs 
to invest in, the government had a different view of the matter. The questions then are, 
what was the state interest which influenced the formation of the cross-strait policy? 
And did this policy based upon the government’s interest influence SME investment 
behaviour in the late 1980s and the 1990s? 
Economic research indicated that more open trade and investment would be 
beneficial for both Taiwan and China. The economic demands of the Taiwanese 
government were unlikely to be met. However, a comparison of the government’s 
policies clarifies that in China its interest was in conflict with the SMEs’ economic 
interest. The analysis of the KMT power structure explains the changes in the state’s 
interest from the 1970s to the 1990s. Such an analysis shows, it might be argued, that 
it was the political conflicts between the KMT and the CCP that frustrated a beneficial 
economic policy with China in the 1980s. However, in the 1990s when the political 
power structure changed, the historical hatred between these two political parties was 
not the main concern. For the KMT, in order to remain in power, it had to consider 
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voters’ opinions on the cross-strait economic policy. The evidence shows that most of 
the voters did not have a clear-cut political status in the 1990s; however, regarding the 
issue of Taiwanese investment in China, a high percentage of them agreed that the 
government should manage investment and trade carefully. This was not only related 
to national security; their concern was also affected by economic issues. If more 
investment was made in China, the voters were not sure whether they would keep 
their jobs. Although new policies might bring new opportunities, voters were 
uncertain about the transaction cost. In these circumstances, they wanted the status 
quo to remain.  
After the late 1980s, the state’s interest influenced the formation of Taiwanese 
outward investment policies. The government by offering preferential banking loans 
encouraged Taiwanese investment in the Southeast Asian countries. At the same time, 
it set restrictions on investment in China. However, the pattern of Taiwanese outward 
investment shows that the restrictions and the indirect model did not influence the 
investment behaviour of Taiwanese entrepreneurs. Comparing the size of each 
investment case in China and in Southeast Asia clarifies that the investment in China 
was mainly by small-scale and labour-intensive industries, while the size of each 
investment case in Southeast Asia was large. This contrast supports the view that the 
government was able to influence the investment behaviour of the larger private 
enterprises. But the influence of the government on the investment behaviour of the 
SMEs was limited. The SMEs clearly followed the market where the lowest labour 
costs could be found. This also implies that the government’s preferential banking 
loans or other benefits were not as significant as the lower labour costs. 
The analysis and evidence in this section indicate the significance of the 
further development of the SMEs after 1980, which questions the argument of Wade 
and Amsden. Although the government was able to influence the foreign exchange 
rate for exports, this affected only the market environment. The SME investment 
behaviour from the late 1980s challenges Wade and Amsden’s argument concerning 
the role of the government in the development of the SMEs. If, as they contend, the 
SMEs relied on the support and encouragement of the state, including credit and 
technological help, the SMEs should have followed the government policy and gone 
to Southeast Asia as the LEs did in the 1990s. The amount of Taiwanese FDI in China 
contradicts the conclusion that the Taiwanese SMEs relied on the support of the state.  
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10-4. Why the State Had Limited Influence on SME Investment in China 
The state’s interest influenced the principle underlying the cross-strait 
economic policy, which sought to discourage Taiwanese FDI to China. The general 
explanation runs that culture and kinship relations facilitated investment and trade 
across the strait despite the restrictions raised by the political conflicts. However, it is 
worth noting that Taiwanese investment did not go to Fujian, the province which had 
the strongest kinship relations and similar dialects. On the contrary, the largest 
amount of Taiwanese FDI went to Guangdong and Jiangsu. The distribution of 
Taiwanese FDI in these two places questions the over-generalisation of factors which 
facilitated Taiwanese SME business operations across the strait in the face of political 
conflict and government restrictions. The social institution facilitated SME business 
operations across the strait, but in a different way from the conventional 
generalisation of socio-cultural factors. 
The explanation can be separated into two areas. The first examines the cost 
and inconveniences that were generated from the imposed indirect model. Most of the 
cost, such as the transport links and money transfers via a third place, increased time 
rather than substantially increasing cost. At the same time, the shipping cost, which 
was crucial for most of the enterprises, would not be reduced by any direct model to 
the degree expected by the Taiwanese entrepreneurs. The shipping routes were 
affected by the industrial structure across the strait. In other words, the demand and 
supply of both markets determined the shipping cost. Under demand and supply and 
the industrial structures, Hong Kong still plays a significant role as more than a mere 
political buffer zone.  
The second aspect was related to the grey areas created by the formal 
institutions. These grey areas resulted from the policy of exporting ‘via a third place’. 
Unexpectedly, due to the ‘via a third place’ policy, these grey areas facilitated trade 
and investment across the strait and made it hard for the Taiwanese government to 
manage the outflow of investment capital to China. The analysis of the grey areas 
within the formal institution significantly explains how the investment and trade 
functioned and continued under the formal restrictions. 
Third, the significant social dynamics which supported the SMEs in China can 
be found from the financial support for the Taiwanese SMEs in the 1990s. The 
continuing support in China from the social institutions to the Taiwanese SMEs was 
also influenced by the Chinese formal institutional framework. The banking system in 
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China and the financial market created space for the social institution. Since the 
Chinese financial institutions and the foreign banks did not play a significant role in 
granting loans or in providing turn-over credit funding for the Taiwanese SMEs, the 
latter after they invested in China still relied heavily on financial support from the 
parent companies in Taiwan. The Taiwanese parent companies in turn relied on the 
financial sources supported by the social institutions. This continuing financial 
support from the social institutions is significant.  
The comparison of the four selected cases indicates what the significance was 
of the source of capital and demonstrates the impact of government support on the 
investment behaviour. Both the Formosa Plastic Group and the UPEC were among 
the largest enterprises to have been supported and protected by the government in the 
post-war development period. The analysis shows that the government was able to 
influence their investment behaviour by controlling their financial sources. In 
contrast, Pou Chen and Tinghsing were not constrained by the state because before 
they invested in China, in Taiwan, they were SMEs. Although the state allowed the 
type of industries represented by Pou Chen and Tinghsing to invest in China, it is 
worth noting that they both entered China (via Hong Kong) before the government 
officially permitted it. The evidence shows that the Taiwanese government had 
limited influence on SME investment behaviour because the SMEs had more freedom 
in making the best of their private capital without government constraints.  
The analysis and explanation in this section clarify why the government had 
limited control over SME investment in China and business operations across the 
strait. The restrictions of the Taiwanese government and the regulations of the 
Chinese government created the grey area which turned out to foster SME investment, 
trade and business operations across the strait. After the late 1980s, the restrictions 
and regulations had limited power to manage and control SME development cross the 
strait. The grey area also provided space for the social institutions to support and 
facilitate SME business in China. This demonstrates that the social institutions were 
able to adapt to the changing formal institutional frameworks and this reduced 
government intervention in SME business operations.  
Although the Taiwanese government set up restrictions and tried to control the 
SMEs, in the event, it clearly  was not able to do so. This goes back to the main 
argument of the dissertation. The direct or indirect support of the state to the SMEs in 
the post-war period was not as important as Wade and Amsden have argued. The 
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further development of the SMEs and their investment in China shows that after the 
late 1980s the state’s control and restrictions did not constrain SME investment 
behaviour and business operations across the strait. 
 
10-5. Historical Similarity and Continuity 
The first historical similarity is that the state policy had an important impact 
on the market environment; and the consequences of the influence on the market 
environment varied. The rise of Taiwan in Chinese economic history resulted from 
the changing policies of the Ming imperial court. Trade in Taiwan prospered under 
the sea bans of the Ming and early Qing periods. Trade in Taiwan was also open 
because there was no integrated political power to regulate it. The Qing and the 
Japanese colonial government opened the market for business; and from then on trade 
prospered across the strait and brought Taiwan back into the regional/international 
trade system. The KMT government opened the international market and induced the 
rise of the SMEs in the 1970s and the 1980s.  
However, state policies sometimes blocked the market and affected trade and 
business. For example, when the Qing imperial court prohibited Chinese migrants to 
Taiwan in the early period, trade stagnated. Moreover, in the 1950s when the KMT 
government monopolised the market and controlled the foreign exchange system, the 
private enterprises and the SMEs were constrained. After 1990 the government 
restricted the Chinese market but opened up the market in Southeast Asia. The 
consequence was that cross-strait trade prospered despite the government’s 
restrictions on the cross-strait market. The different consequences were related to the 
participants in the market, namely, the business groups and to their relationship with 
the state. Based upon the first similarity, it is possible to argue that the governments 
played significant role in opening or closing the market. As long as the market is open 
for trade, other supports or restrictions of the government were not necessarily 
effective to influence or control private business operation. 
The second historical similarity is that the state gave limited support to the 
business groups (or sometimes banned private business altogether) and therefore their 
influence on the business groups was limited. The Ming imperial court prohibited 
private sea trade, but it could not ban the pirates’ illegal sea trade. In the late Ming 
period, the imperial court even institutionalised these pirate leaders and their business 
groups. The Qing imperial court did not have clear economic policies to support or 
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prohibit trade and business in the mid- and late Qing period. Trade and business 
prospered under the control of the Taiwanese Jiao Shang. The Japanese colonial 
government had better economic policies, although they did not focus on supporting 
the development of local Taiwanese business groups. The cross-strait trade was still 
dominated by the Taiwanese businessmen and large amounts of Taiwanese 
investment occurred in Fujian Province. The policies of the KMT government in the 
development period did not directly or indirectly provide the necessary support for the 
SMEs. In the late 1980s, the government tried to help the SMEs to solve the problem 
of the rising labour cost; nevertheless, the encouragement policy to invest in 
Southeast Asia did not correspond to the best profits of the SMEs. Large amounts of 
SME investment went to China and the government had limited influence on 
investment behaviour. 
The limitations of the government policies were related to the interest of the 
government. Given their different interests, the government offered limited support to 
the development of the business groups. Hence the business groups relied little on the 
governments and this weakened the impact of the government policies on the business 
groups. It also explains why the economic policies regarding the market had different 
consequences. The market which was sometimes restricted by the government was the 
market that the business groups were interested in. Conversely, the market which the 
government sometimes opened did not suit the profits of the business groups. From 
the historical pattern, an open market and free trade policy generally benefited the 
business groups, whether or not the government did little to support their business 
transaction. Since the business groups did not rely on the support of the state, how did 
they make profits from the market they were interested in? The historical continuity 
explains the dynamics which supported and fostered their business operations. 
The historical continuity can be found from the support of the social institution 
to the business groups. The historical pattern shows that, no matter whether they were 
ill-established or well-established, the social institutions adapted to the changing 
environment and provided financial support and business connection to facilitate trade 
and business. The social institutions continuously provided sources of financial 
capital and business networks (the subcontracting system) in China for the SMEs in 
the post-war period and after 1990.  
It is worth noting that the support of the social institution had its own 
prerequisites, starting with the presence of demand and supply. The research shows 
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that as long as there is demand and supply in the market (regardless of whether the 
market is opened by the state or constrained), the social institutions can provide 
support. Another prerequisite was the attitudes of the government. Although the state 
was sometimes positive but sometimes negative towards trade and business, as long 
as the state did not entirely block the market, the social institutions were able to 
function.  
There is also a significant difference and discontinuity in history. Before the 
Japanese colonial period the social support for trade and business came from social 
institutions in China and Taiwan. However, the changing policy of the colonial 
government cut the connections. Yet, it is too general to argue that the Japanese 
colonial policy changed the connections and enhanced the development of the local 
Taiwanese society. The development of Taiwanese society for trade and business was 
gradually established in the Qing period. Jiao Shang built up the structure for business 
and society and the financial capital gradually accumulated over time. The policy of 
the colonial government to cut Chinese capital demonstrates that the social 
institutions supporting the Taiwanese local business groups were mature. Evidence 
can also be found from the structure of the SMEs and the continuing financial support 
from the social institutions when the SMEs invested in China before 1980 and after 
the 1980s. The social institutions in Taiwan, rather than those in China, continuously 
supported trade and business across the strait. 
 
10-6. Some Significant Findings from This Research  
The argument of Wade and Amsden concerning the role of the state in the rise 
and development of the Taiwanese SMEs overestimates the state’s influence on the 
SMEs and underestimates the dynamics of social institutions in providing support for 
the SMEs. 
The state’s interest in the formation of development policies is, in their 
analysis, ignored. The legislation and the structure of the KMT facilitated its control 
and allocation of resources for economic development. Its party-state capitalism 
required firm domination over both politics and economics. These influenced the 
state’s interest in the formation of the development policies which focused on the 
support to the SOEs and LEs. Evidence shows that these development policies hardly 
met the needs of the SMEs.  
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Evidence also shows that the significant influence of the state lay in the 
market environment; it was able to block or open the market by controlling the 
foreign exchange rate. The changing market environment influenced the SMEs’ 
economic activity. This part fits the framework of the neoclassical economists. 
However, the market which was opened and established by the government did not 
provide significant financial capital for the SME business operation. In other words, 
the market established by the government was not strong enough to allow the SMEs 
to develop. 
Evidence shows that the state provided only limited direct and indirect support 
to the SMEs. These policies include getting the relative price wrong, increasing 
government investment, tax exemptions, tax refunds, providing business credit, 
cheaper raw materials and intermediated goods. Nevertheless, the analysis indicates 
that the focus should not be on how much support the SMEs had from the policies; the 
question is how many of the SMEs were qualified to access this support and 
encouragement from the state. Before the SMEs were able to access to the support, 
they needed to sustain themselves in some other way while they qualified. 
North argues that the formal and the informal institutions are interlocked and 
delaminated to shape economic activity; in the absence of effective government, a 
limited number of goods and trade, the informal rules stabilise transactions. The 
market which the government established did not provide a source of capital and the 
SMEs had difficulty in accessing state support. In these circumstances, the evidence 
demonstrates that the informal financial market provided the necessary capital and 
turn-over funding for the SMEs.  
The social economists and social institutional theory extend the informal 
institutions and North argues that the informal institutions are socially constructed. 
Orru, Biggart and Hamilton maintain that the dynamics of social networks which 
were embedded in the society played a significant role in Taiwan’s economic success. 
The evidence demonstrates that the main source of capital from the informal financial 
market came from the categories of friends, relatives and private borrowings. The 
informal market is thus founded on the social institutions and the SMEs relied heavily 
on the significant financial capital from them.  
The evidence that the state had limited influence on SME investment 
behaviour after the late 1980s questions how far the SMEs relied on state support for 
their business operation. The political transformation complicated the state’s interest 
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in the formation of the cross-strait economic policy and this led to further restrictions 
and management on cross-strait trade and investment. However, when the state’s 
interests were in conflict with the SMEs’, the SMEs followed the market. 
The SME investment in China also demonstrates that the propitious market 
environment established by the KMT government could have been replaced by the 
Chinese government. This also implies that the key feature of a suitable market 
environment was its openness and some relaxation on the control of international 
trade. Evidence shows that the financial support to the SMEs’ business operations still 
came from Taiwan. The control of the source of capital facilitated SME investment 
and avoided any constraints from the state on their economic activity. 
The historical pattern identifies an open market for trade and the support of the 
social institutions was essential. The social institutions continuously supported the 
Taiwanese SMEs in China with significant financial capital. The social institutions 
could function because the government restrictions (namely, the conditions of the 
indirect model) created grey areas which encouraged the flow of financial capital. It is 
also worth noting that the dynamics of the social institutions derived from Taiwanese 
society. The differences and discontinuity of the support of the social institutions from 
Chinese society had occurred in the Japanese colonial period. The analysis of the 
historical pattern and the social institution shows that Taiwanese society was not a 
passive receiver. The social institutions, as Jones argues, adapted to the changing 
market environment to provide support for business activity.  
By tracing the history from the 16th century and tracing the development of the 
SMEs after 1990 in China, the research project has re-examined the role of the state in 
Taiwan’s post-war economic development. The arguments of Wade, Amsden, Rodric 
and other state-led development theorists cannot fully apply to the case of the SMEs. 
The theory of neoclassical economics on the market environment is, however, 
partially correct. It was not the state, but the environment established by the state that 
created unintended space for the dynamics of the social institutions to provide support 
for the development of the SMEs.  
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Appendixes 
Appendix 5-1. The Government Administrative Structure of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) 
The government structure in Taiwan was almost the same as the Nationalist 
government in Nanking. Both government structures are based upon the People’s 
Three Doctrines. The power of governance is divided into five branches, namely, 
three branches from Montesquieuan thought (The Legislative Yuan, the Executive 
Yuan and the Judicial Yuan) and two branches from Chinese tradition (the Control 
Yuan and the Examination Yuan). Figure A5-1 presents the central structure of the 
political administration of the Republic of China, Taiwan. The head of the ROC is the 
President (vice president) who is elected by the National Assembly every six years.333 
The Executive Yuan is the state chief administration; the premier is nominated by the 
president and approved by the Legislative Yuan.  
The Legislative Yuan is the highest agency of legislation and the will of the 
citizenry and is usually referred to as the Taiwanese parliament. The Judicial Yuan is 
the highest judicial agency in Taiwan; the Examination Yuan is the chief agency 
responsible for national examinations and merit systems for public servants. The 
heads of the Judicial Yuan and the Examination Yuan are nominated by the president 
and approved by the Control Yuan. The Control Yuan is the highest supervision 
agency of Taiwan. The commissioners of the Control Yuan are elected by the 
councillors of the city and provincial councils.334  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
333
 Not until 1986 were parliamentary elections restored in Taiwan. Ma, Qihua, Sanmin zhuyi zhengzhi 
xue (Taipei, 2003), pp.44-75. 
334
 Department of Statistics, Ministry of Interior, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan), Statistical Year 
Book of R.O.C., (Taipei, 1991), pp.26-33. 
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Figure A5-1. The Central Structure of the Political Administration of the 
Republic of China, Taiwan 
 
Source: Based upon the information of Directorate-General Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan R.O.C. (Taiwan), Statistical Yearbook of the R.O.C (Taipei, 1992), pp.26-27. 
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Appendix 5-2. The Members of the KMT Central Committee, 7th KMT National 
Convention 19 October 1952 
 
Administrative 
officials Military 
Party 
affairs Representatives/Legislators Intellectual Entrepreneurs Others 
蔣經國 Chiang, 
Ching Kuo 
陳誠 
Cheng 
Cheng  
穀正綱
Gu, Zheng 
Gang 楊爾瑛 Yang, Er Ying   
陶希聖 Tao, 
Xi Sheng     
吳國禎 Wu, 
Guo Zhen  
黃少谷
Huang, 
Shao Gu  
倪文亞 Ni, 
Wen Ya  王星舟 Wang Xing Zhou   
陳雪屏
Cheng, Xyue 
Ping     
袁守謙 Yuan, 
Shou Qian  
周至柔
Zhou, 
Zhi Rou  
鄭彥棻
Zheng, 
Yan Fen  陳逸雲 Chen, Yi Yun   
上官業佑
Shang Guan, 
Ye You      
張道藩 Chang, 
Dao Fan  
彭孟緝
Peng, 
Meng Qi  
唐縱 Tang, 
Zong  張子田 Zhang, Zi Tian         
張其昀 Zhang, 
Qyi Yun  
郭寄峤
Guo, Ji 
Qiao  
蔣賜福
Chiang, Ci 
Fu   梅友卓 Mei, You Zhuo         
沈昌煥 Shen, 
Chang Huan  
孫立人
Sun, Li 
Ren            
黃季陸 Huang, 
Ji Lu  
王叔銘
Wang, 
Shu 
Ming            
*黃朝琴
Huang, Chao 
Qing  
石覺
Shi, Jue            
吳化鵬 Wu, 
Hua Peng 
胡璉 Hu, 
Lian            
 
Note: 1. Many of the administrative officials also hold important positions in party affairs. Members 
who are included in the category of ‘party affairs’ are the ones who mainly worked in the KMT. 
*: This indicates the Bensheng ren administrative officials in the 1970s. 
Source: Information based upon Liu, Wei Kai, ed, Zhongguo kuomintang zhiming Lu (Taipei, 1994). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
211 
 
Appendix 8-1. The Members of the KMT Central Committee, 11th KMT 
National Convention 17 November 1976 
Administra
tive 
officials Military Party affairs 
Representatives
/Legislators Intellectual 
Entrepreneur
s Others 
嚴家淦
Yan, Jia 
Gan  
黃少谷
Huang, 
Shao Gu 
穀正綱 Gu, 
Zheng Gang  郭驥 Guo, Ji  
秦孝儀
Qing, Xiao 
Yi  
王惕吾 Wang, 
Ti Wu  
徐晴嵐 Xu, 
Qing Lan  
李煥 Li, 
Huan  
黃傑 Huang 
Je 
張寶樹 Zhang, 
Bao Shu  
陳建中 Chen, 
Jian Zhong  
楚崧秋
Chu, Song 
Qiu  
余紀忠 Yu, Ji 
Zhong  
潘鎮球 Pan, 
Zhen Qiu  
謝東閔 Xie, 
Dong Ming  
高魁元
Gao, Kui 
Yuan  
倪文亞 Ni, 
Wen Ya  
錢劍秋 Qian, 
Jian Qiu  
李鍾桂 Li, 
Zhong Gui  
林挺生 Lin, 
Ting Sheng  
易勁秋 Yi, 
Jin Qiu  
趙聚鈺
Zhao, Ju Yu  
王升 Wang 
Sheng  
馬樹禮 Ma, 
Shu Li  
毛松年 Mao, 
Song Nian 
張希文
Zhang, Xi 
Wen  
辜振甫 Gu, 
Zhen Fu  
徐鼎 Xu, 
Ding 
張其昀
Zhang, Qyi 
Yun  
黎玉璽 Li, 
Yu Xi  
鄭彥棻 Zheng, 
Yan Fen  
趙自齊 Zhao, Zi 
Qi  
陳水逢
Chen, Shui 
Fong  
王玉雲 Wang 
Yu Yun  
黎世芬 Li, 
Shi Fen  
袁守謙
Yuan, Shou 
Qian  
賴名湯 Lai, 
Ming Tan  
曹聖芬 Cao, 
Sheng Fen  
楊寶琳 Yang, 
Bao Ling  
張希哲
Zhang, Xi 
Zhe    
葉霞翟 Ye 
Xia Di  
沈之岳
Shen, Zhi 
Yue 
羅友倫
Luo, You 
Lun  
陳裕清 Chen, 
Yu Qing  
呂錦花 Lu, Jin 
Hua 
吳俊才 Wu, 
Jin Cai    
胡木蘭 Hu, 
Mu Lian 
孫運璿
Sung, Yun 
Xian  
馬紀壯 Ma, 
Ji Zhuang  
上官業佑
Shang Guan, 
Ye You 羅衡 Luo, Heng  
張宗良
Zhang, 
Zong Liang    
許素玉 Xu, 
Su Yu 
李國鼎 Li, 
Kuo Ting  
彭孟緝
Peng, Meng  
唐縱 Tang, 
Zong 
蔡鴻文 Cai, 
Hong Wen 
王唯農
Wang ,Wei 
Nong   
阿部都拉 A 
Bu Du La 
*蔣彥士
Jiang, Yan 
Shi  
劉玉章 Liu, 
Yu Zhang  
孫治平 Sun, 
Zhi Ping  
梁子衡 Liang, 
Zi Heng 
倪超 Ni, 
Chao    
胡建中 Hu, 
Jiang Zhong 
沈昌煥
Shen, 
Chang Huan  
梁永章
Liang, 
Yong 
Zhang  
宋時選 Sun, 
Shi Xuan  
張建邦 Zhang, 
Bang Jian      
柯淑寶 Ke 
Shu Bao 
俞國華 Yu, 
Kuo Hua  
胡璉 Hu, 
Lian  
司徒福 Si Tu, 
Fu       
王民 Wang 
Ming 
鄧傅楷
Deng, Fu 
Kai  
王任遠
Wang Ren 
Yuan  徐亨 Xu, Heng       
倪文炯 Ni, 
Wen Jing 
閻振興
Yan, Zheng 
Xing  
唐君鉑 Tan 
Jun Bo  
嚴孝章 Zhang, 
Xiao Yan        
李白虹 Li, 
Bai Hong 
周宏濤
Zhou, Hong 
Tao  
王多年
Wang Due 
Nian          
劉先雲 Liu, 
Shian Yun  
周書楷
Zhou, Shu 
Kai  
宋長志
Sun, Chang 
Zhi          
陸寒波 Lu 
Han Po 
楊西崑
Yang, Xi 
Kun  
鄭為元
Zheng, Wei 
Yuan          
蔣廉儒 Jiang, 
Liang Ru 
瞿紹華 Qu, 
Shao Hua  
馬安瀾 Ma, 
An Lan         
趙曉梅 Zhao, 
Xiao Mei 
*徐慶鐘
Xu, Qing 
Zhong  
汪道淵
Wang, Dao 
Yuan         
鄭玉麗
Zheng, Yu Li 
劉季洪 Liu, 
Ji Hong  
鄒堅 Zou, 
Jian         
鄒懋時 Zou, 
Mao Shi 
薛人仰
Xue, Ren 
Yang  
陳守山
Chen, Shou 
Shan          
官鏡峰 Guan, 
Jing Fong 
郭澄 Kuo, 
          
張訓舜 
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Cheng  Zhang, Xun 
Shun 
羅雲平
Luo, Yun 
Ping            
吳伯偉 Wu, 
Bo Wei 
賴順生 Lai, 
Shun Sheng            
梁尚勇
Liang, Shang 
Yong 
沈劍虹
Shen, Jian 
Hong            
蔡頲 Cai 
Ting 
唐振楚 Tan, 
Zhen Chu              
谷鳳翔 Gu, 
Fong Xiang             
林金生 Lin, 
Jin Shen              
王亞權
Wang Ya 
Qian             
何宜武 He, 
Yi Wu             
夏功權 Xia, 
Gong Qiang             
連戰 Lian, 
Zhan             
費驊 Fei, 
Hua              
*林洋港
Ling, Yang 
Gang             
張繼正
Zhang, Ji 
Zheng              
錢復 Qian, 
Fu             
施啟揚 Shi, 
Qi Yang             
柯文福 Ke, 
Wen Fu              
張豐緒 
Zhang, 
Fong Xu             
*邱創煥
Qiu, 
Chuang 
Huan             
周菊村
Zhou, Ju 
Cun              
*李元簇 Li, 
Yuan Cu             
陳履安
Chen, Lu 
An             
*李登輝 Li, 
Teng Hui             
Source: Information based upon Liu, Weikai, ed, Zhongguo kuomintang 
zhiming Lu (Taipei, 1994). 
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Appendix 8-2. The Members of the KMT Central Committee,
13th National Convention 07 December 1988 
 
Administra
tive 
officials Military Party affairs 
Representatives
/Legislators Intellectual 
Entrepreneur
s Others 
李 煥 Li, 
Huan  
郝柏村 
Hao, Bo 
Cun  
宋時選 Sun, 
Shi Auan  
高育仁 Gao, Yu 
Ren  
李鐘桂 Li, 
Zhuang Gui  
王玉雲 Wang, 
Yu Yun  
蔣孝勇 
Chiang, Xiao 
Yong  
孫運璿 Sun, 
Yun Xian  
鄭為元 
Zheng, Wie 
Yuan  
倪文亞 Ni, 
Wen Ya 
蘇南成 Su, Nan 
Cheng  
鄭心雄 
Zheng, Xin 
Xiong  
王效蘭 Wang, 
Xiao Lan  
 羅  張 Luo, 
Zhang  
宋楚瑜 
Song, Chu 
Yu 
陳守山 
Chen, Shou 
Shan  
何宜武 He, Yi 
Wu  
陳金讓 Chen, 
Jin Rang  
郭南宏 
Kuo, Nan 
Hong  
辜振甫 Gu, 
Zhen Fu  
余范英 Yu, 
Fan Ying  
*林洋港 
Lin, Yang 
Gang  
許曆農 Xu, 
Li Nong  
簡漢生 Jian, 
Han Sheng  
陳田錨 Chen, 
Tian Miao  
魏  鏞 Wei, 
yong  
萬永貴 Wan, 
Yong Gui  
王家鏵 
Wang, Jia 
Hua  
*吳伯雄 
Wu, Bo 
Xiong  
宋長志 
Sun, Chang 
Zhi  
趙自齊 Zhao, 
Zi Qi  
黃鏡峰 Huang, 
Jing Feng 
邵玉銘 
Shao, Yu 
Min  
許勝發 Xu, 
Sheng Fa  
錢  純 Qian, 
Chun 
章孝嚴 
Zhang, Xiao 
Yan  
蔣仲
苓  Jiang, 
Zhong Ling  
周宏濤 Zhou, 
Hong Tao  
張子源 Zhang, 
Zi Yuan  
夏漢民 Xia, 
Han Min  
高清願 Gao, 
Qing Yuan  
吳純義 Wu, 
Chun Yi  
*邱創煥 
Qiu, 
Chuang 
Huan  
溫哈熊 
Wen, Ha 
Xiong  郭  驥 Kuo, Ji  
柯文福 Ke, 
Wen Fu  
高銘輝 
Gao, Min 
Hui  
張平沼 Zhang, 
Ping Zhao  
易勁秋 Yi, 
Jin Qiu  
錢  複 Qian, 
Fu  
孫  震 Sun, 
Zhen  
華加志 Hua, 
Jia Zhi  
洪冬桂 Hong, 
Dong Gui  
王甲乙 
Wang, Jia 
Yi  
朱安雄 Zhu, 
An Xiong  
武士嵩 Wu, 
Shi Song  
黃尊秋 
Huang, Zun 
Qiu  
言百謙 
Yan, Bai 
Qian  
陳璽安 Chen, 
Xi An  
陳庚全 Chen, 
Geng Qian  
吳俊才 Wu, 
Jin Cai    
戴端明 Dai, 
Duan Ming  
章孝慈 
Zhang, Xaio 
Ci  
鄒  堅 Zou, 
Jian 
李治民 Li, Zhi 
Min  
周書府 Zhou, 
Su Fu  
高惠宇 
Gao, Hui 
Yu    
吳健國 Wu, 
Jian Guo  
關  中 
Guan, 
Zhong  
李志鵬 Li, 
Ji Peng    
鄭逢時 Zheng, 
Feng Shi  
林基源 Lin, 
Ji Yuan   
林登飛 Lin, 
Deng Fei  
謝東閔 Xie, 
Dong Ming  
郭汝霖 
Kuo, Ru 
Lin    
許文志 Xu, 
Wen Zhi  
阮大年 
Ruan, Da 
Nian    
郭  哲 Kuo, 
Zhe 
陳履安 
Chen, Lu 
An  
郭宗清 
Kuo, Zong 
Qing    
吳金贊 Wu, Jin 
Zan  
馬克任 Ma, 
Ke Run    
黃順德 
Huang, Shun 
De 
馬英九 Ma, 
Ying Jiu 
黃幸強 
Huang, 
Xing Qiang    
吳水雲 Wu, 
Shui Yun  
秦孝儀 
Qin, Xiao 
Yi   
周曉天 Zhou, 
Xiao Tian  
許水德 Xu, 
Shui De  
葉昌桐 Ye, 
Chang Tong    
黃鎮岳 Huang, 
Zhen Yue  
喬寶泰 
Qiao, Bao 
Tai    
陳炯松 Chen, 
Jiong Song  
蕭萬長 
Xiao, Wan 
Chang  
楊亭雲 
Yang, Ting 
Yun    
陳健治 Chen, 
Jian Zhi  
朱堅章 
Zhu, Jian 
Zhang   
段宏俊 Duan, 
Hong Jun  
施啟揚 Shi, 
Qi Yang  
鐘湖濱 
Zhong, Hu 
Bin    
潘維綱 Pan, 
Wei Gang  
梁尚勇 
Liang, 
Shang Yong    
蕭昌義 Xao, 
Chang Yi  
毛高文 
Mao, Gao 
Wen      
廖福本 Liao, Fu 
Ben  
汪彝定 
Wang, Yi 
Ding    
張豫生 
Zhang, Yu 
Sheng  
連  戰 Lian, 
Zhan  
    
黃澤青 Huang, 
Ze Qing  
楊日旭 
Yang, Ri 
Xu    
呂秀惠 Lu, 
Xiu Hui 
張建邦 
Zhang, 
Bang Jian      
張文獻 Zhang, 
Wen Xian      
於建民 Yu, 
Jian Min 
翁文維 
          
黃天才 
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Wong, Wen 
Wei  
Huang, Tian 
Cai  
李國鼎 Li, 
Kuo Ting            
蔡友士 Cai, 
You Shi 
徐立德 Xu, 
Li De            
谷家華 Gu, 
Jia Hua  
蔣彥士 
Jiang, Yan 
Shi            
張家驤 
Zhang, Jia 
Xiang 
俞國華 Yu, 
Guo Hua            
張祖治 
Zhang, Zu 
Zhi 
簡又新 
Jian, You 
Xin            
詹天性 Zhan, 
Tian Xin 
丁懋時 
Ding, Mao 
Shi            
施純仁 Shi, 
Chun Ren 
趙守博 
Zhao, Shou 
Bo            
沈  蓉 Shen, 
Rong 
王 昇 
Wang, 
Sheng            
陳桑齡 Chen, 
Sang Ling 
楚崧秋 
Chu, Song 
Qiu            
梁子衡 
Liang, Zi 
Heng 
王建煊 
Wang, Jian 
Xuan            
許智偉 Xu, 
Zhi Wei 
曾廣順 
Zeng, 
Guang Shun            
李海天 Li, 
Hai Tian 
馬鎮方 Ma, 
Zhen Fang             
張希哲 
Zhang, Xi 
Zhe 
蕭天讚 
Xiao, Tian 
Zan            
羅光端 Luo, 
Guang Rui 
張京育 
Zhang, Jing 
Yu            
沈  岳 Shen, 
Yue 
鐘榮吉 
Zhong, 
Rong Ji            
林秋山 Lin, 
Qiu Shan 
黃昆輝 
Huang, Kun 
Hui            
侯彩飛  Hou, 
Cai Fei 
林金生 Lin, 
Jin Sheng              
張豐緒 
Zhang, Feng 
Xu              
謝深山 Xie, 
Shen Shan              
餘玉賢 Yu, 
Yu Xian              
林豐正 Lin, 
Feng Zheng              
黃大洲 
Huang, Da 
Zhou              
宋心濂 Sun, 
Xin Lian              
鬱慕明 Yu, 
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Appendix 8-4. Public Opinion Concerning the Cross-strait Relations (%) 
Date Friendly (%) Unfriendly/Hostile(%) 
    06-1995 14 45 
*  06-1995  4 69.5 
**06-1995 11.9 48.3 
    07-1995 7.7 83.4 
    07-1995   18.9 38.6 
    07-1995 10 47 
    07-1995 8 53 
    07-1995 13.2 43.5 
    08-1995 8 56 
*  08-1995 2.3 73.4 
**08-1995 14 46.6 
*  09-1995 3.8 88 
**09-1995 16.6 68.8 
    01-1996 12 47 
    01-1996 18.9 31.9 
*  02-1996 3.2 74.6 
**02-1996 14.1 49.7 
    03-1996 8 53 
    03-1996 13.1 51.3 
*  03-1996 4.6 76.1 
**03-1996 14.8 53.9 
    04-1996 24.2 31 
*  04-1996 20.3 69.4 
**08-1996 36.1 46.5 
    09-1996 17 45 
*  10-1996 4.5 60 
**10-1996 18 43.3 
    01-1997 14 47 
*  02-1997 9.8 74.6 
**02-1997 27.6 50.6 
*  02-1997   3.3 73.3 
**02-1997 16 40.6 
    07-1997 17 46 
*  08-1997 10.5 82.3 
**08-1997 36.9 53 
    10-1997 16.1 39.5 
    12-1997 24 35.9 
    02-1998 21 39 
*  04-1998 16.5 63.2 
**04-1998 32.9 47.4 
*  05-1998 10.1 64.3 
**05-1998 22.9 48.7 
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    06-1998 25.4 28.2 
    07-1998 15.2 48.9 
*  07-1998 7.7 61.1 
**07-1998 22.4 42.4 
    07-1998 10.1 50.6 
*  08-1998 4.7 60.8 
**08-1998 12.9 52.7 
*  09-1998 6.8 68.3 
**09-1998 18 52.8 
    10-1998 21.2 40.5 
    10-1998 20.5 41.3 
*  10-1998 7.7 58.5 
**10-1998 16.9 48.8 
*  03-1999 8.5 63.6 
**03-1999 19.6 47.5 
    07-1999 12.7 52.9 
*  08-1999 8.4 88.5 
**08-1999 27.3 66.7 
    09-1999 10 57.8 
    11-1999 15.1 48.5 
 
Note: * the attitudes of the Chinese government towards the Taiwanese government; ** the attitudes of 
the Chinese government towards Taiwanese people. 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Investgations on Public Opinion Polls, 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/97711145462.htm. (accessed 14 September 2010). 
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Appendix 8-5. People's Expectations of Future Cross-strait Relations (%) 
 
Date 
Immediate 
independe
nce 
Remaining 
status quo 
and 
independenc
e in the 
future 
Remain 
status quo 
forever 
Remain status 
quo and 
decide in the 
future 
Remain status quo 
and unification in 
the future 
Immedi
ate 
unificati
on N/A 
01-1994 2.8 7.6 11.2 32.4 23.2 4.3 18.6 
02-1994 4.4 8 12.3 32.2 23.3 4.1 15.7 
04-1994 4 8.3 12.8 43.1 18.3 2.5 11 
07-1994 3.2 8.4 9.9 42.2 17.2 3.5 15.6 
09-1994 7.4 11.7 17 31.7 13.4 4.4 14.2 
10-1994 4.6 7.1 12.7 36.6 18.9 3.7 16.4 
02-1995 2.4 7.4 21.2 34.9 21.4 3.2 9.5 
02-1995 3.1 7.5 16.2 29.8 16.1 2.7 24.6 
06-1995 6.4 6.7 13.8 32.4 23.1 3.4 14.2 
08-1995 5.9 9.9 11.1 35.4 22.7 2.8 12.2 
09-1995 3.7 8 12.2 42.8 24.2 3.3 5.8 
11-1995 3.4 10.6 12.3 32.4 23.9 1.9 15.5 
02-1996 4.4 8.5 13.9 41.2 20.7 1.8 9.5 
03-1996 7.8 12.7 16.8 33.9 17.3 1.5 10 
08-1996 6.3 9.9 19.3 34.1 22 4.8 3.6 
10-1996 5.5 10.9 15.5 30.4 22.6 2.2 12.9 
11-1996 4.8 10.2 9.3 35.7 25.4 3.3 11.3 
02-1997 8.7 12.6 21 24.8 21.7 5 6.3 
08-1997 10 11.2 21.6 35.4 13.9 5.1 2.8 
09-1997 9 10.7 13.8 34.3 21.5 3.1 7.6 
11-1997 9.5 6.7 18.5 42 15.7 3.8 3.8 
12-1997 7.5 12.4 19.6 29.7 16.3 3.3 11.2 
04-1998 6.1 13 16 39.2 17.7 3.2 4.8 
05-1998 6.7 11.6 16 36.6 17.2 3.9 8 
05-1998 1 18.4 - 41.1 26.8 2.7 8 
06-1998 19.3 15.2 20.9 * 24.1 10.2 10.4 
07-1998 6 29.3 24.5 * 31.1 2.4 6.8 
07-1998 4.3 37.5 18.3   30.4 1.3 8.1 
07-1998 4.9 12.9 15.8 34.9 16.5 1.9 13.1 
08-1998 7.4 12.9 15.3 30.5 14.9 8 18.2 
08-1998 4.1 32.7 23.3 * 27.1 1.3 11.5 
09-1998 18.1 15.5 17.5 * 21.1 11 16.8 
09-1998 7.3 12.2 14.4 36 13.3 3.5 13.3 
10-1998 12.4 11.6 25.3 * 20.2 9.5 20.9 
10-1998 18.7 11.4 29 * 15.2 9.5 16.2 
10-1998 7 12 17.5 35.6 13.5 2.4 12 
03-1999 5.9 12.3 18.1 40.3 17.5 2.7 3.3 
03-1999 14 10 27 * 16 7 * 
03-1999 4.2 11.3 19.7 34.8 14.8 2.5 12.7 
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04-1999 17 12 32 * 17 9 * 
04-1999 20.7 14.2 21.9 * 18.5 12.3 12.5 
04-1999 16 14 29 * 15 8 * 
04-1999 18 12 23 * 20 11 * 
04-1999 17 14 28 * 16 9 * 
04-1999 4.6 13.6 19.4 30.8 14.1 2.4 15.2 
07-1999 19.4 14.8 24.7 * 14.8 10 16.3 
07-1999 5.9 21 10.2 37.9 20.5 0.9 3.6 
07-1999 19 14 29 * 19 8 * 
08-1999 14.3 13.8 12.2 39.6 16.3 2.4 1.3 
10-1999 4.6 17 15.6 36.6 14.9 1.6 8.8 
10-1999 18 12 31 * 20 5 * 
11-1999 19.8 12.8 25.8 * 14.2 8.7 18.7 
12-1999 16 16 30 * 19 7 * 
 
Note: * options not included in the interviews.   
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Investigation on Public Opinion Polls, 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771115967.htm. (accessed 14 September 2010). 
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Appendix 8-6. Public Opinion on China's Military Threats to Taiwan: Was it 
Possible that China Would Invade Taiwan by Military Force under Certain 
Circumstances? (%) 
 
Date Possible Impossible 
07-1995: before 1997  8.9 79.9 
07-1995: Taiwan declares independence 59.1 27.5 
07-1995: Taiwan refused 'one country, two system' 26.4 53.8 
08-95: foreign force intervenes cross-strait political 
conflicts 43 29 
10-1995: Taiwan declares independence 63.1 17.7 
11-1995: Taiwan declares independence 53 18.5 
01-1996 34 46 
03-1996 9 68 
 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Investigation on Public Opinion Polls, 
http:www.mac.gov.tw/public/mmo/mac/tab2.htm. (accessed 14 September 2010). 
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Appendix 8-7. Public Opinion on 'One Country, Two Systems' to Solve the 
Political Conflicts across the Strait (%) 
 
Date agree disagree 
01-1991 7.7 74.1 
08-1991 8 53 
06-1992 4.4 68.5 
01-1993 9.1 78.9 
08-1993 5.2 80.3 
09-1993 6.1 68.8 
10-1993 4.7 78.8 
10-1993 3.3 91.7 
02-1994 4.1 73.8 
03-1995 7.8 84.5 
07-1995 3.5 77.7 
03-1996 3.9 71.5 
12-1996 1.4 54 
02-1997 6.2 74.5 
05-1997 12.9 60.9 
07-1997 21 62 
 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Investigation on Public Opinion Polls, 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/fp.asp?fpage=cpxtem=67599.htm. (accessed 14 September 2010). 
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Appendix 8-8. Public Opinions on 'Special State-to-State Relations’ (%) 
 
Date agree disagree N/A 
10/Jun/99-11/Jul/99 48.9 29.6 21.6 
12/Jun/99-12/Jul/99 56.1 22 1.9 
13/Jul/99-14/Jul/99 60.9 26.6 * 
14/Jul/99-15/Jul/99 43 18 20 
14/Jul/99-15/Jul/99 73.3 17.3 9.4 
15/Jul/99-15/Jul/99 45.9 26.5 27.6 
16/Jul/99-17/Jul/99 55.2 23.4 * 
17/Jul/99-18/Jul/99 57.3 27.5 * 
19/Jul/99-20/Jul/99 78.4 15.3 6.3 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Investigation on Public Opinion Polls, 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771117977.htm. (accessed 14 September 2010). 
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Appendix 8-9. Public Opinion on Taiwanese Investment in China (%) 
 
Date Questions           
09-
1996 
Do you agree that the government 
slow down investment in China? 
Agree:5
0 
Disagre
e:26       
02-
1997 
Concerning government's 
restrictions on Taiwanese 
investment in China: 
More 
strict: 
55.3 
Remain 
status 
quo:4 
Loosen
:17.9 
Depends: 
12.9   
05-
1997 
The amount of Taiwanese 
investment in China has increased 
five times in the past five years.  
Too 
fast: 
58.1 
Modera
te:33.8 
Too 
slow: 
4.7     
05-
1997 
What do you think is the impact of 
the increasing investment scale of 
Taiwanese investment in China on 
Taiwan's economy? 
Very 
benefici
al:2.8 
Benefic
ial: 18.7 
No 
influen
ce: 
11.6 
Harmful: 
46.5 
Very 
harmf
ul: 
18.6 
05-
1997 
Should the government regulate 
Taiwanese investment in China? 
Yes: 
83.8 
No: 
13.8       
05-
1997 
Should the government's restrictions 
on investment in China be adjusted? 
Increas
e 
restricti
ons: 
47.6 
Loosen 
restricti
ons: 27 
Remai
n 
status 
quo: 
20.7     
11-
1997 
Will loosening the restrictions on 
Taiwanese investment in China 
influence Taiwan's economic 
development? Yes:61 No:29.2       
09-
1998 
Should government's restrictions on 
investment in China be adjusted? 
Increas
e 
restricti
ons: 
4.35 
Loosen 
restricti
ons: 
50.32 
Remai
n 
status 
quo: 
19.7 
(1200 
Enterprises 
that invest 
in China)   
09-
1998 
Do you agree that the government 
should prohibit investment  the 
high-tech enterprises in China? 
Very 
agree: 
35.9 
Agree: 
30.7 
Disagr
ee:17.7 
Very 
disagree: 
6.2   
10-
1998 
Do you agree that the government 
prohibit investment by the high-tech 
enterprises in China? 
Very 
agree: 
54.9 
Agree: 
22.8 
Disagr
ee: 
10.3 
Very 
disagree: 
4.4   
03-
1999 
Should government's restrictions on 
investment in China be adjusted? 
More 
strict: 
61.8 
Remain 
status 
quo:3.2 
Losen 
restrict
ions: 
14.7 
Depends: 
3.9 
Other
s: 17 
11-
1999 
Should the government adjust the 
maximum amount (50 million 
dollars) of Taiwanese investment in 
China? 
Continu
e: 63.3 
Loosen: 
23.2 
No 
opinio
n: 13.4     
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Investigation on Public Opinion Polls, 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/fp.asp?fpage=cpxtem=67610.htm. (accessed 14 September 2010). 
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Appendix 8-10. Public Opinions on 'No hurry, Be patient' Policy (%) 
 
Date Agree Disagree Adjusted 
19/Nov/97 56.4 30.8   
08/Dec/97 12.5   57.9 
20/Apr/98-22/Apr/98 19   60 
6/Aug/98-7/Aug/98 47 24.9   
08/Apr/99-10/Apr/99 22.6   56.6 
29/Jun/99-1/Jul/99 45.4 36.2   
 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Investigation on Public Opinion Polls, 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/fp.asp?fpage=cpxtem=67608.htm. (accessed 14 September 2010). 
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Appendix 8-11. Public Opinion on Direct Transport Links with China (%) 
 
Date           
02-1994 Concerning direct flights? 
Without 
conditions: 
8.6 
Under 
conditions: 
61.5 
Disagree
: 8.5 
No 
oinion
: 21.5 
02-1994 Concerning direct flights? 
Without 
conditions: 
5.3 
Under 
conditions: 
64 
Disagree
: 15.3 
No 
oinion
: 15.4 
06-1994 Concerning direct flights? 
Without 
conditions: 
6.1 
Under 
conditions: 
58.6 
Disagree
: 20.8 
No 
opinio
n: 
14.6 
07-1995 Concerning direct flights? 
Without 
conditions:7.
3 
Under 
conditions: 
62 
Disagree
:9.6 
No 
opinio
n: 
21.1 
07-1995 Concerning direct flights? Agree: 44.2 
 Disagree: 
40.5 
No 
opinion: 
15.2   
04-1996 Concerning direct flights? Agree: 452.3 
Disagree: 
26.5 
No 
opinion: 
21.1   
01-1997 
Will direct transport links 
affect national security? Yes: 48 No: 31     
15/Oct/9
7 
Will direct transport links 
affect national security? Yes:47.8 No:29.3     
02-1997 
Will direct transport links 
affect national security? Yes: 43.9 No: 43.3     
02-1997 Concerning direct flights? 
Without 
conditions: 
8.2 
Under 
conditions: 
79 
Disagree
: 1.2 
Depen
ds:6.8 
11-1997 Concerning direct flights? 
Without 
conditions: 
8.2 
Under 
conditions: 
79 
Disagree
: 4.6 
Depen
ds: 1.1 
01-1997 Concerning direct flights? Agree: 43 
Disagree: 
37     
10-1997 Concerning direct flights? Agree: 41.7 
Disagree: 
34     
04-1998 Concerning direct flights? Agree: 52 
Disagree: 
32     
06-1998 Concerning direct flights? Agree: 69.2 
Disagree: 
16.8     
06-1998 
Will direct transport links 
affect national security? Yes: 46.4 No: 40.7     
03-1999 Concerning direct flights? 
Without 
Conditions: 
10.6 
Under 
conditions: 
72.7 
Disagree
: 2.5 
No 
opinio
n: 
14,2 
11-1999 Concerning direct flights? Agree: 46 
Disagree: 
42 
No 
opinion:
12   
11-1999 Will direct transport links Yes: 68 No: 22 No   
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affect national security? opinion: 
10 
11-1999 Concerning direct flights? Agree: 45.9 
Disagree: 
34.4 
No 
opinion:
19.7   
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Investigation on Public Opinion Polls,  
 www.mac.gov.tw/public/mmo/mac/tab7.htm. (accessed 14 September 2010). 
 
 
 
Appendix 8-12 Public Opinions on Maneuvers of the PLA (%) 
Date Questions No Yes 
03-1996 Do maneuvers of the PLA panic you? 73 14.3 
02-1996 Do maneuvers influence your voting behaviour? 84.9 5.3 
02-1996 Do maneuvers influence your voting behaviour? 83.3 4.2 
04-1996 Do  maneuvers influence your investment in China? 77 23 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Investigation on Public Opinion Polls, 
www.mac.gov.tw/public/mmo/mac/tab4.htm. (accessed 14 September 2010). 
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